THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume VIII NOVEMBER, 1943 Number 1

EDITOR
Horace L. Friess

MANAGING EDITOR
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

Roland H. Bainton
Stephen S. Bayne, Jr.
Ruth F. Benedict
W. Norman Brown
Eugene H. Byrne
Louis H. Gray
Evarts B. Greene
William E. Hocking
Arthur Jeffery
Raymond C. Knox
Clarence A. Manning
Ralph Marcus
James B. Pratt
Cyril C. Richardson
David E. Roberts
Herbert W. Schneider
Ryusaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscription: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1943 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

Śrī-Yantra and Śiva-Trimūrti . . . HENRY R. ZIMMER 5

Henry R. Zimmer (1890-1943) . . . DAVID FRIEDMAN, . . . ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY, HERBERT STEINER 14

A Mathematical Analysis of Theism CHARLES HARTSHORNE 20

Thoughts on a Translation of Schelling's *Weltalter:* A Review Article . . . . . EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. 39

BOOK REVIEWS

Axel W. Persson: *The Religion of Greece in Prehistoric Times* . . . . . (RALPH MARCUS) 55

Mrs. Rhys Davids: *Wayfarer's Words,* Vol. III . . . . . (A. K. REISCHAUER) 58

Saul Lieberman: *Greek in Jewish Palestine* . . . . . (LUITPOLD WALLACH) 61

Gershom G. Scholem: *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* . . . . . (Joseph L. Blau) 67

Sister Mary Catherine O'Connor: *The Art of Dying Well* . . . . . (Mother Mary Maude, CSM) 78

Hoxie Neale Fairchild: *Religious Trends in English Poetry,* Vol. II . . . . . (Frederick A. Pottle) 80

Apostolos Makrakis: *A New Philosophy and the Philosophical Sciences,* 2 vols. . . . . (Clarence A. Manning) 84

Douglas Clyde Macintosh: *Personal Religion* . . . . . (Randolph Crump Miller) 87

John Baillie: *Invitation to Pilgrimage* . . . . . (Joseph Haroutunian) 91

Radoslav A. Tsanoff: *The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization.* . . . . . (Cecil De Boer) 93

Book Notes. 102

Ruth Smith, ed.: *The Tree of Life.* Philip Birnbaum, ed.: *The Arabic Commentary of Yefet Ben 'Ali the Karaite on the Book of Hosea.* Solomon Zeitlin: *Who Crucified Jesus?* Winthrop S. Hudson: *John Ponet (1516?-1556).* Nelson R. Burr: *Education in New Jersey, 1630-1871.* John J. Moment: *We Believe.*

Among the Periodicals. 108

ŚRĪ-YANTRA AND ŚIVA-TRIMŪRTI*

HENRY R. ZIMMER

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE ABSOLUTE into antagonistic yet co-operative pairs of opposites can, of course, be represented or symbolized in many different ways. The classic, and most primitive, symbolism is based on the functions of the two sexes, the divine essence in its life-activity being represented by a primeval pair of parents engendering all the life of the universe: Father Heaven and Mother Earth, Uranos and Gaia, Zeus and Hera (or Demeter), the Chinese Yang and Yin (representing Heaven and Earth), the universal male and female energies.

In Hinduism this pair occurs under many forms, the most general and fundamental one being that of the male god and his consort *(śakti)*; the male, passive, the female, the activating energy. In Hindu and later Buddhist tradition this symbolism of the sexes plays an enormous role. Its outward expression in images is often distinctly erotic, yet, essentially, the sexual element is used to express things spiritual. The imagery is almost exclusively allegorical, and is meant to convey highly abstract and lofty notions.

In the Tantras—representing the Śivaitic tradition of the latest great period of Hinduism—this symbolism of the polarity of the sexes is developed most elaborately. Here the Absolute, stirring out of its dormant quietude, manifests itself as Śiva with his Śakti. The Goddess bears many names: Umā or Pārvatī, daughter of the Himalaya; Durgā, slayer of demons; Kālī, The Black One, her most terrific form; Chandī, Gaurī, Vindhyavāsinī, Haimavatī, etc. She is called Tri-pura-sundarī, Fairest of the Three Worlds, that is, the fairest of the universe, the universal śakti. She is enthroned at Śiva's side, adored by his celestial hosts; at her feet her animal vehicle *(vāhana)*, the lion; at his feet, the Bull, Nandin. Or, she sits in his lap, on his right thigh, with his arm around her waist. His other hands hold the trident, his weapon and emblem as a hero-god, and the rosary, his emblem as an ascetic, the two together signifying the extrovert, active attitude combined with the introvert, contemplative aspect. This classic pattern

* We are indebted to Mr. Joseph Campbell, of Sarah Lawrence College, for the transcription from Dr. Zimmer's notes of this lecture, given at Columbia University shortly before his death.

is found repeated again and again in stone and bronze in some of the finest examples of Indian art, such as the beautiful relief from Bengal, in the British Museum (Plate I).

In Tibetan Buddhism, under the influence of Tantrism, this symbolism of the polar opposites reaches a very high state of development. Here the Absolute is represented by the primal, eternal Buddha, Ādi-Buddha or Vairocana, of whose essence all Buddhas are manifestations. From the standpoint of an Enlightened One, there is only one essence, Buddha-hood, enlightenment,—the indescribable state or essence which is realized when all the effects of Māyā-ignorance have been transcended and discarded. This is the sheer "suchness" or "thatness" beyond differentiating qualifications, beyond definable limitations or characteristics. This is *Tatha-tā,* literally, the state, *-tā* of being "so" *(tathā). Tathā* means yes, so it is, so be it, amen. It is the everyday, wholehearted affirmative. Thus the term *tatha-tā,* suchness, represents the utterly positive aspect of nirvāṇa-enlightment, which is the only real state or essence, and is not to be undone or dissolved. All other states of consciousness—the waking state with its sense-experiences, its thinking and its feeling, the dream state, and even the states of "higher" experience—are built up and dissolved again. But the state of *tathatā* is styled adamantine *(vajra),* for it is indestructible, not to be scratched, split, disintegrated or dissolved, either by physical violence or by the power of analytical or critical thinking. Such is the experience and reality of the Absolute. And the figure of him who has attained to this experience, the Buddha, becomes the anthopomorphic symbol of *tathatā.*

Among objects or utensils, the most appropriate symbol of *tathatā* is the adamantine thunderbolt, the vajra, the missile in olden times of Father Heaven *(Dyaus-pitar),* and, in later days, of Indra, King of the Gods. The thunderbolt is the characteristic symbol of that school of Buddhist doctrine which styles itself *vajra-yāna,* "vehicle of the irresistible thunderbolt," the "path toward the adamantine reality of transcendent truth." It figures as the lama's magic wand for the exorcism of evil forces, or as the handle of the bell used to mark time in the recital of sacred texts. It is the principal attribute of the Supreme Personalization of the Suchness of Reality, an allegorical Buddha called Vajra-dhara, "he who holds or wields *(dhara)* the ada-

mantine substance or weapon," or Vajra-sattva, "He whose essence or being *(sattva)* is this adamantine substance."

This Vajradhara-Vajrasattva, seated on a lotus-throne, embodying the essence of all existence, symbolizes the Absolute in its aspect of procreative energy, engendering the phenomenal realm of the universe. In Lamaistic symbolism it is frequently represented as the union of the primeval couple, Vajradhara and his Śakti in close embrace (a Buddhist counterpart of Śiva and his Śakti). They are shown seated on a lotus-throne in a commanding attitude of adamantine repose, in a supreme concentration and absorption, the two figures merging into one another. Both wear the jeweled attire and tiaras of crowned Bodhisattvas, supreme rulers of the enlightening essence. Vajradhara holds the bell and the vajra. The essence of the Absolute, in its twofold aspects of generating energy *(Māyā)* and transcendental calm, could scarcely be conveyed in a more majestic, or more intimate, way, denoting that the two aspects, Saṁsāra and Nirvāṇa, are essentially one and the same. These Śiva-Śakti figures, transformed into a Buddhist symbol by the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Tibet, are called *Yab-Yum* in Tibetan. The gilt-bronze statuette in the India Museum, London, shown in the illustration, dates from the eighteenth century (Plate II).

But these seated couples are definitely static in their statement. A more dynamic symbol, characteristically Indian in its rendition of growing or expanding form, is the *Śrī-Yantra,* the "auspicious yantra," or the "yantra above yantras." First, however, what is the meaning of the word *yantra?* By means of the ending *-tra* substantives are formed which denote an instrument or tool. Thus, *khan, khani* means to dig, and *khanitra* is an instrument for digging the soil, a primitive stick for drawing a furrow, or a spade for digging holes. *Man* (related to "mental") means to think, to have in mind, and *man-tra* is a holy formula, or magic spell, for bringing to mind, or evoking the vision and inner presence of a divinity. A mantra is an instrument for evoking or producing something in our minds. Once a formula is pronounced—say, "democracy" or "charity"—something is produced, crystallized in the mind. *Mantra-śakti* denotes the magic power of words when concatenated to a formula, a slogan, an intellectual or emotional leitmotiv. And *yantra* is an instrument to make *yam.*

What, then, is the meaning of *yam?* "To curb, to subdue, to rule,

to control," that is, to gain control over the energy inherent in some element or being. Yantra accordingly denotes any kind of machine—a dam to collect water for irrigation, or a ballistic contraption to throw stones against a fortress—any mechanism built to yield energy for some definite purpose of man's will. In Hindu devotional tradition yantra is the general term for instruments of worship, namely, idols, pictures, or geometrical diagrams. A yantra may serve as (1) a representation of some personification or aspect of the divine, (2) a model for the worship of a divinity by inner meditation, face to face in one's heart, when the outer elements of worship have been discarded by the initiate, (3) a kind of chart or program for the gradual evolution of a vision and identification of the Self with its contents, namely, with the divinity in its gradual manifestation and transformations. In this case the yantra contains dynamic elements. It is, thus, a pattern to guide the production of inner visualizations, meditations, and experiences. On the one hand, these reflect the reality of the divine essence, and the process of its production of the universe. But, on the other hand, the cosmic process and the stratifications and gradations of evolution are reflected or copied in the structure of the human organism, body and psyche, so that these blueprints for the yoga-work of the devotee-initiate have a psychological as well as a cosmic meaning.

Thus, yantra is an instrument for curbing the psychic forces by concentrating them on the pattern offered, and in such a way that one's power of visualization will reproduce this very pattern. The pattern may indicate a static vision of a divinity to be worshiped, a superhuman power to be contacted, or it may develop a series of visualizations which grow and unfold from each other, forming the links or steps of a process. The latter is the richer, more interesting type, and requires a more complex effort of the initiate. It is a process which works in two directions: first, forward as a course of evolution; then backward, as a process of involution, undoing the visions previously unfolded and successively built up. And this twofold process of evolution and involution represents the series of aspects or stages exhibited by the divine essence, the Absolute, in its manifestation of the universe, accomplished through the activity of Māyā-śakti.

By the visualizing power of the devotee, the process of creation and dissolution is followed in two ways: on the one hand, as extending

(Courtesy of the British Museum)

PLATE I

ŚIVA-ŚAKTI
(Bengal)

(Courtesy of the India Museum, London)

PLATE II

YAB-YUM
(Tibet)

(After Sir John Woodroffe)

PLATE III

ŚRĪ-YANTRA

(After Van Oest)

PLATE IV

ŚIVA-TRIMŪRTI
(Elephanta)

through time and space; on the other, as *beyond* the categories of time and space, as a simultaneous presence of co-existing, antagonistic stages or aspects of the one and only essence. The dynamic diagrams, therefore, suggest, on the one hand, a process of evolution and exfoliating differentiation, proceding from the center to the circumference, and including an element of duration, time and space; but on the other hand, they suggest a hierarchy of aspects or transformations of the Absolute as produced on the phenomenal plane of Māyā-śakti —a gradation of manifestations with the highest value situated at the center. This kind of chart is, thus, a pictorial symbol of ontology, or a metaphysic of the Absolute, and, at the same time, a descriptive symbol of the structure of man's soul and body, itself a manifestation of the Absolute. For the Highest Self *(Brahman-ātman)* forms the core of man's being and is to be experienced through the practice of yoga.

The contents, then, of the yantra-diagram, grouped in concentric spheres around a center, represent those stages of consciousness which lead from the everyday state of naïve ignorance *(avidyā),* through the stages of yoga-experience to the realization of supra-consciousness —the experience of the Self. That is the general meaning of these diagram yantras.

The elements of the Śrī-Yantra are similar to those of the *maṇḍala,* consisting of a square frame of straight lines broken in a regular pattern, surrounding a series of concentric circles and circles of lotus petals representing the outer rim of a lotus corolla—the lotus pedestal on which the Divine itself is enthroned. The square framework is called, in the Tantric tradition, *śiśirita,* "shivered," that is, trembling, as if under the impact of frost. This expression refers only to the appearance, and not to the symbolic meaning. The figure actually represents a square sanctuary, with four doors opening out to the four quarters, and with a landing before each entrance and a low flight of steps leading up to the raised floor of the sanctuary. The character of this "shivered" line as denoting the four walls of a temple is particularly obvious in the Tibetan maṇḍala paintings. This sanctuary is the seat *(pītha)* of the divinity, and should be thought of as the center of the heart of the devotee, the seat of his own particular *Iṣṭa-devatā* (the deity, *devatā* to whom he makes oblation, *(iṣṭa),* the divine nucleus of his own existence—his eternal, higher Self (Plate III).

In the maṇḍala painting, the lotus-throne is generally occupied by an anthropomorphic figure—a Buddha, Bodhisattva, or saint, but in the Śrī-Yantra the space is filled by a group of interlacing triangles, representing by means of linear symbolism the same primal pair of generating energies. There are nine triangles in the figure, interpenetrating each other, five pointing downward, and four upward. The downward pointing triangle is the female symbol, the *yoni,* and is called *śakti*;[1] the upward pointing triangle is the male symbol, the *lingam,* and is called *vahni,* fire. *Vahni* is a synonym for *tejas,* fiery energy, solar heat, kingly splendor, the threatening fervor of the ascetic, the body heat of the warm-blooded organism, the life-force itself condensed in the male seed. Thus the vahni-triangles denote the male essence of Śiva, and the śakti-triangles, the female essence of his consort, Śakti.

Thus these nine triangles are the primitive revelation of the Absolute, as it differentiates into polarities. But the Real Thing, the Absolute itself, is not represented. It cannot be represented, for it is beyond form and space. But it can be visualized by the devotee who concentrates upon this diagram as a vanishing dot or point, as a "drop" *(bindu)* amidst the interplay of all the triangles. It is the power-point, the invisible, elusive center from which the whole picture expands. The four vahni-triangles form pairs with four of the śakti-triangles. The remaining, innermost śakti-triangle forms a pair with the invisible bindu. This innermost triangle represents the primal Śakti, creative, divine energy in union with the transcendental Śiva, or pure, quiescent Brahman-principal, the Bindu. The other four pairs of interpenetrating triangles represent the creative activity of the male-female polarity of cosmic energy on successive stages of differentiation or evolution. Thus, this symbolic diagram, like the Śiva-Śakti figures, represents Life, universal and individual, as the incessant interaction of co-operating opposites producing everything by an unending dynamism. It is the archetypal Hieros Gamos, the Holy Mar-

1. Likewise, the letter D, Delta, a triangle, though upright, according to Greek lexicographers denotes the female sex, "Delta. eidolon gynaikeion." Furthermore, the European gypsies, in their symbol language denote the fair sex by triangles, a usage brought from their ancient homeland, India. Among the marks which they stealthily leave on fence or doorpost to apprise their colleagues of what to expect from the inmates of the house, they use one or more triangles to indicate the number of females within.

riage. The five śakti-triangles expanding from above, and the four vahni-triangles emerging from below, signify the continuous creative process of life. Like an uninterrupted series of lightning flashes they delve into each other and mirror the eternal procreative act—a dynamism exhibited in a static pattern of geometrical repose,—the phenomenal mirage of life, the universe and man's consciousness alike, represented by an abstract diagram.

And this same polarity of male and female principles has found expression in one of the most magnificent documents of Hindu symbolic art, the great Śiva-Trimūrti of Elephanta, belonging to the classic period of the eighth century A.D. (Plate IV). It is not the central image of the temple, the main object of worship being a stone lingam in a quadrangular rock-cut shrine in the center of the cave. The Śiva-Trimūrti is only one of a number of decorative reliefs in the huge, subterranean hall which surrounds the central shrine.

Here the supreme, divine essence, represented by the middle head, unfolds into the primitive pair of antagonistic principles, Śiva, the Great God (Mahādeva), and his Śakti, the Goddess. The center of the transcendental, divine essence, the Bindu, is represented by the middle head of the three-faced image—majestic and sublime. To the right of the central head, growing out of it, as it were, is a male profile, with virility, will-power, and defiance in its arching contours—haughtiness, valor, and temper flashing around the chin, the forehead, and the root of the nose—manly consciousness shown by the twirled mustache. To the left of the central mask is the profile of the female principle—blossom and fruit, swelling with the promise of all sweetness—gentle charm, ineffable attractiveness, the seductive power of nature. In this alluring mask of womanhood are all the delights of the senses; it is *das Ewige Weibliche* (that untranslatable term for which Gérard de Nerval, who first translated *Faust* into French, coined the delightful French equivalent, *le charme éternel*).

But the middle head is self-inclosed in a sublime, dreamy aloofness. By its silent impassivity it silences the two gestures to right and to left, ignoring completely the display of their antagonistic features. Perpetually these two differentiated profiles emerge and evolve from the middle head. They are relief profiles, starting forth from the solid mass of the central head, which is fully sculptured in the round. But this central head contains and fuses in itself the characteristic features

of the two of them: power and sweetness, aggressive vigor and expectant receptivity. In the central head these qualities are dissolved and transformed into a higher essence—ambiguous, ambivalent, comprehensive, enigmatic. This magnificent head, self-absorbed, in lofty and stony silence, ignores the growth of the two antagonistic principles expanding from it. Full of the transcendental quietude of the Absolute, it calmly annihilates, and negates that which comes into existence at the two sides: that archetypal, primitive polarity which ever produces the Māyā of the universe.

Though this center, this Bindu, as represented by the middle head, continually exfoliates into the antagonism of these creative energies, it remains as if unaware of the existence of this polarity. It ignores the life-process of the universe and of the individual, which is reflected in man's individual consciousness. Or, at least, it remains in sovereign indifference, unaffected by the tension represented by the two other heads. So does the inner Self of man, the Ātman, remain unconcerned with the sufferings and delights, the organic and psychic processes which take place in the sheaths that enshroud the adamantine kernel of the divine essence. In the august presence of this central head, the two expressive relief profiles become insubstantial, cloud-like, melting away before its stolid silence; for this enigmatic mask, insisting on nothing whatsoever, contains, blended in transcendental harmony, the opposites which they exhibit. It bears the face of Eternity, out of which time and the life-process are continually flowing—or *apparently* flowing; for, from the viewpoint of the enlightened one, fundamentally there is nothing flowing. This spell of Māyā, this drama on the stage of time and space—personal or collective, historical or cosmological—is utterly unreal. The two producers of this cosmic revue, the male and female forces of the cosmic process who act as stage managers of the universe, though accepted as real by the naïve consciousness *(avidyā)*, are wholly disregarded by the very essence from which they proceed. They are, and they are not. Like vapor they come to pass, they flow, and vanish away. That is the true nature of the phenomenal character of the process of life, Māyā, as it is experienced by individual, limited, perishable consciousness—by us, awake or asleep, remembering or forgetting, acting or suffering, laying our hands on things, yet ourselves slipping out of the grasp of our own hands.

The two profiles are happening; the universe is happening; the in-

dividual is happening. But do they really happen at all—fundamentally? The central mask is meant to express the truth of the Eternal in which nothing happens, nothing comes to pass, changes, emerges, or dissolves again. The divine essence, the solely real, the Absolute in itself, our own innermost Higher Self, abides in itself, steeped in in its own sublime void, omniscient and omnipotent, containing all and everything. This is the portrait of Ātman-Brahman. And this is the paradox of Māyā: our personalities and the universe are as real as, but not more real than, these phenomenal apparitions of the male and female profile, emerging from the center, but ignored by it. Both aspects, Brahman and Māyā, coexist. Māyā is the continuous self-manifestation and self-disguise of Brahman—its self-revelation and its multi-colored, concealing veil. Hence, the dignity of all perishable things, on all levels. That is why their sum total is worshiped as the Highest Goddess, mother and life-energy of all gods and creatures, under the formula, Māyā-Śakti-Devī.

HENRY R. ZIMMER*

(1890-1943)

DR. ZIMMER was born in Greifswald, Germany, and was the son of Heinrich F. Zimmer, the famous philologist, later Professor of Celtic Philology at the University of Berlin. Professor Zimmer was also a Sanskrit scholar, his *Altindisches Leben* (1879), remaining to this day a monument in the field of Indology. From his father the young Zimmer imbibed the great scholarly traditions characteristic of German learning in former times. He pursued his studies at the Universities of Greifswald, Munich, and Berlin, receiving his Ph.D. *magna cum laude* from Berlin in the field of Sanskrit philology and comparative linguistics, working under such famous scholars as Kuhn, Lüders, Streitberg, and Schulze. He also studied Chinese with the Dutch sinologist, J. J. M. de Groot, who awakened his interest in Mahāyāna Buddhism. In 1920 he became a lecturer at the University of Greifswald, and later at the University of Heidelberg. There he met and married Christiane von Hofmannsthal, daughter of the Austrian poet, Hugo von Hofmannsthal. In 1938 he was dismissed from the University because of his anti-Nazi attitude. After lecturing at Balliol College, Oxford, for over a year, he came to America in 1940, and for the past two years has been Visiting Lecturer in Philosophy at Columbia University.

Dr. Zimmer's contributions to the field of Indology can best be understood in their background of the development of Indic studies in Germany for a century and a half. The overwhelming abundance and diversity of Indian Culture came as a new revelation to the poets, philosophers, and philologists of the early nineteenth century. The lyrical and mystical attitude of the great Romanticists made it easy for them to integrate Indian ideas into their own world of ideas, although they were led more by intuition than by sound knowledge. I need only mention, besides Bopp's outstanding linguistic achievements, the work of Goethe, the Schlegels, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and many others. In spite of some wrong notions held by these early enthusiasts, they deserve great merit for

* Excerpts from a memorial read at the April meeting of the New York Oriental Club.

treating the East, not as a kind of interesting curiosity shop, but as a mighty factor in the spiritual development of human civilization. In the later years of the nineteenth century, Indic research became increasingly specialized, under such scholars as Max Müller and the other great philologists, concerning itself with forging the implements and collecting the building materials for a science of Indology yet to come. Their work was tremendous and fruitful, but frequently detached from the general problems of human life, and therefore, Indian ideas and art forms, in contradistinction to the classical, never became integrated into Western culture. It remained for a younger group of scholars, in the twentieth century, to take up the task and carry it on toward a richer conclusion.

In this group were three outstanding men, Otto Strauss, Stanislas Schayer, and Henry R. Zimmer, united by bonds of friendship and mutual admiration—all three representative of new trends in Indic research, and all three victims of Nazi barbarism. For many years Otto Strauss lectured on Sanskrit and Indian philosophy at the Universities of Kiel and Breslau. Like his famous teacher, Paul Deussen, Strauss became a specialist in Vedānta philosophy. He strove to free Indian philosophy from the imaginative fantasies of Western dilettante admirers, as well as from the wrong interpretations of many Western scholars. To him, Vedānta philosophy was a repository of living truth, still able to make important contributions to the development of Western thought. Being of Jewish origin, Strauss fled from Nazi persecution, and died in Holland, an exile, in 1940. Stanislas Schayer, eminent Polish Indologist, met his premature end at the age of forty-five only last year, also a Nazi victim. This Polish scholar, well-versed in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese, devoted himself to Buddhist research, especially translations and expositions of the subtle *Mādhyamika* and *Vijñānavāda* philosophies.

In this group, however, Dr. Zimmer stood alone, forming a class by himself, not only for the wide range of subjects he was proficient in, but also for his unique genius of interpretation. Reverting, to a certain extent, to the attitude of the Schlegels, Zimmer strove to understand both Eastern and Western ideas from universal conceptions lying at the root of spiritual and psychological development everywhere. His friendship with Dr. Carl G. Jung, of Zurich, was a tremendous aid in this endeavor. These two creative personalities, drawn

together by their like-mindedness, were able to pool their vast intellectual resources in a unique venture of collaboration, the Psychology Seminar in Zurich, where the ancient symbolism of the East met the new science of the West in fruitful union.

Perhaps his greatest contribution, made possible by a knowledge of pauranic and tantric literature equaled by few scholars, was his new and original interpretation of the Indian mythological world of ideas which led him directly to the heart of Indian life. In opposition to certain rational trends of the nineteenth century, which discarded the myth as a means of knowledge, Zimmer showed the eternal power of the ancient myths to give new meaning to the development of Indian culture. They form, as it were, the "collective unconscious" of the Indian psyche, transcending individuality and intellect, but time and again crystalizing into new ideas and systems, and eternally expressive of the Indian soul.

Zimmer was an overwhelming personality, full of energy and an immense zest for life. As the old Hindu saying goes, *Dūrastho'pi samīpastho yo vai manasi vartate*—"Even if far away, he is present who lives in our hearts."

DAVID FRIEDMAN

I feel the loss of Dr. Henry R. Zimmer very deeply, not merely as that of a personal friend, or only as a Sanskritist, but because among Indologists he was one of the comparatively few whose interests are not merely philological or even literary, but philosophical and vital. In his own words, he sought "to use linguistics as a tool to interpret the great cultural contributions of India to the history of religion, philosophy, medicine, and art." Zimmer was notably qualified to interpret the Indian tradition, because he understood that the universality of the myth transcends the singular facts of history, as algebra transcends arithmetic. From this point of view, it is significant that he paid so much attention to the Purāṇas, the comparatively late recensions of the myths which are too often neglected and disparaged by modern scholars. His last published article, "The Hindu View of World History According to the Purāṇas,"[1] displayed his powers of penetration in this field. Zimmer had the gift of making the Western

1. *The Review of Religion*, VI (March, 1942).

reader feel and respond to the essential content of the Oriental legends, which must be read not merely as literature but as metaphysics, if we are not to miss their pertinence.

Of the older scholars, Zimmer's work reminds us most of that of Leopold von Schroeder, and the work of both makes it evident that, for any serious interpretation of Indian mythology, a knowledge of the mythologies of other races is indispensible. I think he would have agreed that there is ultimately only one mythology, of which the various traditions are only the different dialects. As the son of a professor of Celtic philology, Zimmer must have been familiar with the many parallels between Irish and other European folk mythologies and the mythology of India. The study of these equivalences is of the utmost value, not merely from the historical point of view, but with a view to understanding; for singulars are incomprehensible as such, but become more and more intelligible the more we are able to recognize them as special cases of universal motifs. When, for example, we study the recurrent motif of the "active door" in Indian, Greek, Hebrew, Irish, North and South American Indian, and Eskimo contexts, and realize that a perilous passage of this type normally separates this world from the other-world, and what are the qualities of speed and lightness (i.e., intellectuality and immateriality) which the hero must possess to pass through it; or discover that the myth of the "fallen feather" is world-wide, then we are already on the way to discount the reference of such motifs to the fancy of individual "poets," and are ready to recognize the logic and consistency of the communicated meanings. Then we begin to realize that what we call figures of speech are, originally, figures of *thought,* and that if we do not understand them the fault is our own. Zimmer's work is stimulating, precisely because he is always alive to the significance of his material; it is never for him a matter of mere curiosity or "pure" scholarship, but a source of wisdom as pertinent now as it was in the "mythopoetic" past.

Besides a great number of important articles in *ZDMG, JISOA, Corona, Eranos-Jahrbuch,* and other learned journals, Dr. Zimmer had published ten books, among them the following: *Kunstform und Yoga im indischen Kultbild* (1926), in which he shows that the patterns of Hindu images and the ground-plans of temples are related to those of the *yantras* of yoga meditation practice, and that these

forms are determined not by aesthetic considerations, but with reference to use in ritual and to the psychic activity of the user, as, indeed, is explicitly enunciated in the *Śukranītisāra; Anbetung Mir* (1929), a translation of the Vedantic poem, *Aṣṭavakragītā; Ewiges Indien: Leitmotive indischen Daseins* (1930), dealing with the basic concepts of Indian philosophy; *Indische Sphären* (1935), a study of Indian mythology, political theory, and Yoga; and *Maya, der indische Mythos* (1936), a survey of Indian mythology, with translations from the Purāṇas. In all these works, Zimmer is concerned with the inner life of India, as expressed in art, in the social norm, in ascetic practice and mystical insights, and in exoteric ritual.

As Professor F. W. Thomas has said of him, "He has been seeking with marked imaginative insight, and to a certain extent with reference to modern developments in psychology, to appreciate from the inside the dominant conceptions and tendencies actively present in the Indian attitude to life.... His work, marked by insight and sympathy, is also eloquent and attractive in its literary form." And the Warden of Wadham College, Oxford, wrote of him, "He has not only the real scholar's approach to a subject, but a gift, rare even in good scholars, of really illuminating everything that he touches and making subjects that seemed of little interest extremely vivid and vital.... I usually feel some diffidence in using the word 'genius' of any man of learning, but in Dr. Zimmer's case I feel that it is the only word that meets the case." There can, indeed, be no doubt that Dr. Zimmer's work has contributed much to the new life that Sanskrit studies have shown in recent years, and to the wider interest in Indian theology and aesthetic theory which is felt nowadays far beyond the limits of a specialized Indology. I am, personally, greatly indebted to Dr. Zimmer for his understanding review of my *Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Government,* in the March 1948 issue of this *Review.*

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

Zimmer bore the stamp of genius; his was an unusual personality, as unusual in the world of European scholarship as in this country which he embraced so eagerly. He stands among those who, in the last hundred and fifty years, have helped the spirits of East and West

to mingle and interpenetrate. He was attracted early and forever by myth—myth "as the form in which the flow of man's secret and of his fate has become crystal darkly shining,"—by myth and its expression in religion, psychology, philosophy, and art. He plunged into the churning sea of the Hindu, and then the Celtic, legends and myths. Hunter-like he penetrated this exuberant jungle growth. He explored the sources of symbols.

He was akin to the Germans of the Romantic period. His very wealth of expression reminded one of them. On meeting him, one was struck first by the richness of his nature. With him idea perpetually turned into metaphor, metaphor into idea. His talk was a precipitous torrent, a flash and sparkle of waves breaking in the light. The longer one knew him the more one felt his spell.

So, too, with his books. They speak of India, a world he never saw, yet deeply visioned. It lay before him, ancient and amoral. With reverence, and caressingly, he rendered Indian legends. He "turned their leaves to transcribe their phantasmagoria of divine forces and of the destinies of worlds into our language." The world of myth was, he knew, his element, bearing him marvellously upon the stream of timeless happening—a swimmer who lifts his arm from the water now and then, in greeting toward the light.

We also owe it to Zimmer that so much of importance among the papers of Hugo von Hofmannsthal has been published since the poet's death. In his swift, bold way, he saw to it that they be brought to light. Fragments and notes that lay before him, hard to decipher, dispersed and elusive, grouped themselves under his divining glance, as the scattered ruins of India's ancient civilizations had ordered themselves at his bidding.

He was a strong and masculine man, with the childlike quality of the strong, a man of generous stride, responsive and unconcerned, free from petty thoughts. He spoke of life as "a homeward journey to one's self." All too suddenly he has reached his goal.

HERBERT STEINER

A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF THEISM

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago

MATHEMATICS, pure logical form, is almost as important in knowledge as observation. One reason for this is particularly significant for philosophy. The function of observation is not merely to decide for or against some hypothesis, but ultimately to decide among possible hypotheses. We do not merely test explanations one at a time against the facts; we bring to the facts a system of possible explanations to be evaluated against each other. The cogency of the procedure obviously depends, in part, upon whether or not the possibilities for explanation have been exhausted. Now, to be sure of having surveyed all the possibilities, one must arrange them in a formal way, by means of a mathematical diagram, algebraic or geometrical. When Kepler saw that the orbits of the planets were not circular, he had available the theory of conic sections—largely worked out long before by other mathematicians—which systematically displayed all the forms of simple curves of the class to which circles belong. When we argue about a philosophical problem, we are little in the habit of looking for a similarly rigorous system of possibilities. This was excusable when mathematics was "the science of quantity," but not now, when it is recognized as in some sense the science of logical structure in general.

In philosophy we customarily employ loose, non-formal—and hence, for all we know, inexhaustive—divisions of doctrines, or else the trivial formal division of positive and negative—as, idealism and non-idealism, realism and non-realism—where the negative case may conceal distinctions quite as relevant as that between it and the positive case. One then forces oneself to believe the "best" theory one happens to hit upon, or finds in the history of philosophy, with no guarantee that the really best, or true, theory has even been considered. And since errors may deviate from the truth in diverse directions to a roughly equal extent, it may be that of the theories surveyed there are several best ones which, though differing sharply from one another, are yet equally good (or bad)—so that only prejudice or taste can produce a decision among them. In view of the stubbornness of philosophical argument, who can fail to suspect that this has fre-

quently occurred? Only if all possibilities are commanded can it be sure that the truth has had a chance to show its superiority over error. The truth, as Spinoza said, is its own commender; but where truth has not even entered the lists, it is not very rewarding to listen to the self-praise and quarrels of competing errors.

The purpose of this article is to provide for one crucial philosophical problem an equivalent of the theory of conic sections in astronomy. Such a "mathematics of the theistic possibilities" is not dependent for its value upon whether or not any form of theism is true, or—as some prefer to say—meaningful. For the time to consider that question is after we know, in some formally exact way, what the possibilities are, even if they are only possible ways of falling into unmeaning. The blanket assertion in advance that none of the conceptions is capable of experiential verification begs the question. Indeed, as can be shown, the very meaning of "experiential" shifts according as one supposes the existence or non-existence of a being corresponding to the diverse conceptions.[1]

The various forms of theism differ from each other mainly in their attitude toward two questions: Is God *independent and creative* of the universe of entities other than himself, or is he this universe itself?; and, Is God a *perfect* being? Now, each of these questions has a formal structure by which it and its possible answers can be made more precise. In combination, the two approaches yield nine formally possible, exactly defined versions of "supreme being" (additional to any usual idea of "finite" or "imperfect" God). Most of these versions are missing from the classical discussions, and the classical arguments for God, *as well as the counter arguments,* can be shown to depend for their apparent cogency upon restricting attention to some only of the nine cases.[2] Also, there is reason to think that the neglected cases include one which, more than any other, is supported by religious insight. Thus the analysis serves to rectify not only formal errors in the interrelating of concepts but a material error in the interpretation of religion. This error concerning religion has recently been widely recognized as such by philosophers and theologians.

When the question of "pantheism" is raised, one is thinking primarily of divine power and scope, of cause versus effect, and inclu-

1. See my *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (Chicago, 1941), Ch. II.
2. *Ibid.*, Chs. II, VIII, IX.

sion versus exclusion. For orthodox theism, God is the universal cause or source; the universe his effect or outcome. The universe is "outside" the divine activity. For pantheism God is the universe itself, and there is no ultimate cause distinct from the cosmic totality. The universe is within the divine activity. But what is the exact meaning of "cause" in theology? Apparently, at least this: something whose existence is requisite for, implied by, the existence of its "effect"—in this case, all reality other than God. But there is more difficulty with the converse relation. If the effect requires the cause, does the cause require the effect? The main theological tradition denies this of God. It holds that he is independent of the world, could exist without it, and is in no way qualified by its existence, though the world is qualified by its utter dependence upon God. This makes God different in principle from what is ordinarily meant by a cause. From a cause one expects to derive consequences, make predictions, but from God, it seems, nothing follows. He has "made" the world, but if he had not done so he would yet have been exactly what he is. Thus his effects do not seem in any sense to "follow from" their cause.

Modern thought suggests a solution. In current science, a cause is conceived as related to its effect, not by necessity but by probability, which means that the existence of the cause involves that there shall be *some one of a class* of more or less likely outcomes. The cause necessitates the occurrence of *some* effect or other with a specified range of variability. In physics, this relation is even convertible. the effect necessitating, not any uniquely specifiable cause, but only a class of causes as variously probable. However, recent philosophy has marshaled evidence for the view that time is asymmetrical in its logical structure, so that, while the "earlier" never entails the "later" in its individual details, the later does strictly entail the earlier. A man's childhood is essential to his manhood, but not his manhood to his childhood. Not every child even becomes a man at all, but every man has been a child. History, biology, and psychoanalysis support the view that the present involves the past at least *more* completely than it involves the future. And an attractive philosophy of time holds that this "asymmetrical involvement" inheres in the very meaning of earlier and later, and that the past is involved absolutely (the past is "immortal"—Whitehead, Bergson), while the future involvement requires only *some* member or other of a given class. If this be the

cause-effect relation, then there can be a formal analogy between divine and other causation. God's existence would make it inevitable that there be a *world,* but only possible (not perhaps probable) that there be just *this* sort of world. He would be independent of any particular world, but not of world-as-such. The supreme cause would be that which, being required by all other things, itself requires only that the class "possible worlds" has some actual member.

The correctness of all this is not assumed in what follows, but only the possibility of its correctness. We are seeking the views that cannot be ruled out offhand as impossible in order, among the not obviously impossible views, to find the true one.

The common supposition that pantheism and theism are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive ways of conceiving the causal relations of God and world forgets that there are two senses in which God might be "independent cause" of the world. "*C* is the independent cause of *W*" implies only that, *as cause, C* is independent. It means that *C* in some aspect of itself is, or has, *something* independent and causative of *W;* it does not necessarily mean that *C* is or has *nothing else* besides, in being or having which it, in turn, perhaps depends upon *W*. A man may be independent of his friends—and support them—financially, but be heavily dependent upon them emotionally. True, by "God is independent" we might choose to mean he is merely that, so that the something independent in God would be God in all aspects or in his entirety. But then we should be assuming, not one of two, but one of three formally possible positions: God is, in *all* his being, independent; he is, in *some* aspect of his being, independent; he is, in *no* aspect, independent. Is it really self-evident that to exert independent power one must, besides possessing something independent, avoid possessing anything dependent? If, indeed, God is wholly "simple," without diversity of aspects, then his independent aspect must be all there is. But such simplicity is only the question at issue in another form (see below). Similarly, if God has no "accidents" distinct from his "essence," then either he is wholly dependent or wholly independent. But we need not here refute the alleged proofs that God cannot have accidents. We are at the stage of formulating the doctrines among which such demonstrations have to decide.

The three doctrines of which pantheism (if sharply defined) and

orthodox theism are but two may be symbolized as *C*, *CW*, and *W*. *C* (in isolation) is God as independent, not only in essence but utterly, with no dependent accidents, while all things else depend upon him. *W* (in isolation) is God as identical with the totality of things, this totality containing no aspect or factor independent of the rest. *CW* is God as containing *both* an all-independent all-causative factor, and the totality of the latter's effects. In *CW*, God *as C* conforms to classical theism, *as W*, to classical pantheism—except for the negative absolutism whereby each doctrine adds to its own distinctive content the denial of that of the other. "God is truly independent and truly dependent" is no contradiction, unless by *truly* one means in all that he is, rather than in something that he is. There is reason for not initially meaning this. To impute to God a distinctive excellence, lacking to all ordinary things, it is enough to say he is, in some aspect, independent of all; for ordinary things are in *no* aspect independent of all. Further, to depend, in some aspect, upon *all* things, is likewise a unique maximum, since ordinary things depend only upon *some* other things (according to nearly all philosophers). Thus each of our three forms, *C*, *CW*, and *W*, marks off a being definitely maximal compared to all conceivable others (outside the three). They are rival versions of "supreme being" in a strict sense. One cannot be more universally independent than independent of all; more universally inclusive than inclusive of all; nor simultaneously more independent-and-inclusive than, in some aspect, the one, and for the rest the other. That inclusiveness means dependence is quite self-evident; for a whole that could be, in all respects, what it is were its parts otherwise than they are is nonsense. Accordingly, *as* independent, God is exclusive not inclusive, and if this be all of God, then God-and-what-is-other-than-God must be a total reality greater than God. This desperate paradox is removed by construing "God-and-not-God as God in his independent *and* his dependent aspects (and parts). God in all aspects is naturally more than God merely in some aspect, as the concrete is more than the abstract.

In scope, *CW* is no more than *W* alone, for either means, "all reality." But the *W* in *CW* means, all reality as involving *one* factor which is independent of the rest, while *W* in isolation means all reality as in *no* factor independent. Pantheism, or *W* in isolation, contains no positive factor lacking in *CW* (best called panentheism);

just as all that separates *C* in isolation (classical theism, deism) from *CW* is the former's negation that God has in himself anything *from* which he is independent (in his independent aspect). The denial that the beings from which God is independent are parts of him (in another aspect) is sheer negation, as descriptive of God. And though "independence" itself is verbally negative, it can be construed positively. It means, self-identical no matter how other things vary. But that the varying things are *not* in the independent being as a whole, or that the self-identity is the whole content of the being, making it *merely* the same, and not the same in a partly different state (or experience), is sheer negation. Of such negations, arbitrary at the stage of formulating alternatives of doctrine, the stubborn conflict of theism and pantheism is the offspring.

If our earlier analysis of causality be accepted, the *C* in *CW* implies the class, *some* realities (or other) differing from God, at least as part from whole, but *C* does not imply just the realities which in fact do exist. Thus *W* is really a variable, and the variable as such and *C* mutually involve each other, though between *C* and any actual values of *W* the implication runs only toward *C* (the cause is necessary to the effect). God in his essence is independent of any world in particular, though not of world-as-such; God in his concrete total being at a given moment (a certain value of *W* and so of *CW*) contains just the actual world that then exists.

It is popular to say that God is immanent as well as transcendent; but this misses the point. *C* is, of course, immanent in *W* as in *CW*, the cause in the effect. But is God merely the *C*, or is he the *CW*? This is the critical question; and it is not answered by asserting both immanence and transcendence of God.

God as *CW* "transcends" the world, not only as every whole transcends each and every one of its parts, but in the uniquely radical way of containing an element of self-identity absolutely independent of whichever among possible contingent things are actual as its parts. The genuine triadic issue is, is the world in relation to God: (1) wholly extrinsic; (2) wholly intrinsic; or (3) wholly extrinsic to *something in* God, but intrinsic to God *as a whole*?

We now turn to the evaluative approach to the idea of God, his "perfection." What is the formal structure of this idea? The perfect, one often hears, is what lacks no possible value, so that all possibility

of increase in value is cut off. But we must be cautious here. For "all the value possible," or "the sum of all perfections," may not itself be a possible value, since there seem to be "incompossibles" (Leibnitz) among possible values. Hence "that whose value leaves no possibility of value unrealized" may be a self-contradictory definition. But it may be that we can find some other formula sufficiently related to this one to deserve its name, perfection, but sufficiently different to avoid its, at least apparent, self-contradiction.

"Perfection" perhaps means: excellence in some emphatic or pre-eminent sense. To excell is to surpass others in value. An emphatic, if not the most emphatic, case is to surpass all conceivable others in value. Such a being need not actualize all possible value. For suppose a being so related to others, and to the very possibility of others, that it (and it alone) contains *all* the values actual beings contain, and that it is bound to acquire, and only it can acquire, *all* new values actualized anywhere, if and as they are actualized. Then the superiority which it already enjoys—for all others are but parts of it in value—cannot conceivably be overcome. Nor is the supposition fantastic. With a mind truly cosmic, able to enjoy the universe as content of its knowledge, every new beauty of experience realized anywhere must be added to the cosmic experience, plus any emergent values due to the synthesis of the various values, new and old, in one experience. True, this supposes that the cosmic mind does not know its experiences in advance, or "eternally." But (as we shall see) this would not mean that it was "ignorant," or inferior to some other conceivable mind.

What I have been saying implies that the perfect, the surpasser of all others, may also surpass itself. And indeed, by "others" we may very well mean entities more radically distinguishable from the given being than would be other states of itself (other experiences?) than the actual one; and in such other states the being might potentially surpass itself as it actually is. Then must not the actual state lack something? I remind you that we have not defined perfection as all possible value, and that the only "lack" excluded by our definition is lack of superiority to conceivable others. Moreover, the alleged idea of a being lacking no possible value can be produced as a (doubtfully consistent) special case under our own definition. One has only to refuse to restrict, as above, the meaning of "other" (to what is, I suspect, its reasonable scope) in order to find oneself confronted with

the idea of a being which *cannot* improve, and which surpasses all conceivable beings. It must then have all possible values (and be an immutable, "pure actuality") for any value which it lacked would be impossible for it to attain, and yet possible for reality as a whole, which would be a conceivable other surpassing the unsurpassable being, a reduction to absurdity of the supposed lack. (I have skipped a step or two in the proof, which is perhaps not the only possible one.) Thus the classical concept (or pseudo-concept) of perfection is but a special case of the idea of the all-other-surpassing—the case in which "other" is given the dubious meaning, "other being, or other state, could there consistently be such, of the same being," or alternatively, in which, to the positive prescription, "surpassing others," is added the dubious negative one, "*not* conceivably surpassing self."

The basic idea of other-surpassing has three forms, according as it is applied to zero, some, or all (conceivable) others. The first gives the idea of minimal or least being; the second, that of middling or imperfect ("finite") being; the third, that of maximal, supreme, or perfect being. This division is mathematical or purely formal, since the non-formal aspects of the relation of surpassing do not function to create the distinctions, but only the notion of relation to all, some, or no terms other than the term in question.

If we include the distinction between self-relation and relation to others, we find that each of the three forms of other-surpassing subdivides into two, making six forms in all—as follows. (By "non-reflexive" will be meant, without surpassing or being surpassed by self, with no possibility of change for better or worse. By "reflexive" will be meant, with some possibility of change—whether for better, for worse, or both, being left open by the table, though I shall hold that in the case of R only change for the better is plausible.)

Minimal Being (superiority to *no* others)	
n non-reflexive form.	Null, zero, as static abstraction. The negative absolute, or absolutely small.
i reflexive form.	Infinitesimal, the dynamic, concrete diminutive. The negative relative or infinitely small (e.g., the life of a dying man as near death as you please).

Middling or Imperfect Being	(superiority to *some* others)
a non-reflexive form.	Ordinary abstractions, e.g., manliness. The little absolute.
r reflexive form.	Ordinary concretes, e.g., a man. The little relative.
Maximal or Perfect Being	(superiority to *all* others)
A non-reflexive form.	The Supreme Abstraction. (God as merely self-identical?) The Great Absolute or Absolutely Superior.
R reflexive form.	The Supreme Concrete. (God as living personality, self-contrasting as well as self-identical?) The Great Relative, or the Great, Relatively to all others and to (past states of) itself. The Super-Relative or Reflexively Transcendent—Transcendental Relativity.

This table, the skeleton of which could be put into purely mathematical form (but for the inconvenience of printing it thus), shows that the ordinary contrast, perfect vs. imperfect, as usually construed, is a misleading (or imperfect) distinction. Thus the perfect is usually taken as incapable of increase in value, so that "imperfect" lumps together the reflexive forms of minimal, middling, and maximal superiority! Again, the habit of identifying "absolute" and "perfect" conceals the cardinal truth that ordinary abstractions have a kind of absoluteness or independence of relations and of change, and that reflexive maximal superiority, though relative, or varying with relations and change, is just as radically superior to ordinary concrete things as is non-reflexive or absolute perfection to ordinary abstractions.

A certain species of quality is always just that species, trivial or exalted, but a concrete being can take on new, additional, perhaps better species. It can become better than its previous self, whereas, by the very meaning of abstraction, what a given abstractive act discerns is the same wherever and whenever it be found. This suggests

that *A*, non-reflexive or classical perfection, is the supreme object of abstraction, not the supreme object of concrete or total awareness.

Many considerations support this. One is that *R* implies *A* as an abstractable aspect of its own meaning. For what is *R* improves upon itself, and what improves upon *itself* must retain some kind of self-identity; it must become, X better than X. But if a being in *all* respects was *R* or improved, it could in no respect remain the same or identical; moreover, the required non-*R* aspect of the *R* being must conform to the definition of *A*, since, as superior to *all* others, the *R* being already possesses an absolutely perfect or *A* quality, the quality of being universally other-superior, of surpassing absolutely all others. Thus *A* is required as self-identical aspect of what, in the respects in which it is not *A*, is *R*. (Of course *R* itself, as such, is self-identical in that the quality of being *R* is always that quality. But this is like the fact that change as such never changes but is always—change. *R* —as we saw of *W* earlier—is really a variable, the abstract variable of which *A* is the abstract constant, the latter being like "sameness" abstracted from concrete samenesses-and-differences, the former like "difference" abstracted from the concrete.

The above account fits the obvious fact that we get such ideas as identity, being, absolute, by abstracting from that aspect of novelty in experience by which the given is more than mere being but is also becoming, more than mere actuality but also actualization, more than a being good but a freely becoming better, an adding of novelty to treasured and funded experience. "To be less at one time and more at another" may be equivalent to self-surpassing; but it presupposes the ideas of time and of dynamic self-identity, and these can never be derived from that of mere being. How could we reach the *concrete* ultimate by omitting process from the process of experience, or diversity from the unity in diversity? True enough, it was often said that God is equally above unity and diversity, being and becoming, *in our sense*, for he escapes all our categories. But the partiality for unity, identity, being, over plurality, diversity, becoming, oozes from nearly every page written on this subject for some twenty centuries (until Kant and later).

Being and becoming are not the only factors in the "process" from which both are abstracted. There is also the having-become, by which the real, as self-surpassing, is still what it previously became, while

becoming more besides. It became p, it now becomes q, additional to (and involving) p. Thus we have: (1) becoming; (2) having-become, or earlier becoming as involved in later; (3) the primordial and fixed aspect of mere being constituting the abstract self-identity of process at *any* and every time.

An old objection to conceiving of God as subject to increase is that then he must also be in danger of decrease, decay, even of total destruction. This is a non sequitur. You might as well say that to be able to act well is to be able to act badly, therefore God may act badly. Increase in value is good change, decrease is evil change; the capacity for one does not imply capacity for the other, unless anything good implies the correlative evil. And if the *ultimate* process is not one of net gain, why process at all? In any case, an R being cannot decay; for one reason, because then another R being (it could not be the same one) must be conceivable as its superior, namely an incorruptible R being. And an incorruptible R being is conceivable, since we need only suppose one with complete memory of past actuality, and the ability to maintain self-integrity while becoming aware of each addition to actuality as it occurs. He who knows this to be impossible is welcome to explain his insight. If the past once for all "has been what it has been," then *something* does preserve, and as it were remember, all that happens. Why not a literal memory? Is there a better explanation? Thus, new experiences, additional values, need not mean losing any of the old. "Time is creation or nothing" (Bergson). Destruction is not co-ordinate with creation. (For us men, who forget nearly everything, past values are, it is true, mostly lost. Also, enduring sources of values, like buildings or bodies, may "cease to endure," but this only means that they no longer add new chapters to their histories; it does not mean that the old chapters are abolished. As parts of the past, they are all fully there, if it be true that the past is real in spite of our forgetting.)

Another objection is that God is simple and so cannot have an aspect which is A while, as a whole, he is R. Now, the A aspect itself may be simple; for instance, God's knowledge as A is the same as his goodness as A, and so on. But his knowledge as A is not the same as his knowledge as R, or as his happiness as R. The axiom of simplicity has been deduced as end result from reasoning that starts with such pseudo-axioms as that a cause must contain the equivalent of its ef-

fect. But if all of value is there without the effect, why the effect, or in what significant sense is it real, if its creation adds no value?

The formula AR is no more self-contradictory then the formula ar. A happy man may acquire a higher species of happiness without one of these species becoming higher. *The abstract and immutable qualifies the concrete and mutable.* The perfect was supposed an exception because the conceptual structure of maximal superiority was not clearly stated, and the overlooking of the concept R illegitimately assumed the functions of a refutation of that concept.

AR seems more promising than A alone as descriptive of the creative source of things, since AR contains the principle of relativity, which cannot be derived from the merely absolute. Relation is a positive idea; unlike ignorance, or "inattention to the interests of others," it cannot be equated with the partial absence of any positive elements. If relation is simply not in God, then no magic can explain its presence anywhere.

In order to avoid positing relations, even though of "superiority to others," in God, it has been customary to define him negatively as unrivaled and unsurpassed by others, so that he was not related as superior but only they as inferior. Thus Anselm's "that than which none greater can be conceived" may at least appear to avoid relating God. But it is of no consequence, for the same divisions of minimal, middling, and maximal, reflexive and non-reflexive forms, arise from this negative definition as from our positive one. And the same is true for all the other stock concepts, such as completeness, pure actuality, aseity, infinity. On any showing (had I space to go into this) the neglected alternative, R, would present itself and demand a hearing, and there would be the same indications as we have found that the non-R form of perfection is abstract.

Furthermore, on any assumption, God must be related to have knowledge. Knowledge of x is relation to x possessed by the knower. The possession is contingent if x is contingent, for if x had happened not to be actual, then it could at most have been known as a possibility, not an actuality. It is answered that divine knowledge has only a formal analogy, not a concrete similarity, to ours. But it is on the most formal, analogical level that the difficulty arises. God's knowing that proposition P is true cannot be an accident of his being, if his being is without accidents, absolute, relationless. Hence none of his knowledge

could have been other than it is. But if *P* affirms the existence of a contingent being, then *P could* have been false, though God must have "known" it as true. Thus something could have been which, had it been, would have meant false knowledge in God. This is simple, formal contradiction of the infallibility of his knowledge. It is not a mere inability on our part to imagine a knowing concretely so different from ours as the divine.

The contradiction is not mitigated by urging that God's knowledge does not have to conform to things, since it conforms things to itself. Read the conformity either way, you contradict it in saying that, on the one side things could have been different, but on the other, all is as it must be. In addition, if things alone are conformed, then when a man sins he is only being conformed to God's knowledge.

Again, God is said to know his own all-causative essence, and in this he sees all that can be produced by it. But can he see *which* among the things he can produce he does, and which not? It is a contradiction if something contingent is involved in something wholly necessary. Aquinas discussed the matter, I know. But if he removed the contradiction, let anyone state in plain, precise language, how.

No doubt divine knowledge is radically different from ours, and surpasses ours not merely as ours surpasses that of the animals. We may say, indeed, that God is the being who *transcends* others while *surpassing* himself; whereas we surpass ourselves and others, but transcend no one. God's knowledge, accordingly, is analogous, not similar, to ours. But analogy should be honestly carried through; it should set *some* requirements that are adhered to, and when one removes from classical theology all that covertly implies super-relativity and accidents in God, *nothing* is left of divine knowledge (as Maimonides said) but a word.

The absolute cannot know or have any relation to the relative, but only the relative to the absolute. Thus *AR* does not relate *A* to any relative things, but it relates God, as transcendentally relative, to *A* as well as to ordinary relative things. What contains a relation contains its terms, relation of *x* to *y* being only a relational type apart from *x* and *y*. What includes relations is, in so far, concrete and comprehensive, *what excludes relations is abstract* and non-comprehensive. What has the relations of absolute and relative has all the reality that is in either, and is more than the absolute. This is no paradox, except by

misuse of terms. Absolute does not mean inclusive, concrete. It means independent; and what guarantees that the independent can be inclusive? True, the inclusive must depend only upon its parts; but that is real dependence, for, given different parts, the whole must be correspondingly different.

Nothing, of course, can be more than what is "absolute *in all respects,*" "absolutely absolute"—save as a consistent conception means more than a self-contradictory one. "*A* in all aspects" means no more than round-square. For it must have all actual values while having no actuality. Determination, definite actuality, is limitation, negation. But to be indeterminate, indefinite, inactual, is also limitation of another kind. The purely and all-ways unlimited is mere nonsense.

In one sense *A,* absoluteness, includes relationship. Among abstractions, as Russell has remarked, are "abstractness" and "concreteness." The property of being concrete is not a concrete thing. Now *R* is the over-all abstraction, divine concreteness as such. And the *A* in *AR* means that the reflexively perfect must, in some abstract aspect, be non-reflexively or immutably perfect. *A* has relation to *R* in that its only meaning is as abstract aspect of concrete perfection. But this is relation to *R* as a mere suchness, the generic property of "having accidents," by which the perfect transcends all and surpasses itself, and this "having accidents" as such includes no accidents, but only demands that there be some. So *A,* though related to *R,* is not related to anything contingent, but to the necessary category of accidentality—there shall be accidents. God as a concrete whole, *AR* in nature, is the one who is related to accidental things themselves.

God is a whole whose whole-properties are distinct from the properties of the parts. This is so of every whole, but most radically so of the supreme whole. The parts are *ar,* the whole, *AR*. A whole of relative parts can never be merely absolute, for there can always be additional parts. But a whole of *ar* parts can very well be *AR*. What is in the parts is in the whole, so our misdeeds are in God; but not *as his* misdeeds, or his deeds at all—rather as his misfortunes. They make his over-all satisfaction less than it otherwise would be, but not his goodness of decision. For if a part decides something, the whole permits, suffers, endures, the decision, it does not make it. It is orthodox doctrine that God does not enact our sins, and this is just as tenable if we are parts of God, since to be is to have power; therefore, to be

distinguishable from the whole, though within it, is to have power which is not the whole's as its own whole-quality. In this whole-quality, the power of parts is something suffered not enacted, as, in general, what is active in the other is passive in the self. This Fechnerian principle is the only self-consistent view of dynamic wholes and parts and of the relations of human and divine freedom.

Let us now combine our two classifications of ideas of God, that in terms of causality, and that in terms of perfection, or *C, CW, W,* and *A, AR,* and *R.* In combination these become:

A-C	*A-CW*	*A-W*
AR-C	*AR-CW*	*AR-W*
R-C	*R-CW*	*R-W*

The first column contains three forms of transcendental theism; the second, three forms of what is best called *panentheism;* the third, three forms of pantheism. The first row contains three forms of nonreflexive perfectionism; the second row, three forms of reflexive-nonreflexive perfectionism; the third row, three forms of reflexive perfectionism. The middle member of the middle row (or column), *AR-CW,* has the advantage of synthesizing all the positive principles of the entire table. If there be a "higher synthesis" or golden mean with respect to the extremes, this must be it. The first row is God as the extreme of pure absoluteness, with nothing positive from which relativity can be derived; the third row is God as the extreme of pure relativity with nothing stable that can be asserted once for all, even relativity itself; the first column is God as the extreme of sheer causality divorced from any of its effects, power with nothing that power does; the third column is God as the extreme of contingent phenomena with no element of independence, necessity, or self-existence. Is it hard to see that these are all broken fragments of truth rather than the truth? Only *AR-CW* avoids all the extremes. Of the others, four, such as *A-C,* are in two extremes at once; the remaining four, such as *A-CW,* suffer from the special absurdity of positing a profound duality in terms of one category and sheer unity in terms of the other, in spite of the evident truth that the two categories are so closely interrelated as to forbid such differential treatment.

The argument which our analysis furnishes for the conclusion *AR-CW* is the stronger in that it is not isolated, but is the type of ar-

gument that alone offers any hope of producing agreement in philosophy. For who imagines that the classical extremes of doctrine, such as monism vs. pluralism, pure transcendentalism vs. pure immanentalism, pure atemporalism vs. a temporalism that can point to no ultimate identity in process—who imagines that these mighty opposites can ever fight their battles to a definitive triumph of either side? Surely only a doctrine which can say to all such extremes, you are all of you right and all of you in error, right in refusing to accept your opponent's position, wrong in supposing the choice lies between you—surely only so can the conflicts be resolved.

Of course, atheists will suppose that all nine theistic doctrines are erroneous (or absurd), and that there is no cosmic or perfect being, in any such strict sense as these doctrines agree in supposing. But this is to suggest that one of the most extreme doctrines of all, a relativism more radical than *R* by itself, ought to gain final assent. What a counsel of despair! It would mean that the totality of things (or, again, that the most universal causal factor) was in no way formally different from items which it contains (or effects which it produces), or that the totality of values is surpassable in all senses in which values short of the totality are surpassable, or again, that the element in being or existence which makes being to be itself, or existence existence, is in every sense as contingent as anything else.

But is *AR-CW* a religious doctrine? It implies a God more knowing, more benevolent, more powerful, more happy or blessed than any other conceivable being. So far, surely, so good. But then, *R* means that God can somehow increase in value. Yet as "omniscient" already, the God of religion cannot increase in knowledge, if that means overcoming previous error or ignorance; as "holy" or entirely righteous, he cannot overcome previous selfishness or meanness; nor, as "all-powerful," can he overcome previous weakness. But this leaves ample room for, nay requires, an *R* factor of improvement! For the things God knows to exist, and deals righteously and powerfully with *as* existent, are not all the things that *can* exist (it is logically impossible that all possible things should co-exist); accordingly, suppose that something which does not but *can* exist subsequently does so, there will then be a new existent for God to know and deal with as such, and his total life, as inclusive of his knowledge and its contents, will be enriched. That he did not know the new thing before, or eternally,

was not ignorance, since—as Carneades, Levi ben Gerson, Ockham, and Socinus long ago pointed out—to know as existent or determinate what is in itself only an indeterminate possibility would be *error;* and there is reason to think that future events, e.g., my death as I write this, are, while future, objectively and in truth indeterminate—in details, at least, mere, more or less vaguely outlined, may-or-may-not-be's. True knowledge will know them only as such. When they are no longer mere may-be's but definite existences, they will, by true knowledge, be known as such, and this knowledge will be more satisfying than the former, for beauty increases with definiteness of contrast and relationship.[3] (The argument, "what will be will be," assumes that the future consists entirely of will-be's, not at all of may-or-may-not-be's. The doctrine of timeless omniscience, God's eternally "knowing" the facts of time, innocently—or recklessly—assumed that the facts of time are a completed or unambiguous sum, not an ever-increasing one. The doctrine really denied all that we know of the nature of time, and it must, if consistent, follow through with the denial of the reality of human life and of anything humanly conceivable.) Since the new objects of God's knowledge include new states of happiness in the creatures, and since God cares for this happiness, he must obviously derive satisfaction, and new satisfaction, from these states. Denying this is hardly an imperative of religion, since it makes nonsense of the alleged love of God.

But I shall perhaps be told that religion has thought of God as beyond and exclusive of the world, rather than as, according to *W,* its receptacle. I think this is an illusory impression of religion, due to inattention to the meanings of words. Religion has not emphasized the bare idea *that* we are in God, but has stressed *how* we are in God, and this differs from the most ordinary, crudest, and most unspiritual conceptions of "in." We are in God by being objects of his love and knowledge.

> I only know I cannot drift
> Beyond his love and care.
>
> —Whittier

There is no need to multiply quotations. But, it will be said, this does not literally mean we are inside God. I reply, what then does

3. See my *Man's Vision of God,* pp. 224 f.

it literally mean? Do you seriously suppose that God's being is one thing, and his knowledge with its immediate contents, or his love with its direct objects of concern, just another? What then unites God with "his" knowledge or love, or these with "their" objects, if it is not God's being (I do not say, his essence!)? I honestly believe that those who make such proposals have literally not thought what they are saying.

True, our human knowledge and love may not seem to embrace things within our own being. But human knowledge and love are radically imperfect, especially where their objects are the most indirect or external to our being.[4] It seems strange to try to conceive God's knowledge and love by supposing that the indirectness and externality of the most fallible forms of our experience are the models for conceiving his infallible form!

But can dead matter be part of God? I reply, no one has proved there is any mere dead matter, and many of the best scientific and philosophical minds have thought the notion a pseudo-concept. Again, can human freedom be part of God? As indicated above, the Fechnerian principle justifies an affirmative.[5] Once more, can human ignorance and error be part of divine wisdom? The answer is much the same. Believing is an act, and this may be our act but not God's, except as the whole *endures* the acts of its parts, as precisely their acts not the whole's. It has our beliefs *as* ours, and as ours parts of itself—but not as its beliefs would be parts of itself. That this is conceivable has been affirmed by two great psychologist-philosophers who meditated long on the matter, James and Fechner.[6]

Thus *AR-CW* stands out as the truth, if there is an ascertainable truth, of theism. The absolute, non-reflexive or merely identical, factor in God, God as *A-C*, is the pure cause which neither is nor contains any effect; the unmoved mover which, as Jacob Boehme was one of the first to see, is *in* God but is not God (in his concreteness). The super-relative or reflexively transcendent perfection of God is the fulness of his being, his wholeness as always self-identical, but self-identi-

4. *Ibid.*, Ch. v.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 209, 211, 226-28, 289-97; also my "Organic and Inorganic Wholes," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. III (1942), 127-37, esp. 133.

6. Wm. James, *Pluralistic Universe*. Last chapter; G. T. Fechner, *Zendavesta*. Ch. XI.

cal as self-enriched, influenced, but never fully determined by (and never fully determining) others—in short, a living, sensitive, free personality, preserving all actual events with impartial care, and forever adding new events to his experience. The absolute is the One merely as One; the super-relative is the many as also one, or the one as also many. The world as *not God* is the many merely as many—an abstraction from the many as one, as the integrated, active-passive content of omniscience.

THOUGHTS ON A TRANSLATION OF SCHELLING'S *WELTALTER*: A REVIEW ARTICLE

EDGAR A. SINGER, JR.

Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania

THERE ARE TIMES when a reviewer may feel that the interest both of his author and of his reader will be better served by a loose than by a tight account of the book entrusted to his care. A tight review will confine itself faithfully to setting forth the purpose of a book, its construction, and an estimate of the measure in which the work has met its purpose. A loose review will rather let itself go to reflections awakened by—or more likely, old reflections reawakened by—the appearance of a new volume, and concern itself with the topic of the volume and problems inherent in that topic.

But no reviewer could be so loose as to fail to pay his tribute to what he takes to be the indisputable merits of the work before him. That work in the present instance is *Schelling, "The Ages of the World,"* translated with introduction and notes by Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr.* Among the qualities general to the whole study, I should put first the thoroughness of its documentation, the faithfulness of its adherence to documents, the ordering of its introductory material (reviewing all of Schelling's work, and reflecting the world of thought old and new to Schelling's day as seen through his eyes), the plenitude, reach, and pertinence of its footnotes to the translation. As to the translation itself, the translator characterizes it truly as "more literal than literary." That is as it should be; but to adhere to this rule in the instance of Schelling and many others of his period and country takes courage. No skill could render readable in English vast portions of Schelling's argument, of which one feels (with one of my valued German colleagues) that no pen could have compassed them save one possessed of "the genius, or else the demon, of the German tongue." Where Schelling's pen was setting forth matters of common human experience—the anxiety, care, misery of our finite lives—it could take on eloquence and beauty; nothing of these qualities has been lost by our translator that could have been saved by any other translation. And as to the introductory review already referred to, it is difficult to see how it could have done greater justice or rendered better service to the man Schelling and

* New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. xi + 251 pp. $3.00.

his works, without stepping outside the world in which the man lived and to which his work appealed. This, the exegete and commentator has steadfastly refused to do, and we think quite rightly. Such a view of Schelling would be of the loose order, a looseness that would have spoiled Dr. Bolman's book; but a looseness into which, at whatever risk, the reviewer has promised himself to fall for the remainder of his opportunity.

Perhaps I can let some thoughts that have long preoccupied me concerning the whole matter of post-Kantian German idealism spread out from a quotation or two from the opening pages of Mr. Bolman's book. Thus, Professor E. S. Brightman closes a "Foreword" to the work with the sentence: "If this work of the later Schelling is really mastered, a new impulse may be given to contemporary religious thought." On the next page, Mr. Bolman opens his preface with the sentence: "Friedrich Schelling was one of Germany's greatest philosophers." In the next paragraph he sums up his thesis: "My thesis, briefly stated, is that Schelling reoriented his transcendentalism and speculative theories of nature so as to present a more 'realistic' interpretation of finite existence."

Let me turn first to Mr. Bolman's thought, to return later to Mr. Brightman's. If a philosopher's greatness is to be measured by the extent of his influence on later thought, Schelling may be called either "one of the greatest" or "one of the least of Germany's philosophers," according as his importance is measured by his influence on one or the other of two lines of post-Kantian development that might both be called by the same name, yet are as remote from one another in the kind of man that contributed to their respective histories as in the kind of man to which they now appeal. Either might be described as a progressive reorientation of thought toward realism and idealism; both result in an approach to truth that might be called indifferently a realistic idealism or an idealistic realism. From the names with which tradition has distinguished two groups of men from which came their respective contributors, I shall call one of these two developments the *romantic,* the other the *scientific* resolution of the old conflict between realism and idealism. Now, what has long stirred me to curious reflection is the historic fact that no one contributing to either of these movements of modern thought toward a like-named conclusion has had the slightest influence in the promotion of the other; nor do the present-day heirs

to either tradition have commerce with, or even sympathy for the inheritors of the other. Why is this; how can it be; what is to come of it?

Let me begin by explaining what one would have in mind who spoke of the *scientific* or, as it might better be called, the *experimentalist* development, which goes on from (not "back to") Kant and culminates in modern experimental method. As all have remarked, history has called the critical philosophy idealistic for two very different reasons, difficult to bring into any sort of mutual dependence. One points to Kant's doctrine of the forms of thought as developed in the *Aesthetik* and *Analytik* of his *K.d.r.V.*—an idealism that has nothing to do with ideals. The other considers Kant's discussion in the *Dialektik* and later *Kritiks,* of what "reason" can and cannot do, to a conclusion that has to do with nothing but ideals. Now, I conceive the experimental method of our day to have absorbed both these Kantian innovations, to have modified them in ways that only post-Kantian contributions to technical science made possible, and to have brought them from a state of entire unrelatedness into a relation of mutual dependence, as follows:

First, as to the doctrine of a priori forms: The modern experimentalist is quite awake to a necessity that Kant was first to see, the necessity, namely, of making use of a whole system of formal sciences in order to give expression to any given experimental finding. To mention just a few of the better known because more underlying of these presuppositions *die die Erfahrung möglich machen*: the physicist, to explain what his experiment has found out, must use an idiom whose meanings are fixed by the postulates characterizing *some* type of formal mechanics; this mechanics, in turn, must have accepted for its own *some* type of formal geometry; this geometry, *some* type of arithmetic; and this arithmetic, *some* type of logic. What the experimentalist of today sees, which neither Kant nor any of his day could have seen, is the development (beginning with the neo-geometers of the nineteenth century) of an ever-widening range of schemata, to any one of which the experimentalist may, but to at least one of which he must adjust his observational data, if he is to incorporate a new finding into a system made up of all previous findings whose observational data will already have been adjusted to at least one formal schema. When, from his experience of the past, your experimentalist turns his thought to the future, he forsees that a constantly progressive science will forever find itself in recurrent situations in which adjustment of new observations to old

forms will no longer be possible. Then, in the future as in the past, it will be the part of your scientist to summon all the resources of his *produktive Einbildungskraft* for the invention of new forms apt to receive new data; i.e., to serve for the formulation of new findings and reformulation of old ones in such wise that they may compose a single world-image. With this development, the Kantian doctrine of a priori *forms* (= postulates) remains; that of a priori *truths* (= propositions) disappears.

But if Kant's "idealistic" doctrine of a priori forms has been thus generalized by and absorbed into modern experimental method, no less has his idealistic interpretation of certain "realities" served to form that method into a *modus inveniendi* that is only to be called an idealistic realism. It is generally agreed that no part of Kant's theoretical philosophy was left in a more confused and confusing state than his conception of the real, or rather, of the reals; for he recognized two of them, one the phenomenal, the other the noumenal real. The first he identified with the immediate datum of experience (*reine Empfindung*); the second, with what he finally called a limiting conception (*Grenzbegriff*). To put in a word what I conceive the experimentalist development to have made of these two reals, it is this: experimentalism reduced both reals to limiting conceptions, having first given to *limiting conception* a definiteness of meaning that was entirely lacking to the term as used by Kant. This development is not long in beginning; it is to Kant's own day and to his most admiring disciple that we owe the first step toward ridding our thought of the almost universal assumption that experience can give us nothing, unless it be given indubitable facts to start with. With Salomon Maimon, the "given" of empirical knowledge ceases to stand for anything given in perception; it is, however, a conception indispensable to our understanding of empirical knowledge; a conception quite analogous to the one which the mathematician entertains of an irrational quantity—say the $\sqrt{2}$. Now, a term that is to be conceived in analogy with the mathematician's concept of a limit may well enough be called a limiting conception; and the greater clarity of meaning won for the *Grenzbegriff* in its new application to the "phenomenal real," may be shared by the term in its original application to the "noumenal real." The two reals are thus brought under one and the same concept, that for which the term limiting conception is an appropriate name. But, of course, merely to

have brought the limiting conception as a term of experimental science into analogy with the mathematician's conception of a limit, is not yet to have defined that term. Much remains to be done before such definition is completed; but it already begins to appear that if the experimentalist's limiting conception is not to be identified with the mathematician's conception of a limit, it is unlikely to be defined save by making use of the mathematical theory of limits. That this is so, is borne out by reflection on the later history of that other real of Kant, the noumenal real to which he himself gave the name *Grenzbegriff*.

When an experimenter sets himself to "determine" the distance between two given points at a given moment of time, he gathers a set of measurements from which he calculates the "closest available approximation" to what he himself would call the "real distance" between those points. He knows very well that no experimental determination of this length can ever give him anything but an approximation to the real, but he is frequently successful in obtaining by improvement of methods a "closer approximation" than some given approximation. But how can the experimenter know which of two approximate distances comes closer to being the real distance between two points when, as he himself maintains, neither he nor any one ever has had or ever could have knowledge of that or any other reality? The beginnings of an answer to this question were not clearly formulated before 1805, when Legendre published his theory of least squares. Applying this theory, one could calculate from a set of measurements what they yielded in the way of a most probable value of a quantity sought, together with the probable error of this most probable value. From that time on, it has been possible for the experimenter to say (with some technical reservations of no present concern to us) that of two approximations to the same given distance, that one lay the closer to the real distance sought, whose probable error was the smaller. If then we conceive experimental science to have succeeded through any number of steps in halving the probable error with which each step started, we will have conceived the beginning of a process which, if indefinitely continued, would yield a sequence of progressively "closer approximations," i.e., most probable values whose probable errors converge toward zero, and whose magnitudes, therefore, approach a single errorless value as a limiting conception. But has not the scientist called that to which one approximation lies closer than another, the *real*? And is not this real

that turns out to be a limiting conception the only real to which experimental scientists need ever refer? If so, may we not say that science knows no "real," save one that is such a limiting conception as traditional use is accustomed to call an "ideal"? Whether, then, we take idealism to imply a doctrine of a priori forms, or a doctrine recognizing some or all *reals* to be *ideals,* your modern experimental scientist is an idealist on both counts. But it is no longer an accident, as one may think it to have been with Kant, that he is an idealist on *both* counts. If we had time to look into the matter more closely, we should find that the scientist's eternal task of finding new forms to which observation can be adjusted is imposed upon him as a condition to the progressive reduction of his probable error, i.e., a condition to the indefinite approach of the observed appearances is the *real* of which each observation is an *appearance.*

One last reflection, before turning from the experimental to the romantic development of an idealistic realism. If the experimental science of our day preserves, generalizes, and brings into mutual dependence the formal and empirical aspects of Kant's "theoretical" philosophy, does it perform any similar function toward the theoretical and the practical doctrines which Kant leaves juxtaposed rather than connected? We have taken the modern analogue of Kant's theoretical philosophy to lie in a present-day theory of the conditions that make scientific progress possible. This progress we define to be a transition from a remoter to a closer approximation to a limiting conception. That limiting conception we call, in traditional terms, the ideal reality, Nature. Should we not, then, look for the analogue of Kant's practical philosophy in some later theory of the conditions that make possible another kind of progress—a progress to be defined as a transition from a lower to a higher order of approximation to another limiting conception, this other limiting concept being some such ideal as tradition would call the really Good, or the true God? Does the idealistic realism in which the experimentalist development culminates include theories of this kind, theories which might be called the system's practical philosophy? None, I should say, of sufficient following and influence to deserve analysis here; yet some of us who have given the matter patient thought have come to feel that such a theory can and ought to be developed within the limits of experimental method. If our speculations (of which I have written elsewhere) as to how the discussion of

the matter should be conducted, and to what conclusions it would lead are not entirely wrong, the result would include these points. There *is* an end that should appeal to the understanding of every man in the very words in which the God of the *Imitatio* appeals to the faith of the believer: "My son, I ought to be thy supreme and ultimate end, if thou would be truly blessed." This end, this God, that so appeals to the understanding of every sufficiently thoughtful man, not to the mystical faith of any man, can be no other than what the God of Kant's philosophy was, *eine reine Idee*. But for this ideal to be real, i.e., really to guide the conduct of our brief, stuggling lives, it must fulfil several conditions that Kant's *Gottesidee* did not meet. It must be much more sharply defined in terms that would make it clear to every man willing to think out his own deepest desires, why it is that to make the struggle toward this ideal the regulative principle of his whole life is a necessary condition to the only contentment a finite life can know. If these requirements are met in the only way in which some of us conceive that they could be met, the interdependence of progress toward the ideal reality which is Nature, and progress toward the ideal reality which is God would be clear enough: to religious progress, scientific progress would prove itself a necessary condition; to scientific progress, religious progress would prove to be the one adequate incentive.

Turning from one to the other line of post-Kantian development, we find all the defects imputed to Kant by the experimentalist and corrected in one way, to have been recognized by the romanticist and corrected in another way. Were this statement convertible, the differentiae that distinguish the scientific from the romantic type of idealistic realism would have to be sought in the differences revealed in their respective ways of making good the same shortcomings. But the statement is not convertible; we find Schelling insisting on the fundamental importance of a question to which no answer is to be found either in Kant or in the scientific development that sets out from him. It is the question: How make intelligible the existence of finite things? a question Schelling takes to be equivalent to, or at least to involve another: Why should anything be? This question is unanswered by Kant because unasked; it remains unasked by the experimentalist deriving from Kant because to him it is unintelligible, devoid of all meaning. What meaning then does Schelling attach to the question?

The sense this "ontological problem" has for Schelling may perhaps be gathered from our commentator's resumé (p. 34) of a page of his author's offering, a typical example of the reasoning by which Schelling is led to a solution of this problem:

> The ontological problem is to know why we can say "A *is* B." What is the meaning of the copula, its full existential significance? In the analysis of every sentence stands the need for analysis of being, and this analysis is two-fold. In the first place, we can think the subject of being, *what* is. . . . Second, we can distinguish being itself which *is* "what is." To think the latter alone is to have being in concept, the concept *par excellence*. The ontological problem involves knowing what being in concept means. . . . The difficulty in philosophy has been that being has been contained in concept without an explanation of how this occurs; moreover, the being in concept . . . has not been correctly related to free existentiality, existence outside the concept.

So condensed a sample of Schelling's many ways of arguing out a solution of his ontological problem is too brief to settle, but not too brief to raise a question that must occur to everyone at this point: Whether this argument is to be taken as replacing or as merely reproducing in other words the rationalistic ontology of the seventeenth century, depending as it does on the "ontological proof of the existence of God." As any well-considered answer to this question would demand a documentation and discussion beyond the scope of a summary review, let me do no more than set down the hypothetical conclusion on which depends the place awarded Schelling's romantic philosophy in a classification of systems later to be offered. Defining a rationalistic ontology to be any doctrine that proposes to deduce from the meaning of at least one general concept the existence of at least one individual being, this final classification assumes an ontology to which the reasoning cited in our sample is essential, to be, and to have been meant by its author to be, to this extent rationalistic. This is not to say, and we shall find good reason for not saying, that the reasoning by which Schelling is led to his final answer to the question, Why is anything? remains throughout rationalistic. But it is to say, that so much of this reasoning as lets him conclude that a temporal world of manifold beings presupposes a Being conceived to be neither temporal nor manifold is meant to be purely logical, to be independent of any empirical evidence as to what sort of world this temporal manifold of beings may turn out to be.

For such a quick comparison of experimentalist and romanticist as

is within reach of a brief review, it is no more necessary than possible to follow the thought by which Schelling is led to his further account of the one Being, the world of many beings, and their interrelation. It will be enough to show why in the end we must recognize one more critical difference between the kinds of evidence by which the two developments are led to their different forms of idealistic realism.

In his own way, then, Schelling enriches the all but empty concept of a Being, merely recognized to be the logically necessary antecedent of a world of beings, by such successive additions to the content of antecedent-consequent relation as may be conveniently ordered as follows. The antecedent turns out to be not only one timeless Being, but a Being that has brought into being a temporal world of manifold beings. If we could call this Being God, and the world of beings, Nature, and conceive this God as the Cause of Nature, we should be in the world of Spinoza. If we could call the Cause a Self, we should be in the world of Fichte. But though Schelling would allow us to call his one timeless Being, God, and this God a Self, he will not allow us to call this Self a Cause of Nature. No,—the relation of the timeless Being to the temporal world of beings is not that of cause-and-effect, as Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, or the modern scientist would understand the cause-effect relation. No formal necessity connects one with the other. It is not even the producer-product relation, as common sense and empirical science understand this relation. No empirical probability connects one with the other, such as would explain the relation between an antecedent carpenter, acorn, egg and a subsequent house, oak, bird to be a normal sequence of the producer-product order. Whereupon as experimental science considers only such sequences to be explicable as a formal science makes necessary, or an empirical science finds normal, Schelling's refusal to allow the relation between God and Nature to fall under either of these concepts leaves the God-Nature sequence inexplicable. Nor does Schelling propose any other concept under which this sequence may be subsumed—the relation of God to Nature is completely inconceivable.

But (and this is the core of the romantic philosophy) for the romanticist, to be inconceivable is not to be senseless; to be beyond understanding is not to be beyond realization. For beside the knowledge that consists of bringing an intuition (*Anschauung*) under a concept (*Begriff*), there is such a thing as an intuition beyond understanding

(*Anschauung ohne Begriff*). And this too is knowing; nay, the deepest, warmest, most intimate kind of knowing. But can mortal man point to a moment of our finite existence when we are possessed of such a pure intuition, when, say, we actually experience an inexplicable beginning of aught in the world? He can, indeed, the humblest of us can, when through his own completely free will he brings into being *an act*. Nor is man's realization of inexplicable bringing-into-being limited to the immediate experience of his own free creation; an experience analogous to his own he intuitively imputes to others, whenever their activity impresses him as analogous to his own in his moments of perfect freedom. But of all the acts of our fellow beings in which we sense freedom, none seems freer, none less explicable, none less normal, than the gesture with which the artist throws off a work of art—unless, indeed, it be the dance with which the madman plays out his role in some world of his own creating. Nor for Schelling are the *genius* of the artist and the *madness* of the demented unallied; for him, as for many another before and since, there is something mad in every artist, something *geneal* in every madman: it is the influence two kinds of irrational creation exert on other lives that lets us distinguish the madness that is genius from the genius that is madness. Not the least interesting and valuable pages of Schelling are those that relate the mad genius of the artist's method with the sane purpose of his result. To reproduce their thought here would carry us too far, but no doubt the larger part of humanity would accept without argument, as a plain fact of experience, Schelling's main point, that in art we actually see a maker unguided and untrammeled by definite rules achieving a result that has a definite purpose, one that all men call lofty or sublime. If so, this same humanity will be prepared to take with Schelling the last step to his ultimate answer to our question, Why anything? For it is by way of our intuitive sense of divinity in a great work of art that we are finally led to a realization of the Divine in the order of Nature. In the course, in the successive "ages," of this temporal world of many beings we divine the Maker, that one timeless Being who brought Nature into being.

We began by seeking a name to stand for the relation of God to his world. We could find it in no such categories as causation or production, terms which stand for general concepts. We now find it in the name, *creation*, a word which stands for nothing conceivable, but for

something intimately realizable. This realization begins with the immediate intuition of that freedom which each senses in his own spontaneous gestures; it ends in the divination of a like freedom in the Maker whose work is Nature. But who says Maker says in English what the Greek would call a Poet. To Schelling, our world reveals itself as just such a world as would result, and could only result, from an original *poiesis,* wherein the one timeless Being brought into being the temporal world of countless individual things. If we ask the why and wherefore of this *poiesis,* the answer must be the same for the Divine as for the human poet: to still an inner unrest born of a need for self-expression; to achieve that state of peace-with-oneself which can only come when one's meaning has been revealed to the sense of others, and has received their acknowledgment. Only, in the human poet, both the states of antecedent unrest and of subsequent rest are brief, his peace is but transient, on him has fallen the weight of Canidia's curse:

> Ingrata misero vita ducenda est in hoc,
> Novis ut usque suppetas laboribus (Horace, *Ep.* XVII).

For the Divine Maker, both the antecedent unrest and the subsequent peace are timeless. What lies between is the course of the world, in the succession of whose ages Schelling sees just such a history as would reveal an estrangement of manifold beings from the Oneness of Divine Being, and their prospective return thereto.

For the story of the *Weltalter,* one must, of course, turn to the text. The whole drama might be likened to a Divine Comedy, in which the ascent from hell to heaven lay along the dimension of time, instead of along a radius of space. Or it may be caught up in Schelling's own likeness of the *Weltalter* to an epic that tells of an Iliad of estrangement from, followed by an Odyssey of return to, God. When the course of the world is run, and all things are returned into the God whose creative act first separated them from himself, or at least distinguished their manifoldness from his unity, God and world are one and indistinguishable in the timeless peace that follows.

Meagre as are the historic data here chosen to mark the divergent paths of those two lines of post-Kantian development, the scientific and the romantic orientation of thought toward idealism and realism, we may yet make them suffice to answer at least one of the questions by which your reviewer confessed himself perplexed whenever his

thought returned to the course of post-Kantian philosophy. The first of these questions expressed a wonder as to how it comes about that two developments culminating in philosophies that might well enough bear the same name, have always been and still are without a common contributor, or even a common friend. If, with the few distinguishing points of doctrine now at our disposal, we are to find some answer to this question, this can only be by devising some simple but formal scheme of classification in which these and other schools of modern philosophy may find each its place. A classification frame simple enough, formal enough, and historically available enough to serve our purpose may be developed from that most quoted epigram of Kant's:

(A) Concepts *(Gedanken = Begriffe)* without intuitions *(Inhalt-Anschauungen)* are empty.

(B) Intuitions without concepts are blind (*K.d.r.V.*,75B).

Consider first what membership we should find for a school accepting both the (A) and (B) clauses of this sentence. That Kant himself retained so much of empiricist tradition as based all empirical knowledge on immediate data of experience (*reine Empfindungen*) we have already seen. In so doing he violated the (B) clause of his own dictum. But purged of this inconsistency by the shrewd criticism of Maimon, followed by the insistent scorn of Hegel for all *unmittelbare Gewissheiten,* one line of post-Kantian thought moves steadily forward toward that position of our day which I have called the *scientific* or the *experimentalist* theory of evidence. If, then, we define the experimentalist theory to be that which accepts without reservation both the assertions (A) and (B) of Kant's dictum, the contradictory theory (non-emperimentalist) will include all schools that either (A′=conceptualist) deny the emptiness of concepts devoid of intuitions or (B′=intuitionist) deny the blindness of intuitions falling under no concept.

The most complete conceptualists of history were of course those seventeenth Century *rationalists* who denied the ultimate necessity (whatever might be the immediate helpfulness) of intuition for knowledge of the kinds and cases of individual that make up the world of finite beings. For the rationalist, the problem of "making the world of finite beings intelligible" was solved in principle, however difficult to apply in practice, by the use of logic alone. To this theory the acceptance of *some* ontological proof of the existence of God was indispensable.

The most complete *intuitionists* of history were the eighteenth century empiricists, who, holding all concepts to be acquired from previous experience, could not but deny the need of concepts for the knowing of those first data of experience, the individual occurrences of "red," "bitter," "warm," etc. Such knowledge must be purely intuitive, yet such intuitions are indispensable to all empirical knowledge, for only from such beginnings could experience furnish us with richer knowledge of the kinds and cases of individual things that compose our world. For the empiricist, the problem of making the world of finite beings intelligible was of practical importance only. It was well for us that experience showed this world to be as law-abiding (*verständlich*) as Newton found it to be; it would be better for us if experience showed it to be more purposeful *(vernünftig)* than Hume could find it to be; but however things may turn out for human good or ill, they must constitute a world intelligibly good or intelligibly ill, so long as we understand the evidence on which this world is taken to be one or the other.

And now, where shall we place the *romanticist* in this scheme of classification? As for our "prince of romanticists," Schelling, I think it evident enough from what has been said, that he must be either a conceptualist, or an intuitionist, or both. But let us consider certain matters that may make for doubt of this conclusion.

First, if Schelling is a conceptualist, he is certainly not a rationalist after the manner of a Spinoza or even a Leibnitz. Quite apart from any intuitionist method which we may later recognize as essential to his argument, his result presents a world-view that would meet none of the demands laid by these earlier thinkers on an intelligible world. And conversely, no world they would consider intelligible, would leave room for that free play of Divine Genius which Schelling's conception of intelligibility demands: a genius whose mastery accomplishes its plan, but whose madness leaves forever inexplicable the choice of one rather than another distribution of individual destinies for the accomplishment of this plan. But if Schelling has nothing in common with the rationalist, if there is nothing of the conceptualist in his make-up, what possible role can that part of his argument play which seems to depend on logic alone for evidence that a temporal world of finite beings must presuppose as its antecedent one timeless Being? And is it not to this very element in his doctrine that Schelling would

point, as setting him apart from the mystics with whom he is otherwise most akin: Boehme, Jacobi, Schleiermacher?

Again, if Schelling is an intuitionist, he is certainly not an intuitionist after the manner of a Locke or a Hume. Whether or not we recognize a conceptualist method as essential to Schelling's argument, an empiricism that did all it could to limit its "immediate sense-certainties" to passively received impressions ("simple ideas" whether of "sense" or "reflection") can have little in common with a romanticism that does all it can to limit its pure intuition to that ineffable experience which the humblest may have for his own, but which the wisest can impart to no other. It is by pure intuition that each is aware of his own moments of freedom; it is still by pure intuition that he divines a like freedom in others, be they plain men, his neighbors, or demigods creating works of art, or God the All-Creator. But if Schelling has nothing in common with the empiricist, how is he to "realize," how make real to himself, the inconceivable gesture of Creation?

For my part, I see no objection to recognizing Schelling's theory of evidence as standing in double opposition to the experimentalist's theory by denying both the (A) and (B) clauses of the Kantian sentence. If we so take him, we may carry his differentiation from other thinkers further: as conceptualist, he is distinguished not only from the empiricist, but also from all his fellow romanticists, whether mystics or not mystics; as intuitionist, he is distinguished not only from the seventeenth century rationalist but also from his influential contemporary, Hegel. But in this classification, Schelling would by no means stand alone; the Thomistic acceptance of both "truths of reason" and "truths of faith" would put one of the most influential world-views of history in the same category with his. For truths of faith are established in the hearts of the faithful, either by an immediate and ineffable experience of the believer, or by the imputation, on whatever ground, of such an experience to others. But it is not necessary to decide this point in order to be quite certain that Schelling is either a conceptualist, or an intuitionist, or both; whichever he is, his conception of evidence is incompatible with the conception I have attributed to the experimentalist.

I trust that those who find formal classifications unnecessarily tedious will yet have patience with those of us who find such formalism indispensable, whether to the definite answering of old questions or to

the clear asking of new. At least, they enable me to give myself an answer to the first question with which these reflections started: Why have the scientific and the romantic reorientations of thought toward idealism and realism been throughout mutually unhelpful? Why do the two types of idealistic realism in which they culminate remain mutually unintelligible? It is because what constitutes evidence for the one school stands in at least one and sometimes two respects, in direct contradiction to what the other school demands of evidence. Deeper cleavage than this, separating one thinker from another, there cannot be; it goes to the very root of things.

But if I have thus disposed of one of the two questions that beset me at the outset of this discussion, what shall I say of the second? We have seen how a certain antithesis has come to be; can we see what is to become of it? Must scientist and romanticist always remain strangers to each other, uncollaborative, unsympathetic, even where they are trying to think out an answer to the same ultimate question? For example, I used to wonder whether it were possible to reconcile those religious views that may be arrived at by non-experimental methods (rationalist, intuitionist, or both) with such views as an experimentalist may develop without departing from the rules of evidence that govern him in all his science. I wonder no longer; the thing is impossible. Where understandings of evidence are antithetical, no synthesis of conclusions is even a meaningful hypothesis. What then? Is the disciple of each school to confine his reading to the literature of his own school's past and present; is he to leave unread and unpondered the literature of every other doctrine? Those who in ready answer quote from the "ancient wisdom of childhood" that fable of the two sides to a shield may be right in their lesson, but inexperienced in the cost of applying it. That end has to be very important to attain which one is willing to pay what it costs, say, an experimentalist to read a romantic, or a romantic an experimentalist. Yet at no less price can these two minds, which between them influence the greater part of the thinking world, come to a mutual understanding of the most fundamental things in which they differ. Only an analysis of the logico-historical order suggested in the scanty, sketchy survey of the preceding paragraphs can reveal what differences are those most fundamental. To develop such a method on a scale that would let it classify the philosophies of all history, would require the collaboration of all disciples of

all present schools. And there is no reason why such collaboration should be other than welcome to all; for there is no reason why the schools should disagree on the scheme best fitted for their classification, however firmly each remain convinced of the superiority of the class in which it falls. But no such collaboration is possible, unless the disciple of each school put his whole mind and heart into an effort to interpret in ways intelligible to all other schools the literature of his own; and no less into an effort to interpret the literature of every other school in a manner adapted to the understanding of his own.

Is such a task impossible, given time and good will? I venture to think not. Would it prove easy? I am bold to swear not. Is it important enough to warrant the cost? That I must leave to the sense of others. To me it seems that a world of permanently contending philosophies, of changelessly warring religions, exhibits the only kind of "irrationality" it is important to reduce, if not to cure. Especially is this true because the irrationality of the whole is bound to reflect itself in the confusion of each part, leaving each individual mind in a state to which Hegel gives the telling name, *ein insichentzweites, ein unglückliches Bewusstsein.*

But if the result to be hoped for, mutual understanding if not ultimate agreement, is worth the cost of striving for it, then Mr. Bolman has paid his brave share of a worthy expense in the work that is before us. And Mr. Brightman may not be wrong in his surmise that a real mastery of the writing whose translation and commentary is the offering of this work may give "a new impulse to contemporary religious thought." Only, I should consider that the most valuable impulse it could give to contemporary thought of any kind would be an impulse to search out and ponder anew those pages of thought's history that to some seem its brightest, to others its darkest moments.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Religion of Greece in Prehistoric Times. By Axel W. Persson. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1942. 189 pp. $2.50.

In this continuously interesting volume, which is the seventeenth in the series of Sather Classical Lectures, Dr. Persson has given new archeological and philological material to add to the rapidly accumulating store of evidence for the theory that Minoan and Mycenaean cults and myths belonged to the larger complex of the archaic vegetation religion of the Mediterranean and Near Eastern regions. In this connection it may be of interest to recall that so long ago as 1934 Christopher Dawson, in his semi-popular but well-documented book *The Age of the Gods* (first published in 1928), stated with confidence that

> prehistoric Greece also belonged to the domain of the ancient vegetation religion. . . . Thus in Greece we find Athene, the great city goddess, who was also a virgin warrior, Artemis the huntress, and Aphrodite, the goddess of love, as well as a multitude of half-forgotten figures, such as Britomartis and Dictynna, Ariadne and Atalanta, Ino and Pasiphae, all of whom were originally forms of the Mother Goddess.

It is Persson's merit to have substantiated this general statement, particularly with regard to the Aegean goddess Dictynna, Ariadne, and Pasiphae, by concrete arguments.

A list of chapter headings indicates the scope and limits of the book. Chapter I is an introductory survey of survivals of the Minoan-Mycenaean religion in classical myth. Chapter II, which is the most original and important part of the work, traces the connections between the Minoan-Mycenaean signet-rings and the vegetation cycle. Chapter III deals with death and resurrection and the appropriate offerings and festivals. Chapter IV compares the Minoan-Mycenaean religion with the religions of Asia Minor, Syria, Babylonia, and Egypt. Chapter V discusses Minoan-Mycenaean survivals in the religion of classical Greece. Chapter VI deals with the common features of the vegetation cycle and the Nordic religion of the Bronze Age, and ends with a lucid summary of the author's theories.

In the running commentary that follows, the reviewer will briefly indicate those points which seem of most general interest, and will then turn to those statements which seem to call for question or correction.

Though Persson sees differences between Minoan and Mycenaean religious forms, he is reluctant to draw any hard and fast distinctions between them, and he does not hesitate to express disagreement with Martin Nilsson concerning such general questions, in spite of his generous admission that Nilsson has done invaluable work in this field (pp. 3-6).

The Glaukos myth serves as a point of departure for the study of the Minoan vegetation religion as revealed in the scenes shown on signet-rings of the second millenium B.C. This myth, it will be remembered, tells how Glaukos, son of Minos, fell into a jar of honey and was suffocated, and how Polyidos found him by means of divination and after being shut up in the boy's tomb, observed a snake restore to life another snake, killed by Polyidos, by touching it with an herb, and how Polyidos restored Glaukos to life by using the same herb. Persson plausibly explains this myth in part by seeing in it a reference to the old Aegean practice of preserving dead bodies in honey and by connecting it with the cult of the dead, some features of which survived in the *Pithoigia* of the Athenian *Anthesteria*. The tomb of Glaukos reminds us of the beehive tombs and burial chambers of the Minoan period, and the herb-bringing serpent is certainly to be connected with the wide-spread symbolism of the serpent as the life-giving force of nature. Other details of the myth are best interpreted with the help of the Minoan-Mycenaean signet-rings, which Persson calls the "textbook of the ancient religion. In these representations (all given in plates at the back of the book) Persson finds parallels to a number of religious symbols well known from Anatolian, Mesopotamian, and Egyptian religious art. Some of the engravings he interprets as scenes from the winter or spring or autumn vegetation cults, with such well established symbols as the wild goat, the sacred tree, the solar mirror, and the like. He also regards it as a further result of his research that the Cretan bull games were part of the great official spring festival (p. 91).

Another point of general interest is Persson's revival of the theory earlier advanced by Boeckh and K. O. Mueller that the Amazons were hierodules, who mutilated themselves to make an offering to the gods of fertility. In opposition to Nilsson, he maintains that the figure 8 shield had sacral significance, and like the so-called sacral knot was used as an amulet.

In comparing the Minoan-Mycenaean fertility cult with that of the Near East, Persson is handling more familiar material, but here too he contributes a number of useful details, especially in the matter of *epikleseis* or invocatory names, and their bearing on the differentiation of a mother goddess into distinct deities.

Agreeing with Nilsson that "we have a very strong cumulative evidence for the continuity of Mycenaean cults into the Greek age," Persson presents further evidence for this theory, particularly with regard to the Cretan origin of the Eleusinian mysteries.

A summary of the author's general position can best be given in his own words:

> We began these lectures by establishing in outline the larger background against which we desired to see our subject, the religion of the Minoan-Mycenaean period. Naming this background the Afrasian culture world, we held that it was to be considered, above all else, as the chief seminal influence behind the great cultures which were to follow. These, in turn, could arise only with a more complex and developed agriculture. If, then, we think of these new cultures as outgrowths from a common basic culture, we can understand more readily certain of their fundamental similarities. Further, this may justify us in assuming a degree of cross-pollination intrinsic to their later flowering. It is my considered belief that in order to interpret correctly the Minoan-Mycenaean culture, no less than the Hellenistic culture of a later period, we must maintain constant care to recognize influences both from the Orient and from Egypt (p. 163).

With this conclusion no well-informed student of the Bronze Age in the Mediterranean and Near Eastern areas is likely to disagree. There are, however, a number of minor or detailed points in Persson's admirable sketch on which the reviewer ventures to express dissent or doubt.

Persson seems to attribute to the Paleolithic period certain industries which, at the present time, are generally regarded as innovations of the Neolithic period (p. 1). His assertion that the Cretan linear script undoubtedly reads from left to right seems rather dogmatic, especially since he himself admits that the signs face the right. In this connection it may not be irrelevant to point out that Persson's earlier published theory that Cypro-Minoan writing was brought from the Greek mainland by Achaean colonists has been disproved by Daniel (*AJA* 1941, 251). Persson expresses himself more cautiously in saying that "it seems most probable that an orientation from left to right was

preferred on the gold rings, and one from right to left on the frescoes" (p. 31). On sealring No. 2 may we not see a serpent, schematically represented by dots, approaching a beehive? Incidentally, this would fit in with Persson's interpretation of the Glaukos myth. On the Cybele cult, Persson might well have consulted more recent literature, making full use of the new Anatolian material (p. 105). The author may also be justly criticized for relying almost wholly on Virolleaud's translations of the Ugarit (Ras Shamra) texts, and not taking sufficient account of recent corrections by other scholars (pp. 113 ff). Persson seems not to distinguish between matriarchy and matrilinearity (p. 123). Rather speculative is the etymology of Europa as "dark glancing," and its treatment as a verbal parallel to Pasiphae, although Persson may be right in holding that Pasiphae and Europa are invocations of the same deity (p. 135). Finally, one may query whether there is a significant connection between the oxen at Eleusis and the bull games of Crete (p. 150).

RALPH MARCUS

University of Chicago

Wayfarer's Words, Vol. III. By MRS. RHYS DAVIDS. London: Luzac & Co., 1942. viii + 1146. 5*s*.

Like its predecessors, *Wayfarer's Words,* I and II, this volume consists of a collection of articles, reviews, and addresses published or delivered by Mrs. Rhys Davids over a number of years. The thirty chapters making up the main body of the book and the twenty-two sections of the appendix cover quite a variety of subjects, though in one way or another almost all of them have some direct bearing on Indian religions and particularly Buddhism of which, as is well known, the author had been one of the outstanding Western students before her death in 1942.

Some of the chapters are rather technical and of interest only to the specialist, while others are of a more general nature. Of the latter type, perhaps the most valuable is the one on "Buddhist Parables and Similes." In fact, this article though first published in *The Open Court* (Chicago) in 1908 should be given wide circulation today, for it enables the Western reader to get a real glimpse of the thought imagery of the Indian peoples so essential to a better understanding of that sub-continent.

The dominant note that runs through most of the articles reprinted here is expressed in the title of the volume, "Wayfarer's Words," for that expresses the author's conception of the true nature of human life, a conception which she thinks was held by original Buddhism, or rather *Śākya,* the term she regards as a more appropriate designation for early Buddhism, since the very term *Buddha* did not gain general currency until some time after the Buddha's day. According to this conception, man is above all else a *wayfarer,* and his life upon earth is only a short section of the long journey. And by *man* the author means individual man, and above all man as a spiritual being.

Mrs. Rhys Davids is one of the chief proponents of an interpretation of original Buddhism which is in sharp contrast to views held by many Western students of that religion. This pertains not merely to some minor or secondary aspects but to some of the fundamentals, such as the conception of the nature of ultimate Reality and the true nature of man. Thus she repudiates all views that would represent the Buddha as an atheist or as teaching that the human self has no real existence, and hence that there can be no real survival beyond the death of the body. The author grants, of course, that this older interpretation seems to be justified by many Buddhist texts, especially of the Pali canon, but in spite of this she stoutly maintains that the Buddha had stressed the truth about man's spiritual nature and the survival of the real man beyond death. To be sure, this continuity and identity does not mean that the self remains always the same. Far from that, for man has by nature the capacity for growth, or to use a more characteristic expression, "for becoming." Man can *become* "the more" and move ever forward towards "the most," though the author would add that what this "more" and this "most" really are cannot be fully known by the individual until he reaches progressively these higher levels of human "becoming."

One thing is certain, namely, that it is an existence of positive content, even though it may be "empty" of much which now makes up the life of the empirical ego. Or, to put this in another way, early Buddhism according to Mrs. Davids, starting with the deepest insight gained by the Upanishad philosophy, expressed in the pregnant phrase *Tat tvam asi,* "That art Thou," made this apparently absurd dictum have real meaning by saying that man is akin in his true spiritual nature to *Atman,* the Great Self, and while he can not at present

equate himself with the "That," or Ultimate Being, of the Upanishad dictum, he can progressively become like "That." Thus, "That art Thou" really means "That thou canst become." This, as we have said, is the ever recurrent note that runs through most of the articles collected in this *Wayfarer's Words,* Vol. III.

Now there is little doubt but that Mrs. Davids is far nearer a correct interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha on this vital matter than are those who speak of him as the great atheist and as one who reduced the human self to a mere flux of psychic phenomena. But one may well question whether the author does not over-state her case a bit. Was the Buddha quite as positive in his interpretation of the true nature of the human self or of the greater Self as the author maintains? She admits that his followers soon gave a very different interpretation of these cardinal elements of religion. Her explanation of this radical change is hardly satisfying, even though one can readily grant that most great teachers have had their teachings more or less perverted by their followers.

We fully agree with the author that the Buddha was not an atheist in the sense in which this term is generally used and which would imply a materialistic interpretation of the nature of ultimate reality, and equally clear is it from the texts which the author quotes from the Pali canon, and even more from the Buddha's whole emphasis on moral and spiritual values, that he regarded man as a spiritual being and hence that the deepest reality of his being has survival values. But we doubt whether the Buddha defined either the spiritual nature of man or of Ultimate Being quite so explicitly in terms of the human self known in self-consciousness as Mrs. Davids seems to hold. The Buddha was, after all, a true son of India and of his age, as well as a sort of mystic, and as such he laid great stress upon the transcendental nature of Ultimate Being and hence upon the inadequacy of all human concepts to express its true nature. Likewise, of the true nature of the human self and particularly of the nature of man's existence beyond death, the Buddha spoke only with hesitance or caution, even though he was usually quite positive in his emphasis on moral and spiritual values for man's present life. This unwillingness to express himself more definitely and his resort to negations whenever he discussed the nature of Ultimate Being or human destiny is, of course, the chief reason why the Buddha's real teachings have suffered such

wide and often contradictory interpretations, both at the hands of the his own followers and of his Western interpreters.

Perhaps Mrs. Davids, with all her real insight into Indian religions and her great admiration for the best in them, is after all much more the heir of the great theistic religions and the culture that tends to regard man, individual man, as truly significant and as the key to unlock the riddle as to the nature of Ultimate Reality, than she herself seemed to realize.

A. K. Reischauer

New York City

Greek in Jewish Palestine: Studies in the Life and Manners of Jewish Palestine in the II-IV Centuries C.E. By Saul Lieberman. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1942. ix + 207 pp. $3.00.

The principal aim of this book is "the explanation of Rabbinic texts in the frame of the cultural conditions of the Mediterranean world" (p. viii). Professor Saul Lieberman's encyclopedic reading, combined with a careful industry, has enabled him to cover a large body of literature. In itself, the book is intended as a contribution to the analysis of the Greek vocabulary contained in Rabbinic literature, and accordingly, the author states that "a new edition of loan-words in the Talmud and Midrashim is an urgent need" (pp. 6, 9).

Samuel Krauss's *Griechische und Lateinische Lehnwörter,* appeared in 1898-99. But since its publication new source material has become accessible, especially through Preisigke's *Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden* (1925), because the Greek of the Palestinian Rabbis has "much in common with the non-literary papyri and inscriptions" (p. 3).

Thus, "the comparative method" (p. 4) of these two source currents results in a better understanding of many passages of rabbinical literature, and bears testimony to "the close contact between Jewish Palestine and the Hellenistic world in general" (p. 6). Says the author: "Words cannot be treated singly; they can be understood only in a context, within the frame of the surrounding world." But the statement that "a complete change in the method of investigation is absolutely necessary," is a conclusion that cannot stand the test, in view of such excellent comparative studies, not yet outdated, as Mi-

chael Sachs, *Beiträge zur Sprach- und Altertumsforschung,* I and II (1852), or Manuel Joël, *Blicke in die Religionsgeschichte zu Anfang des zweiten christlichen Jahrhunderts,* I and II (1880-83), and to mention one more, Heinrich Lewy's brilliant "Parallelen zu antiken Sprichwörtern," *Philologus,* LVIII (1899). In this connection, the reviewer must, for the sake of completeness, call attention to two lengthy papers of his own, entitled: "The Colloquy of Marcus Aurelius with the Patriarch Judah I," *The Jewish Quarterly Review,* XXXI (1941), 259-86, and "Alexander the Great and the Indian Gymnosophists in Hebrew Tradition, *"Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research,* XI (1941), 47-83.

The author has brought a wide rabbinical learning to his comparative method of investigation. He is in control of his subject so far as rabbinics are concerned. But since the cultural historic background of many rabbinic texts dealt with is an Hellenistic one, the author himself invites "suggestions made by scholars" (p. viii) who are at home in this field too. Making the most of this broadminded request, we must modify another conclusion, reiterated again and again (pp. viii, 152, 156, 160, 186), namely, that the comparative investigation of rabbinical passages sheds light upon many texts of classical literature. The overflowing masses of classical source material are *not* in need of elucidation derived from any rabbinical text. Some vernacular Greek word may, indeed, be preserved in rabbinic literature (p. 46), but any broader statement cannot have good authority, in view of the fact that Greek words inserted into "the Aramaic speech of the Rabbis" (pp. 2, 39), and the Aramaization of these loan-words (p. 6) are relatively in the same relation to spoken Aramaic as the Old-French words inserted into Rashi's commentaries are to medieval Hebrew.

Preface (pp. vii-ix) and Introduction (pp. 1-14), which offer the author's indicated methodological approach to his subject, are followed by chapters dealing with the Greek of the Rabbis and the Synagogue (pp. 15-67), and rabbinical passages mentioning *Gentiles and Semi-Proselytes* (pp. 68-90). Adopting Immanuel Loew's example, offered in his Index to Samuel Krauss's *Lehnwörter* (p. 7), loan-words arranged according to subject-matter are elucidated in the chapters entitled *Pleasures and Fears,* and *Oaths and Vows* (pp. 99-143). The chapter on *Greek and Latin Proverbs in Rabbinic Literature* (pp. 144-66), where the author tries "to demonstrate that all Greek phrases in

Rabbinic literature" (pp. 6, 39) are "quotations," is followed by a treatment of *Misunderstood Expressions and Words* (pp. 161-84). An Appendix, additions and corrections, a key to abbreviations, and indices conclude the volume so rich in subject-matter.

The sheer weight of the subject-matter seems to control the author to such an extent that it occasionally replaces the intended comparative technique by the dialectical rabbinic "learn" method. This shifting may be unconscious as far as the author is concerned, but it sometimes mars the comparative scientific strictness of the exposition. Furthermore, the reading of the book is rendered more difficult on account of the additional fact that the exposition is burdened with text emendations and corrections, instead of these more technical elements of the investigation being buried under the line in footnotes where they belong. There are, on the other hand, instances where the contents of footnotes should be in the context above the line (e.g., note 112, p. 160). Unfortunately, the line between historical fact and mere hypothesis is not always drawn in a clear way.

When Rabban Simeon, son of the Patriarch Rabban Gamaliel, once said: "There were a 1000 young men in my father's house, 500 of whom studied the Law, while the other 500 studied Greek wisdom" (p. 20), it is not commendable to see in such a remark "first-hand evidence" (p. 1) for the alleged existence of an "officially recognized academy of Greek wisdom." The hyperbolical meaning of these figures cannot be taken as valid historical evidence (cf. also J. Bergmann, "Die runden und die hyperbolischen Zahlen in der Agada," *MGWJ*, LXXXII [1938] 361-76). Another evidence of such a hypothetical way of reasoning may be found on page 88, concerning the alleged social intercourse between the Gentile and the Jew who "met accidentally in the Colonade."

An example as to how a rabbinical passage is explained by means of a rabbinical category of valuation, and not by means of the comparative method, is to be found on page 22: "Abbahu sent a letter to Simeon b. Abba, writing him, 'for the sake of these gray hairs' come back to Palestine." Professor Lieberman argues: "It seems to me that we may treat all these words in this letter as enigmatic." But the words plainly reflect Proverbs 20:29, "The beauty of old men is the hoary head."

The same method of interpretation is applied to one of the Anto-

ninus and Rabbi traditions (pp. 78-81). The result of the investigation is summarized in the statement: "This, of course, indicates that Antoninus was not converted during his earthly life." The real state of affairs may be found in the reviewer's previously quoted paper dealing with the Antoninus problem (*JQR*, xxxi, 266-70).

The interpretation of IV Ezra 10:1, "evertimus omnes lumina," evidently errs in the meaning of this phrase, which did not presuppose that the lamps "be first extinguished" (p. 104), because the formulation possesses a merely symbolical meaning referring to the death of a person. When Lord Edward Grey said, at the outbreak of World War I, "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime," he was using the same figure of speech.

To the chapter on the Greek of the Synagogue (pp. 29-67) must be added Hans Lietzmann's excellent summary on the Jewish Hellenistic Diaspora, in his *The Beginnings of the Christian Church*, I (1937). Not only the *Shema* was occasionally read in Greek by certain rabbis (p. 59), but even the *Tefilla*. Fragments of such a Greek *Tefilla* are preserved in a Church regulation of the fourth century, in the *Constitutiones Apostolicae*, as was shown by W. Bousset, in *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* (phil.-histor. Klasse, 1915), and by K. Kohler (*HUCA*. I [1924], 410 ff.).

Corrections are sometimes necessary when references are made to instances or alleged instances of some Church historical source of a rabbinical text. Thus Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho* is taken as an actual historical colloquy (p. 87), whereas it is in reality a fictitious conversation. According to A. Harnack (*Judentum und Judenchristentum in Justins Dialog mit Trypho*, [1913], p. 92), it is the monologue of the victor who made Trypho express his own conceptions. E. R. Goodenough (*The Theology of Justin Martyr*, [1923]), and Seeberg ("Die Geschichtstheologie des Justin Martyr," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, [1939]), express the same opinion.

The assumption that Tertullian might have found his idea of interpreting *Taw* in Ezechiel 9:4 "in various books of testimonies current among Christians" (p. 87), has to be dismissed, because there did not exist in early Christian Literature "books" of testimonies, but only loose collections of testimonies (cf. also Rendell Harris, *Testimonies*, I and II [Cambridge, 1916-20]).

The *Mekilta* story (pp. 16 f.), does not only contain an allusion to the Greek oath, "By the Dog," but a combination of this oath with the sophistic fallacy, "Is the Dog the Father," ridiculed by Plato (*Euthydemus,* 298 E) and refuted by Aristotle (*Peri ton sophistikon elenchon,* XXIV, 179a, 24), as will be shown by the reviewer in a forthcoming paper entitled "A Palestinian Polemic against Idolatry."

The numerous references to be found in rabbinic literature bearing on the attitude of kings toward the law, whether it is binding for them or not (pp. 38, 144), obviously testify to the influence of a specific Hellenistic literary species, the so-called "Treatises on Kingship." Such a Neo-Pythagorian *peri basileias* is, for instance, also used in the *Epistle of Aristeas* (cf. the reviewer's "Alexander's Conversation with Fictitious Jewish Elders and the Letter of Aristeas, "*PAAJR,* XI [1941], 76-80).

The saying, "Be a tail to lions and not a head to foxes" (*Aboth,* 4:15), does not have anything to do with the quoted saying by Caesar (pp. 146-48), as has been stated already by Wilhelm Bacher. It must be traceable to some Aesopian fable tradition (cf., for instance, Aesop's *Fables,* Book 5, fable 5, on the fox which lost his tail, etc.).

The study on *Chi and Theta* (pp. 185 ff.) deals with the rabbinical interpretation of *Taw* in *Ezechiel* 9:4, and in other sources. The remark, "We have to presume that the letter Taw in itself conveyed the idea of life, death, decay, or end" (p. 186), shows that the merely symbolical meaning of the different interpretations has been neglected. In this connection Origen's report that a Jew, "one of those who believe in Christ, said, the form of the Taw in the old (Hebrew) script resembles the cross, and it predicts the mark which is to be placed on the foreheads of the Christians" (p. 188), is in need of a re-interpretation. The assumption that this *mark* is an allusion to the *nigrum Theta,* is untenable. Referring to Ezechiel 9:4 and to the Apocalypse 7:3 (14:1), the passage possesses an obvious eschatological connotation; the mark singles out those who are privileged to live in the eschatological time. It has been hitherto overlooked that those who are marked with a *Taw* on their foreheads are mentioned in a parallel (9:11) to the main text of the *Zadokite Work* (cf. S. Schechter, *Fragments of a Zadokite Work,* 1910).

Origen's identification of *Taw* with the cross has a definite historical

appropriateness. The ancient Jews did not see in the *Taw* the Greek symbol *Chi* only (p. 188); they also saw in it a prefiguration of the cross, as the Jewish Christians did. This fact that *Taw* in the older Hebrew script also resembles a T-shaped cross, is not utilized by the author. It is precisely to this that Origen refers. Jewish Christians found in the cross form of the *Taw* a prefiguration of the Christian main typology. The endeavor on the part of the early Christians to see the cross prefigured in the Old Testament is to be found in numerous sources. The Epistle of Barnabas (ch. 12), for instance, finds the cross prefigured in the outstretched hands of Moses in prayer, according to Exod. 17:8-11, and in the brazen serpent lifted up by Moses in the wilderness, according to Num. 21:6-9.

The Hellenistic identification of the Hebrew *Taw* with the cross has an exact analogy in the identification of the Greek *Tau* with the cross. In a writing of the second or third century C. E. entitled, "The Consonants at Law, Sigma vs. Tau," attributed to Lucian of Samosata, and presenting a mock prosecution based on the interchangeability of certain consonants in the Attic dialect, we read (Lucian, 1, ed. A. M. Harmon, *The Loeb Class. Library,* p. 405) how this "bad-natured" *Tau* inflicts material injury on mankind (p. 407):

> Men weep and bewail their lot and curse Cadmus for putting Tau into the alphabet, for they say that their tyrants, following his figure and imitating his build, have fashioned timbers in the same shape and crucify men upon them; and that it is from him that the sorry device gets its sorry name (*stauros,* cross). For this, do you not think that Tau deserves to die many times over? As for me, I hold that in all justice we can only punish Tau by making a T of him! [by crucifying him; MSS read "for the cross owes its existence to Tau, but its name to man"].

As a whole, this is a very useful book, covering a field in which there is need of something of its size and scope. It is to be greeted with a cheer by all interested in the subject itself. Within its lexicographical limits this book of scholarship meets a real need; at the same time it clearly establishes the necessity for more research on the role of Hellenistic culture in rabbinic literature. Historians and linguists will welcome a second volume in the same field from Professor Lieberman's versatile pen.

Luitpold Wallach

Florence, Alabama

Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. By GERSHOM G. SCHOLEM. Jerusalem: Schocken Publishing House, 1941. xv + 440 pp. $4.75. (The Hilda Stich Stroock Lectures, 1938, delivered at the Jewish Institute of Religion, New York.)

An adequate and accurate account of that movement in Jewish religious thought which is known as Kabbala has been a scholarly desideratum for many years. The necessity for such an account has been the more marked because an understanding of Kabbala is important, not only for those who would know more about Jewish and Christian religious life, but also for those interested in non-religious fields into which Kabbalistic thought has entered. It is surprising that the devotion of scholars of the past has not produced the needed account, since Kabbalism as a movement developed in the full light of history, and since the literary remains of Kabbalistic speculation are numerous, and, for the most part, not difficult of access.

Perhaps the reason is that those writers whose equipment was equal to their chosen task lacked the perspective and detachment necessary for its accomplishment. The Kabbala is an occult tradition; the major Jewish historians, such as Graetz, Zunz, Geiger, Steinschneider, Joel, and Luzzatto, who treat of Kabbala in their works, all boasted their own rationalism and the rationality of the group whose annals they celebrated. In the works of these historians, an unsympathetic and highly-colored version of Kabbala is to be found. Other writers interpreted Kabbala in such a way as to give support to some belief which they favored, or some theory in which they were interested. Thus, C. D. Ginsburg, a nineteenth century Jew who became a Christian, wrote of Kabbala as if it had been a manual for the would-be convert; Adolphe Franck, who was interested in Parsi religion, brought Kabbala into the orbit of that interest; and Eliphas Levi, G. Encausse (Papus), Aleister Crowley, W. Wynn Westcott, and Madame Blavatsky, who were all concerned, in one way or another, with theosophical movements, recreated Kabbala in terms of their own prejudices.

Only in the work of Franz Joseph Molitor (*Philosophie der Geschichte oder über die Tradition.* 4 vols. [Münster, 1827-55]) and of A. E. Waite (*The Holy Kabbalah* [New York, 1930]) has there been any evidence of true insight into the nature of the Kabbala. Unfortunately, neither Molitor nor Waite had the requisite historical or philological background to convert sympathetic insight into genuine understand-

ing. In the work of Waite, moreover, there is some element of special pleading for his own particular brands of occultism. At best, then, a student who wished an overview of Kabbala on which he could rely was able to find only second-rate substitutes.

That this situation has changed, that it is possible today to find accurate and reliable studies in the Kabbala, is largely the work of Gershom Gerhard Scholem, Professor of Jewish Mysticism in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Professor Scholem has devoted more than twenty years to this theme; his published studies have been of a varied character, bibliographical, biographical, historical, analytical and critical in turn. They include many pioneer studies, and have thrown light into many obscure corners of the Kabbala. Thus, for example, the now classic statement of the origin and development of the Kabbala is Scholem's "Zur Frage der Entstehung der Kabbala" (*Korrespondenzblatt des Vereins zur Gründung und Erhaltung einer Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums,* IX [1928], 4-26). The only bibliographical study of any fullness is Scholem's *Bibliographia Kabbalistica* (Leipzig, 1927). Many of Scholem's pioneering literary studies are collected in the Hebrew volumes, *Kabbalistic Manuscripts in the National Library and the University in Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, 1930) and *Chapters in the Literary History of the Kabbala* (Jerusalem, 1931); others, uncollected, appear in the Hebrew periodicals *Kirjath Sefer, Tarbiz* and *Zion,* and in the German *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.* Deserving of mention as a summary of our knowledge of the Kabbala is the article "Kabbala" contributed by Scholem to the German *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* IX, columns 630-732.

These works of Scholem are mentioned here to try to give some impression of the vast background of accumulated knowledge which makes this scholar not just one of many writers on the Kabbala, but *the* authority to whom any interested student should turn first for information and for material. He is a giant compared with whom all others who work in this field are as children. It is especially fortunate, therefore, that Scholem's latest work, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism,* which presents his basic approach to the Kabbala and a series of summary surveys exemplifying this approach, should have been written in English, and unfortunate that wartime conditions have so seriously curtailed the number of copies available for distribution here.

Consistent readers of this *Review* will be, in the main, familiar with Scholem's general understanding of the pattern of Jewish mysticism, for the first chapter of this present book is an expansion of a lecture which was printed in *The Review of Religion* in 1938, under the title "Philosophy and Jewish Mysticism." Furthermore, this reviewer's article, "The Diffusion of the Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in English Literature" (*Review of Religion,* 1942), was based upon Scholem's general position. What Scholem has added in his recently published version is an account of the nature of mysticism as he sees it, and further details of his philosophy of Jewish mysticism.

Scholem presents a suggestive general analysis in which mysticism is a distinct stage of religious development. It is the third stage, and arises after the transformation of the naïve religiosity of the "mythical" epoch into the "institutional" phase; mysticism arises in a subsequent "romantic" period. In the mythical stage, no gulf exists between humanity and divinity; nature is the meeting-ground of gods and men. This period involves a "truly monistic universe," because it is marked by an "immediate consciousness of the interrelation and interdependence of things." There is no room here for mysticism, because there is no knowledge of duality.

In the second period, religiosity becomes religion. In its institutionalized forms, religion asserts the infinity of God and the finitude of man, and thus creates an abyss between God and man unbridgeable save by revelation and by prayer. No longer monistic, the universe is conceived as fundamentally dualistic.

> Religion's supreme function is to destroy the dream-harmony of Man, Universe and God, to isolate man from the other elements of the dream stage of his mythical and primitive consciousness. . . . Man becomes aware of a fundamental duality, of a vast gulf which can be crossed by nothing but the *voice*; the voice of God, directing and law-giving in His revelation, and the voice of Man in prayer. The great monotheistic religions live and unfold in the ever-present consciousness of this bipolarity. . . . To them the scene of religion is no longer Nature, but the moral and religious action of Man and the community of men, whose interplay brings about history as, in a sense, the stage on which the drama of Man's relation to God unfolds (pp. 7-8).

This positive and communal formulation, in Scholem's view, precedes and gives rise to mysticism. For mysticism is basically the attempt to return to primitive unity; it does not ignore the gap between divinity and humanity, but, rather, involves a search for a hidden path

to bridge the unbridgeable. The meeting-place of God and man cannot be nature; the God-idea has developed beyond such simplicity. No more can history suffice, as in the institutional stage, for history is finite, as man, its protagonist, is finite. In the mystical stage, the soul becomes the scene of religion, which is now individualistically conceived. The primary concern of mystical religion is with the path of the soul through mundane diversity to the primordial unity of the Divine reality. Mysticism is a revival of religious creativity and originality in and for the individual.

Whether or not his analysis could be justified as a history of mysticism in any religious tradition, it is certainly of great value in the formulation of a psychology of mysticism. So, for example, the recurrent longing for a return to a "golden age" of the past becomes clear in the light of the desire of the mystic to return to primitive unity, yet the description of that "golden age" is obviously neither of any remembered past nor of any possible present; it might well be a future conceived on the level of the human soul integrated with the Divine. Here Scholem's theory is at least as satisfactory as any involving the desire to return to uterine conditions.

It is at this point in Scholem's treatment that this reviewer finds it difficult to follow the next step. For, up to this point, Scholem has presented mysticism as an individual response to the religious environment. Now, without showing a clear relationship between this mysticism of the individual and the type of systematic formulation of esoteric techniques and beliefs with which the bulk of his text is concerned, the author continues to use the word "mysticism" to describe what seems to be far from his original definition. Nothing seems more remote from mysticism, which "seeks to transform the God which it encounters in the peculiar religious consciousness of its own social environment from an object of dogmatic knowledge into a novel and living experience and intuition" (p. 10), than the new dogmatism of theosophical or occult systems.

It is possible that this difficulty can be surmounted by the postulation of a fourth stage in Scholem's psychology of mysticism. This fourth stage might be called the "theosophical" period, and its primary concern would be the institutionalization and systematization of the creative insight of the mystic. The "meeting place of God and man" would

no longer be in the individual soul; the uniqueness of the mystic's experience would be formalized and externalized into the "Path," and the meticulous compliance of the theosophist with every detail of this formalized pattern would be the condition of salvation. By the addition of this fourth stage, such cultic manifestations as the Kabbala are made intelligible in their relation not only to mysticism, but also to the parent religion. It is in some such terms that it is possible to explain why occultism is seldom heterodox.

Scholem, however, uses the term "mysticism" to apply without discrimination to the individual mystic experience and to its subsequent societal formulation. He points, too, to the dependence of the mystic upon tradition; the unique experience of the mystic centers in the historical creed of the religion in which he was born; in both senses, that religion is the mystic's point of departure. Thus, the themes of Jewish mysticism are the themes of Judaism, treated, perhaps, with novel emphasis, reaching, perhaps, to novel conclusions, but, withal, firmly rooted in the Jewish past. Jewish mysticism attempts to discover and utilize the mystical values in the traditional monotheism and bibliolatry of Judaism.

That Kabbala, which is a general name for the entire Jewish mystical tradition, is not a single consistent movement, that many strands and many systems have gone into its development, is a point to which Scholem gives considerable attention. It may well be said that his book is concerned with the analysis of this diversity, and with the discovery of the elements of unity residing in this diversity. The various subphases which Scholem analyzes in this volume range in time from the first century B.C. to the eighteenth century A.D. They vary in subtlety from the simple pietism of latter-day Hasidism to the highly abstruse doctrines of Zoharic Kabbalism.

The first phase to be treated might prove, on further analysis, to be divisible into several; for convenience, Scholem treats as one the varying aspects of Merkabah (Chariot) Mysticism and Jewish Gnosticism. The earliest literary remains of this form of Jewish mysticism are from the first century B.C.; its latest manifestations date from the tenth century A.D. The central theme of these oldest of Jewish mystical doctrines

is not absorbed contemplation of God's true nature, but perception of his appearance on the throne, as described by Ezekiel, and cognition of the mysteries

of the celestial throne-world. The throne-world is to the Jewish mystic what the *pleroma,* the "fullness," the bright sphere of divinity with its potencies, aeons, archons and dominions is to the Hellenistic and early Christian mystics of the period who appear in the history of religion under the names of Gnostics and Hermetics (p. 43).

Much of the surviving literature of this mysticism consists of unpublished fragments of the so-called "Hekhaloth" books, or descriptions of the heavenly halls through which the visionary passes before reaching the seventh palace, in which the throne of the divine glory is to be found. It is significant that this literature is not exegetical in character; it is rather the presentation of a new religious experience than the elaboration of an old. It is also important, in the light of the reviewer's preference for a distinct category to represent the formalization of a post-mystic cultus, that Scholem speaks here of a "school of mystics" known as the *Yorde Merkabah,* or "descenders to the Merkabah," for admission to whose circle certain general moral characteristics and certain esoteric knowledge are requisite.

Of enormous psychological import is Scholem's conclusion that the members of these groups were not concerned with a mystical union between the soul and God. "The infinite gulf between the soul and God the King on His Throne is not even bridged at the climax of mystical ecstasy" (p. 54). Nor is there much sense of love of God.

> Throughout there remained an almost exaggerated consciousness of God's *otherness.* . . . The Creator and His Creature remain apart, and nowhere is an attempt made to bridge the gulf between them or to blur the distinction. The mystic who in his ecstasy has passed through all the gates, braved all the dangers, now stands before the throne; he sees and hears—but that is all (p. 55).

Because of this characteristic of Merkabah mysticism, its liturgical remains are mere storehouses of "incomparably solemn and at the same time infinitely vacuous hymns" (p. 57), without the vitality or inspiration which would enter with some feeling of love. "Holiness" in these hymns is a purely numinous term, with no moral connotation; "power" and "glory" are the most significant divine attributes.

With this brief and admittedly inadequate summary, we leave this excellent treatment of Jewish Gnosticism, and pass to Scholem's discussion of Hasidism in medieval Germany. Hasidism continued the apocalyptic and eschatological speculations of Merkabah mysticism, but with rather more emphasis upon the unity of God than upon His glory.

More important, however, than these speculations is the introduction of a moral note; a human ideal is defined, that of *Hasiduth,* or devoutness, which is entirely independent of learning. The three chief elements in this pietism are: "ascetic renunciation of the things of this world; complete serenity of mind; and an altruism grounded in principle and driven to extremes" (p. 91). For later developments, it is also important to point out that, in the popular mind, the Hasid took form as a magician, "the true master of magical forces who can obtain everything precisely because he wants nothing for himself" (p. 98). Thus, the legends of the Golem are an outgrowth of the popularization of the Hasid as Magician.

In the system of German Hasidism there occurred a very marked development of penitential ideas and practices. This is ascribed by Scholem to the influence of Christian asceticism, which, at this period, was decidedly flagellant in character and remained so during the period of the Crusades, despite the attempted Gregorian reform in the eleventh century. Among the Hasidism, too, was stressed God's attribute of omnipresence, in itself part of a complex of transcendent attributes, yet yielding readily to immanent interpretation. Finally, both numerical and alphabetical techniques of interpretation loom large in the actual practice of the German pietists.

The next four chapters of Scholem's book are devoted to what is generally known as Kabbalism: that late medieval theosophy in which all the previous trends of Jewish mysticism are united, and which provides the starting-point for all later Jewish mysticism. To typify the non-Zoharic schools of the Kabbala, Scholem selects for presentation the interesting doctrine of the Prophetic Kabbala, as developed by Abraham Abulafia and his disciples. This is, at one and the same time, the most ecstatic and the least popular form of Kabbala. Its major works, those of Abulafia himself, were written at about the same time as the Zohar, and, as Scholem points out, "it is no exaggeration to say that each marks the culminating point in the development of two opposing schools of thought in Spanish Kabbalism . . . the ecstatic and the theosophical" (p. 122).

Abulafia's doctrine involved the use of letter combinations and number substitutions as an aid to meditation. According to Abulafia, this is "nothing less than the 'mystical logic' which corresponds to the inner

harmony of thought in its movement towards God" (p. 132). Inasmuch as Abulafia's method involved certain rules of body posture and breathing, Scholem compares it with the combination of techniques known as Yoga. The content of ecstasy in Abulafia's doctrine was not so much a mystic union with God, involving a breaking down of the consciousness of God's *otherness,* as it was a concept of adhesion to that *other (Devekuth).* The identification of the ecstatic is rather with a disembodiment of his teacher, and thus, remotely, with the Torah as Knowledge. In another form of the ecstasy, some dissociation of the ecstatic's personality is present; he "encounters his own self confronting and addressing him" (p. 139).

Because of its importance, overshadowing all other texts of Jewish mysticism, the Zohar is the subject of two sections of Scholem's work. The first of these is an elaborate historical and philological essay designed to present Scholem's conclusions about the authorship, textual history and date of the Zohar. In this chapter, the conclusions are quite similar to those of Graetz and others; the Zohar was written in Spain by Moses de Leon sometime during the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The evidence presented is very complete and convincing.

After this chapter, Scholem presents a survey of the theosophical doctrine of the Zohar. In such a survey, much must inevitably be omitted. Scholem's thorough grasp of the material, however, makes his summary more complete and more systematic than others. He presents the doctrine of the Zohar as antithetical and yet complementary to that of Abulafia. Where Abulafia was concerned with the techniques of meditation, the Zohar is concerned with the object of meditation, namely, the intelligible world. Essentially, the Zoharic theosophy is "an attempt to preserve the substance of naïve popular faith, now challenged by the rational theology of the philosophers" (pp. 202-3). It goes beyond the contemplation of the throne characteristic of Jewish Gnosticism to a contemplation of divinity.

Thus the Sefiroth represent an attempt to push the knowledge of God into as yet uncharted regions of the spiritual universe. These Sefiroth are both ten fundamental attributes of God, and "ten stages through which the Divine life pulsates back and forth" (p. 205). Thus they are not a ladder between God and the world, as D. H. Joel, influenced by neo-Platonic ideas, suggested, but successive phases in the emanation of God. "The emanation of the Sefiroth is conceived as a

process which takes place *in* God and which at the same time enables man to perceive God" (p. 206).

The existence of a good English translation of the major sections of the Zohar (*The Zohar.* Translated by Harry Sperling and Maurice Simon. 5 volumes. [London, 1931-34]), and the consequent availability of much of this material make it unnecessary to go into much detail about this section of Scholem's book. In broadest summary,

> the spiritual outlook of the Zohar might well be defined as a mixture of theosophic theology, mythical cosmogony and mystical psychology and anthropology. God, the universe and the soul do not lead separate lives, each on its own plane. The original act of Creation in fact knows nothing of such clear-cut division which . . . was the cosmic fruit of human sin. . . . As far as the Zohar is concerned its fascinating appeal to the mind is to a large extent bound up with its unique combination of the three elements into a colourful though not unproblematic whole (pp. 238-39).

Scholem's presentation of the Kabbala according to the ideas of Isaac Luria and his school is unmatched in any language. English readers will find a valuable supplement in the charming essay by Solomon Schechter, "Safed in the Sixteenth Century" *(Studies in Judaism.* Second Series [Philadelphia, 1908] pp. 202-306). The distinctive features of Scholem's presentation are: first, his freedom from animus; second, his thoroughness; and third, his brilliant psychological analysis of the development of the Lurianic Kabbala. This last merits discussion. The development of the Lurianic Kabbala is conceived by Scholem as a reaction to the tremendous emotional upheaval attendant upon the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. It represents a fusion of apocalyptic and Messianic concern with the "end" and the traditional Kabbalistic concern with the "beginning." The Expulsion was conceived first as the catastrophic inception of the Messianic era; gradually the hope of immediate redemption died, and the Expulsion was viewed solely as catastrophe. This physical catastrophe was paralleled by spiritual catastrophe: "Life was conceived as Existence in Exile and in self-contradiction" (p. 245). "The horrors of Exile were mirrored in the Kabbalistic doctrine of metempsychosis, which now won immense popularity by stressing the various phases of the soul's exile" (p. 246). "Death, repentance, and rebirth were the three great events in human life by which the new Kabbalah sought to bring man into blissful union with God" (p. 245).

Luria's chief cosmological doctrine was that of *Tsimtsum,* or contraction; to Luria, this meant that "the existence of the Universe is made possible by a process of shrinkage in God" (p. 257). This, too, Scholem interprets in the light of Exile, of God's banishing Himself from totality into seclusion. This self-seclusion of divinity is a necessary prelude to the revelation of the divine light. Luria also contributed the concepts of the "shattering of the vessels" and of their restoration. The breaking of the vessels is the "cause of that inner deficiency which is inherent in everything that exists" (p. 264). "The restoration of the ideal order, which forms the original aim of creation, is also the secret purpose of existence" (p. 264); salvation is the mending of the broken vessels. Inasmuch as some part of the process of restoration is allotted to man, the true worshipper exercises great power over the inner worlds through his prayers. Thus, for Luria, prayer "stands directly on the border between mysticism and magic, where the one only too easily passes into the other" (p. 273).

The messianic movement which, in the seventeenth century, focussed the attention of a large part of Europe on Sabbatai Zevi, the Messiah of Ismir, is interpreted by Scholem in terms of an amplification of the psychology of Exile, under the rubric of which he treated the work of Luria. In this interpretation, the apostasy of the Messiah, his exile from the ranks of the faithful, is conceived as a necessary prelude to his messianic mission. A similar perversion of the normal psychology of religion appears, even before the need arose for a rationalization of Sabbatai's conversion to Islam, in the tendency to accept Sabbatai's noncanonical behavior as proof of his messianic character. But, while such an explanation suffices for the disciples, another analysis must be provided to explain Sabbatai himself. This Scholem finds in various sources on the basis of which he classifies Sabbatai as a manic-depressive; during the manic phase of the disease, Sabbatai performed "bizarre and anti-Halakhic acts" (p. 287).

The later developments of Sabbatianism raised paradoxy to a cult. Such cultic paradoxes were the doctrine of the holiness of sin, and that of the apostasy of the Messiah. Both doctrines represent a thoroughly nihilistic antinomianism; where, however, the doctrine that apostasy is a necessary part of the mission of the Messiah demands no open break with canon law on the part of the believer, and is, therefore, merely

passively antinomian, the doctrine of the holiness of sin involves active antinomianism on the part of each sectarian. It is this latter type which the eighteenth century pseudo-Messiah and thaumaturgic Kabbalist, Jacob Frank, and his followers advocated.

Scholem's last and least pretentious chapter deals with the still active movement of Polish Hasidism. In Hasidism, Scholem sees a problem of the "social function of mystical ideas" (p. 323). This is essentially a product of popularization; such gradual popularization Scholem finds carrying through from the Lurianic Kabbala to Sabbatianism and thence to Polish Hasidism. But, while the paradoxy of Sabbatianism alienated the masses,

> Hasidism, . . . broadly speaking represents an attempt to make the world of Kabbalism, through a certain transformation or re-interpretation, accessible to the masses of the people, and in this it was for a time extraordinarily successful (p. 323).

The new element which was introduced was, however, not doctrinal. It must

> not be sought on the theoretical and literary plane, but rather in the experience of an inner revival, in the spontaneity of feeling generated in sensitive minds by the encounter with the living incarnations of Mysticism (p. 333).

Hasidism represents the ethicizing of the Kabbala. In it, "almost all the Kabbalistic ideas are now placed in relation to values peculiar to the individual life" (p. 336). Those few ideas which are not so related, seem vain and without effect. As in other revivalist movements, the personalities of the leaders, as exemplifications of ethical values, have more power than the doctrines they teach.

The fascinating, millenial story of Jewish mysticism, and the equally fascinating, and often brilliantly original interpretations of this story by Professor Scholem make this book an interesting and valuable document. Comparatively few copies of the book have reached this country because of transportation difficulties. This reviewer feels, that, because of the importance of the book and the limited possibility for interested persons to obtain copies, this extensive summary is justifiable. No summary can, however, do justice to the many excellencies of Scholem's work. It is epoch-making.

Joseph L. Blau

Far Rockaway, New York

The Art of Dying Well: The Development of the Ars moriendi. By Sister Mary Catharine O'Connor. (No. 156 of the Columbia University studies in English and comparative literature.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. xiii + 258 pp. $2.50.

A competent study has been added to the growing list of the English and comparative literature series sponsored by Columbia University. The value of these monographs to scholars is attested by the fact that nearly one-fourth of them are now out of print. The present volume, while primarily a scholar's book, contains in the narrative sections material of interest to the general reader, written, moreover, in clear, good English, with frequent vivid and picturesque phrases.

The subject of the study, the *Ars moriendi,* is "a popular little conduct book that taught one how to die." It was printed by Caxton for the Westminster Press about 1491, and again somewhat abridged a year later. He translated it from the French and entitled it the "Art & Crafte to Know Well to Dye." It exists in at least three hundred manuscripts, and also in various versions in well over one hundred copies printed from wood blocks and movable type before 1500, and also in many issued through the following century. Details concerning the various manuscripts and printed editions to be found in libraries in the United States are included in the carefully classified and exhaustive lists that occupy almost one-half of the book. The only version of the treatise in English was made by Miss Frances M. M. Comper, under the title of *The Book of the Craft of Dying* (New York, 1917, now out of print). She gives a translation of the two forms, which are treated at length in the present study.

Part I of the volume is given to a description and history of the text, and to a consideration of its sources and authorship. Part IV is devoted to books in the *Ars moriendi* tradition. The intermediate sections contain the lists already mentioned.

The Introduction tells of the work itself. "It is a complete and intelligible guide to the business of dying, a method to be learned while one is in good health and kept at one's fingers' ends for use in that all-important and inescapable hour." A note points out that the fifteenth century was "frenzied about death." It was a time when widespread visitations of plague made death an imminent affair, even as today death is imminent from the plague of war conditions. Hence there is a timely aspect to the present publication. The book was not only for

religious in monasteries, but also and chiefly for "carnall & seculer" men. It is not a handbook for priests, it was intended, probably, "to guide the business of dying of those to whom the ministrations of the clergy were not available," as would be frequently the case when an epidemic was raging.

The treatise exists in two principal versions, which are designated as CP and QS, "from the beginning of their *Incipits* in the Latin versions." The former is the longer and the latter apparently an abridgement. Sister Mary Catharine O'Connor states that she holds this to be the case "in dissent from all who have written on the subject." However, Miss Comper takes the same opinion for granted. The book is divided into six parts or chapters, and generally speaking the subject matter is parallel in the two versions. Chapter I teaches that death is a boon to be desired, and since it is inevitable we are told that "therefore we ought to take our death when God will, wilfully and gladly, without any grutching or contradiction." (This quotation is from Miss Comper's translation.) Chapter II describes five temptations with advice how to meet them. The QS text appears to have been written to accompany pictures; the block books of this version contain eleven famous woodcuts, five of which illustrate the "Temptations" to unbelief, despair, impatience, vainglory, and avarice, and five appear under the titles of "Inspirations" to the contrary virtues. There is an added cut showing a picture of death. Chapter III gives various interrogations that should be put to the dying man. The writer of the monograph with a scholar's eye for relationships notes that "the question and answer method is a very ancient and very common practice of the Church," and cites the baptismal and ordination offices, with other instances. The last three Chapters contain various instructions and prayers. The sick man is not to be given false hopes of recovery, but is to be exhorted to make good preparation for his death while he yet has the full use of his reason and senses. A number of prayers are given to be said over the sick person in his last agony.

Concerning the authorship, the scanty known facts are related, with the conclusion that the CP text was written at the time and in the locality of the Council of Constance (1414-1418), inspired probably by Gerson's *De arte moriendi,* the actual author having been, in all likelihood, a member of the Order of Preachers. Detailed arguments are given in support of this opinion.

As to the question of sources, the author sums up her conclusions in

the following brief statement, and then proceeds to elaborate arguments in support of her theory:

> The author of the CP text incorporated into it much of Gerson, but also much besides him. As anyone investigating the sources of a medieval religious work learns to expect, the added material is to be found in the Fathers and in the liturgy, with occasional contributions from the transmitters of patristic thought and from the ecclesiastical writers of the later Middle Ages.

The final section of the monograph, which treats of books in the *Ars moriendi* tradition includes, in addition to contemporary and later Catholic books, publications by post-Reformation writers, Protestants and others, including our own Jeremy Taylor, who receives an appreciative notice.

The volume as a whole must be regarded as notable in scholarship and in treatment of the subject in its literary and historical setting. The author gives evidence of wide reading, both in the extensive bibliography and in her text with its footnotes. These include quotations from innumerable writers from the early Fathers onward through the Middle Ages down to contemporary scholars in her field. She has a first-hand acquaintance with a number of the manuscripts and editions, which she lists and describes. Her material is well arranged, and not least to be commended, the Index is full and usable. The frontispiece of the volume is from a facsimile of the woodcut "Inspiration to Faith" in an edition owned by Columbia University.

MOTHER MARY MAUDE, CSM

St. Mary's Convent
Peekskill, New York

Religious Trends in English Poetry. Volume II (1740-1780): *Religious Sentimentalism in the Age of Johnson.* By HOXIE NEALE FAIRCHILD. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. xii + 406 pp. $5.00.

In this volume Professor Fairchild completes the first portion of his massive study of the history of religious thought as it finds expression in English poetry of the eighteenth century. His method, as readers of his first volume will not need to be reminded, is minutely inductive: that is, instead of grouping the major poets of the century to illustrate a thesis drawn from the explicitly philosophical and theological writings of the period, he has confined himself to verse, and has allowed his

conclusions to develop from an analysis of the work of over one hundred poets and poetasters, some of them so obscure as to be nameless. The two volumes, "composed," as he says, "of many separate bricks firmly cemented together," will furnish the foundation for a third volume in which, omitting minor figures altogether, he will investigate the religious thought of the major romantic poets. This he hopes to complete in six or seven years. If he keeps to his schedule, he will have performed a remarkable feat, for the mere amount of reading involved—not only in the poets themselves but also in previous scholarly studies, which he never neglects—is enormous. He will probably succeed, for few scholars of our time handle large masses of literary erudition so confidently or firmly.

It may be simply because I have adjusted myself to the method (for which, as I indicated in my review of the first volume, I had a certain lack of sympathy), or it may be that the poetry studied in this volume is more interesting to me, but I think there are other reasons for my conviction that this is a better book than its predeccessor. Professor Fairchild, whose response to criticism is disarmingly frank and manly, has heeded the plea of a critic of the earlier volume for a somewhat less starkly inductive method and for more guidance in the way of general historical comment. To provide room for this, he has eliminated a number of minor poets whom he had originally planned to include. This seems to me a distinct improvement. Though he claims no originality for his summaries of different movements in eighteenth-century thought, they seem to me to deserve special commendation for terseness, clarity, and vigor. (The best and longest is Chapter IV, "The Evangelical Movement," which treats under one heading Methodism and Evangelicalism proper.) And the case is really made more persuasively when some of the evidence is suppressed, not necessarily as irrelevant but as superfluous.

Sentimentalism, as defined in this study, is a religion (generally believed by the person holding it to be Christian) which substitutes for the historic dogmas of "the redemption of sinful man through the incarnate life and sacrificial death of Jesus Christ, the Son of God" a doctrine of optimism and self-confidence grounded on "the conception of a universal harmony in which God, man, and nature are pantheistically interfused." It is Professor Fairchild's contention, based on a great amount of painstakingly collected evidence, that the Protestantism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tended steadily to decay into

sentimentalism, usually, though not always, after having passed through a stage of Christian latitudinarianism. Evangelicalism was a retrograde tendency, a revival of puritan Protestantism. Though sentimentalism is much more abundant in the Age of Johnson than in the Age of Pope, its basic tenets had all been stated in poetry by 1740. It remained for the poets who flourished from 1740 to 1780 to make sentimentalism more subjective, more friendly to moods, and less didactic. The medievalism which emerged so strikingly during this period shows—except in the forgeries of Chatterton, where the religious feeling appears to be histrionic—no genuine sympathy for, or even understanding of, Catholic theology or practice. It "implies no more than a desire for emotional stimulation by the strange and the remote." From these general conclusions, stated as historical facts and not as complete judgments of the value of the particular poems considered, I see no reason to dissent. Nor do I think any reader is likely to. The real objection will come from modern "sentimentalists," who will complain that all Professor Fairchild's terms are loaded against them—as they admittedly are. For "sentimentalism" they will wish to substitute "liberal Protestantism," and for "decay," "progress."

Teachers of English literature like myself need to be reminded constantly that *Religious Trends in English Poetry* is not, in its main intent, a book of fully rounded criticism. It is a history of modes of religious thought as they appear in poetry. There is, however, rather more in this volume than in the preceding that is immediately applicable to the needs of the classroom, probably for the reason that as modes of thought get generally accepted they become more accessible to poets of genuine power. The sections on Churchill, Cowper, Akenside, and Young are exciting, that on Young, I think, especially original and persuasive. (Young was not a deist but "a witty, sentimental, posturing, believing Protestant Christian"; his conception of the divine creativeness of the senses—remembered approvingly by Wordsworth in *Tintern Abbey*—is more "romantic" than his melancholy.)

But the literary critic will feel a certain disappointment and dissatisfaction with the tenth chapter—that dealing with Shenstone, the Wartons, Chatterton, Collins, and Gray—towards which he will have been looking wistfully as he plods through Samuel Derrick, William Kenrick, Catherine Jemmat, Abraham Portal, and Dr. Dodd. The fact is that these poets, who have been considered more strikingly "pre-roman-

tic" than any others in the book, are an embarrassment to Professor Fairchild, because they pretty consistently decline to illustrate the religion of sentiment which he considers inseparable from the rise of romanticism. He explains the paradox by asserting that by 1740 sentimentalism had become so firmly established that its conventions "could be practiced by men who had no strong interest in their deeper meaning." These poets are consequently an eddy outside the main historical stream which carried the intellectual sources of the Romantic Movement. It may be so, but the explanation leaves us with another paradox: the poets to whose *art* the romantic poets were most sympathetic (this, I think, is incontrovertible) did not furnish them with their *ideas*. No doubt Professor Fairchild will find occasion to comment on this in the book to follow. But I wish that in this volume he had probed deeper for an explanation of the cleavage between the religious views of Collins and his art. For Collins, he admits, was a fervent Christian. Gray also puzzles me. Professor Fairchild asserts that though he later moved toward an affirmative latitudinarianism, he wrote all his poetry except the Norse and Celtic paraphrases "against a background of witty contempt for institutional religion and of sceptical indifference to spiritual concerns," and really had the same kind of religion as his friend Horace Walpole, that is, none worth mentioning. Again, this may be so. Professor Fairchild has read Gray's letters more recently than I have, and has read them with this point in mind. But my recollection of the letters (which certainly are anything but sentimental) is a pleasant one of having been in touch with a mind that was melancholy, self-depreciatory, and irresolute, but definitely Christian, a mind very different from that which one meets in Walpole's letters, which a man sensitive to blasphemy can hardly read without pain. I think Johnson must have had something of the same feeling when he said (after reading Mason's selection from the letters) that Gray's life gave him more pleasure than his works. And Keble, as Professor Fairchild reminds us, regarded the *Elegy* as effective, though indirect, sacred poetry. One must be very cautious in inferring that the absence of explicitly Christian reference in a man's poetry means an absence of genuine Christian belief in his life.

It is largely for that reason that I regret the exclusion from the study of the poems of Dr. Johnson. He is passed over on the ground that his religious views are more explicitly presented in his prose, and that a

judgment based on his verse alone would be incomplete. (Goldsmith also is omitted.) In Johnson, one would suppose, Professor Fairchild would have found a closer approximation to the Christian orthodoxy he accepts as a norm than in any other important literary figure of the century. There is no doubt as to the fervor and pervasiveness of Johnson's piety: his absent-minded mutterings were scraps of Christian prayers. Yet I wonder if his major poems are much richer in explicitly Christian references than those of Collins or Gray. *The Vanity of Human Wishes,* his most sustained and serious work, is surely as "indirect" in its Christianity as Gray's *Elegy.* If it be retorted that explicitly Christian reference would have been out of place in a paraphrase of Juvenal, the answer is obvious: he was under no compulsion to paraphrase Juvenal. Is it not likely that, in the eighteenth century, as in the twentieth, this cleavage is common, and that one pretty often needs to go outside a man's poetry to discover his religious views? The decision not to study Johnson on the basis of his verse alone is obviously sound, but would it not have been better, in the case of a figure of such importance, to include him and present the religious ideas of his verse against the fuller statement to be found in his prose? The strict limitation of the material to verse has had one other unfortunate result: it has excluded Ossian, who seems to have been the most effective popularizer of sentimentalism in the entire period. But it may well be answered that, though the limitation of the material is somewhat mechanical, so much material is presented that the validity of the main conclusions is not likely to be impaired.

FREDERICK A. POTTLE

Yale University

A New Philosophy and the Philosophical Sciences. By APOSTOLOS MAKRAKIS. Volume I, *Introduction to Philosophy, Psychology, Logic, Theology, Philosophy.* Translated out of the original Greek by DENVER CUMMINGS. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940. xlviii + 843 pp. Volume II, *Ethics.* Translated out of the original Greek by ALBERT GEORGE ALEXANDER. xxix + 716 pp. Two volumes, $10.00.

It is very difficult to write a satisfactory review of this work, the chief product of the thought of Apostolos Makrakis, who was a thorn in the side of the Greek government and politicians as well as of the official

clergy, whom he denounced in no ambiguous terms, and of the University of Athens, which he attacked as a place of darkness in equally unstinted tirades. The book challenges many of the generally accepted conceptions of modern thought, and even though we do not accept the self-evaluation of the author as the modern Socrates or the over enthusiasm of his admirers, it still contains many points which must give the serious reader pause and make him review many of the fundamental postulants of his ideas.

Makrakis realized clearly one of the contradictions that are most frequent in modern religious and philosophical thinking. If it is true that Jesus Christ is the Redeemer of the world and the Second Person of the Trinity, the very incarnation and exponent of Divine intelligence and the goal of human life, how does it happen that most modern scholarship, including much that is called Christian, endeavors to develop a secular or non-Christian apparatus of critical and religious scholarship? Put in this way, the idea is preposterous, and it can be explained only by a latent unbelief in the divine message of Christianity. Of course Makrakis has no consideration for those persons who regard Christ as only a good man or a wise teacher. If Christ is to be judged on their terms, Makrakis would say that he was neither good nor wise. But Christ was God. We know about him from the Gospels and the Church, and both of these sources agree that he was God. Therefore our ideals of goodness and wisdom and holiness must be drawn from Him, and He is the very center of all studies that can guide in the training and development of humanity. Hence came the violent opposition of Makrakis to modern philosophy and the work of men like Descartes, Kant, etc. who endeavored to build up a purely secular learning. Hence, too, his opposition to the University of Athens and its professors of philosophy who taught this secular thought.

Once this is understood, we can follow the system of Makrakis without much difficulty. He repudiates the idea that the laws of thinking are independent of and irrelative to knowledge of the entities (Cf. Vol. 1, p. 197), and insists that all knowledge, religion, and ethics must be judged according to the traditions of the Church, with the object of developing a Christocratic society. He assumes the truth of the teaching of the Gospels, of the Church, and of the Fathers on the role of God and of Satan, the leader of the revolt against God and he also traces the history of man from childish ignorance to adult civilized life. In a

word, he has combined much of modern knowledge and science with that attitude of mind which prevailed during the period when the teachings of the Church were universally accepted.

His main difficulties with the Orthodox Church were relatively minor but were aggravated by his unyielding attitude on the weaknesses of nineteenth century Greek life. They were chiefly the insistence that man was composed of body, soul, and spirit, the last being a definite gift from God, and a tendency to believe that in some manner Christ was perfected or more fully developed after his Baptism by St. John the Baptist. These two doctrines were the chief ones cited by his opponents as heretical, and they are either true or susceptible to reconsideration in an Orthodox sense.

What we have, then, is an attempt to weld the various sciences of man and the cosmos into the traditional Christian doctrine, and on the whole Makrakis made an excellent fusion with what is considerable open-mindedness on details. At times, in his description of human life, he is too attached to the old order of things as in Volume II (pp. 188 f.), where he cites the marriage of Isaac and Rebecca as a model for arranged marriages and argues for their superiority over those brought about by the mutual feelings of the husband and wife.

There is little use in prolonging this review. The work will appeal to those people who accept the author's fundamental idea that the one goal of philosophy is to develop right reason, another synonym for the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity. It will be rejected at once by all those who do not accept the Orthodox Christian idea of Christ and the Trinity. His philosophy is purely Christocentric, starting from the three primary judgments, "I exist, the world exists, God exists" (Vol. I, p. 267), and can be summed up in the phrase, "Philosophy is the love and science of the God-equal Word, or Logos, leading to deification" (Vol. I, p. 21).

The editors and translators have done their work well and with few misprints, and they certainly deserve thanks for bringing to the attention of the scientific world of America this organized attempt to explain man in Christian terms. The author had no apologies for his faith. He believed that the Church alone could save Greece and the world, and that salvation could not come unless the pseudo-pagan education and thought of the world was abolished. Hence comes his polemical attitude against much that is commonly accepted at the present time

as science and scholarship. Perhaps Makrakis was a fanatic. Yet perhaps he was merely a sincere Christian who refused to be deluded by the words of modern unbelievers. At all events, he deserves to be studied, and studied carefully, by all those who would bring in a Christian civilization and see the hope for humanity in Christianity as it has always been considered by the Orthodox East.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

Personal Religion. By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. pp. xvi + 411. $3.00.

As in his *Social Religion,* so in this new volume Professor Macintosh has given the dry bones of empirical theology the warmth, vitality, and driving power of flesh and blood and spirit, for here is living religion, adequately critical, as he would say, and yet alive to the full demands of the abundant life in Christ.

The heart of this book is the meaning and function of evangelism in the world today, and the theme recurs in many variations, in an historical case study, in theology, in prayer, in missions, in the true church and ecumenism, in religious education, and finally in several modern movements. It is, perhaps, not even a complete picture of personal evangelism, but it serves as a complement to the approach to social religion as presented in his previous volume.

There is a long prelude in which the power of evangelical Christianity is traced through several generations of an unknown family. As history it has little value. As a typical case study of what evangelism can do for generation after generation, it is a powerful witness and a source of data for the remainder of the book. By means of letters and a recounting of historical connections, the "latter-day Puritans" are seen at their best. It indicates the sane evangelism which needs to be recovered by the modern, liberal evangelical.

The second chapter recounts the significant features of *Theology as an Empirical Science* as it has been developed in various volumes, with especial emphasis on those phases dealing with evangelicalism: Sin, Christ, Redemption, Conversion, and the Christian Life. The treatment of the first two are open to criticisms that have been made of all Macintosh's statements. But concerning redemption and conversion

he has many helpful things to say. "The trouble with the 'moral theory' of the atonement is not that it is moral, but that it is not moral enough. . . . Only the complete eradication of moral evil and the countering of its evil consequences can satisfy God, and nothing short of that should satisfy us" (p. 124). The atonement is not a

> finished work. . . . In its fulness, satisfaction of the righteousness and good will of God, in which full at-onement, reconciliation, must culminate, is not an event completed in the past, but an ideal for the future. God's necessary part in it will assuredly be performed; but whether all men will finally yield to the reconciling love and work of God remains to be seen (p. 127).

Both repentance and faith are involved in conversion, which is a final and comprehensive commitment to God, done "in dead earnest" and with or without emotional upheavals.

The chapter on prayer is properly titled, "Realism in Prayer." Dr. Macintosh makes it abundantly clear what we cannot expect prayer to do, both for ourselves and through intercession. This negative approach is especially valuable in the light of what he calls "trench religion," in which men pray only for their safety or the safety of their loved ones, and expect God to do the rest. The essence of prayer is to be found in the author's familiar "right religious adjustment," which has been the mainstay of his empirical theology. True prayer is answered, for it is always "the soul's sincere desire" to do God's will. In this sense the true Christian can pray without ceasing, and in the world God's will is done. Without sentimentality or appeal to doubtful coincidences, Professor Macintosh has presented a picture of prayer which makes it the dynamic center of Christian living, and which will appeal to all who have discarded the magic of many explanations of prayer.

The second half of the book deals with "The Propagation of Personal Religion." After an interesting survey of the changes in missionary theory and practice, of the present crisis in missions, and the suggested alternatives for today, the author falls back on his empirical theology as providing the way out. We cannot use universally the older, Christocentric, and westernized theology. Even *Re-Thinking Missions* does not have the answer. Quoting Kenneth Latourette as his authority, Dr. Macintosh makes an appeal for a *new evangelism* which will be based on Christianity "at its best" (which it has not been).

Concerning the Church, the author is fearful that its power is waning. The decline of evangelical Christianity is both the clue to the diagnosis and the cause. He is suspicious of most of the proposed reme-

dies, and comes back to evangelism as the cure, perhaps even the evangelism of the Oxford Group. Against Charles C. Morrison's view, he proposes to define the "distinguishing marks of the true Church of Christ" as "the participation in an evangelically Christian religious experience and the propagation of that experience in individual and social life" (pp. 251-52). There may be seven sacraments or more, and the traditional ones are *potentially* sacraments, depending on whether they are actually means of grace in their psychological effect. This extremely "low" view of the sacraments will prove unsatisfactory to many. He is skeptical about any organic union, but sees hope for a World Federal Council of Churches among the "evangelical *and ex-evangelical*" groups.

The chapter on religious education is an excellent summary of the present crisis, in which progressive methods must come to grips with the Christian faith or both may perish. " 'Democracy and Education' are not enough." The author asks: "Can it be that what 'religious education' has been doing has been inoculating our young people with a very mild form of religion which has made them all but immune to the more acute and dynamic form of Christianity which has tended to characterize those brought up by the methods of personal evangelism?" (p. 314). We do not need a revival of Anglo- or Roman Catholicism or Calvinism. Again—the answer is the "recovery of an effective personal evangelism . . . adapted to our times and to the peculiar situation which exists today" (p. 315). This would not eliminate Christian education and its methods, but would relate it to a more dynamic Christian living through a vital experience of commitment.

The final chapter deals at length with "Evangelism Today and Tomorrow." There is a deserved tribute to the evangelism among students at Yale in the time of Henry Burt Wright. There is a treatment of "guidance" which may or may not seem adequately critical to the average reader, followed by an interesting defense of the Oxford Group Movement. The interpretation made by Professor Macintosh indicates the same conclusion that one draws when he considers the attachment of Canon B. H. Streeter or Emil Brunner: Men who come into the groups already fortified with a sound theology and faith may find enrichment through the practices of the Group. Rarely does the amateur within the Group reach the critical appreciation and use of prayer which is so clearly outlined by Professor Macintosh in an earlier chapter. The book ends with a few case studies.

Of a book fundamentally sound and helpful, both for experts and for amateurs, there are three criticisms which might well be made: (1) The book is misnamed. Only partially is it a treatment of personal religion; it is a helpful approach to some of the problems of personal evangelism, and on that one subject it offers much rich wisdom and inspiration. The fundamental thesis is sound, that is, that unless we have an evangelical appeal suited to this century and the modern mind, the Christian religion will not be revitalized; unless we can instill the evangelical spirit into individual Christians, they will never be converted to thoroughgoing and courageous Christian living. But the author's practical suggestions do not seem to fill the requirements he has so ably set forth. Furthermore, this is not the whole story of the muddle we are in, even for personal religion, and I believe that Professor Macintosh would admit it, even though he does not say so in this volume.

(2) The book is one-sided. It assumes that a return to a sound evangelism will solve most of the problems facing us. What is wrong with missions—or religious education—or the Church—or individual Christians? And the simple answer is that we need more evangelism. Of course we do; but that is not the whole answer in any of these fields, and the author does not always do justice to some of the other proposals, such as the hope that resides in the Ecumenical Movement, and he ignores completely some other helpful developments, such as the revival of worship and the new sense of the nature and function of the Church.

(3) The book is not consistently critical. Of all American theologians, Professor Macintosh has been most cautious in his conclusions, and his theological method is guarded with critical apparatus. He is daring for all that, because he knows that dynamic religion has a habit of breaking the shells of the human mind. But to find in one volume such a variation of critical procedures as in the chapter on prayer, and those dealing with some aspects of modern evangelism (not just the Oxford Group), seems to this reviewer to be inconsistent.

These strictures must not keep anyone away from this fine volume. In it a modern, critical, liberal, evangelical Christian mind is at work forming the principles of a re-invigorated evangelism that is sorely needed by the world today.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

Church Divinity School of the Pacific
Berkeley, California

Invitation to Pilgrimage. By JOHN BAILLIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942, 134 pp. $1.50.

This little book by Dr. Baillie is addressed to educated and thoughtful laymen who may be "seeking a firm foundation for their life." It is offered to those who are aware of need for security in an unstable world, for eternal truths in an age of skepticism and atheism, for guidance at a time of bewilderment and despair. It is an apology for the Christian faith, written in the best of the author's fine style and with his usual certainty.

Dr. Baillie's argument is directed towards the "humanist," the man who is or was a believer in science and technology, in reason and progress, in his ability to achieve the good life without the benefit of the Christian religion (pp. 74 f.). He invites the humanist to take a fresh look at Christianity, to see if he has not rejected it through hasty thinking and misunderstanding. But first, he turns the attention of the latter not to the Christian faith but to the problem of the existence of God. He restates his favorite "moral argument." He insists (that is the right word) that man encounters God in the experience of absolute obligation. No sooner than we are able to say "I and thou," do we become aware of a conflict of wills, and confront an authority which transcends the will of man. Our self-will comes up against a "Greater Will," and our self-centeredness is face to face with a Center other than ourselves and other men. "As for the attempt to persuade me that the reality which constrains me is an *impersonal* reality, I can only answer that such a notion is plainly ruled out by the nature of the constraint itself (p. 45)." Thus our moral experience establishes indisputably that there is a personal God. Dr. Baillie does not really argue the existence of God; he "encounters" Him. Presumably those who do not find God in this way are either amoral or blind.

But Dr. Baillie does not think of God as One who has come merely "for a payment. The knock is a Saviour's knock, but we are so ready to think it a Taskmaster's (p. 48)." At this point it is not clear whether Dr. Baillie is appealing to the reader's moral consciousness or inviting him to believe the Gospel which "is the news of salvation." With an apologist's deftness, he passes from the appeal to experience to an invitation to faith. He offers the humanist the Christian proclamation of the good news of redemption through faith in Jesus Christ. Then he wonders: "What is it in us then, which would have us reject the

proferred divine salvation? It cannot, I am sure, be anything else than *pride* (p. 53)." The modern unbeliever's intellectual difficulties with the Christian religion makes no impression upon Dr. Baillie. He is so conscious of the pride and complacency of the humanist that he makes it his primary business to expose to the latter the mess he is in. If the modern man would only open his eyes to the tragedy of his situation, if he would only see the hopelessness of his quest for the good life, if he would only face the problem of his destiny in the cosmos, then he would recognize that the only way out for him is the Christian faith. Dr. Baillie has written some eloquent passages along this line (pp. 93 f., 117 f.), and posed once again the eschatological problem which a man can avoid only at the expense of his integrity as a human being.

However, we do not believe this book will bring an intelligent humanist one inch nearer the Christian faith. Dr. Baillie writes as though he has made very little effort to understand the intellectual difficulties in the way of Christian belief today. The humanist may be a "naughty child," but a theologian should argue, and not merely shake a stick. It is not enough to scold the unbeliever and to tell him that he is in a bad way. If it is not true that "these moderns differ from their forefathers only in being more wicked," as Dr. Baillie says, then it is high time that the Christian apologists make some honest effort to understand the modern unbeliever. What if modern atheism is an inevitable consequence of new insights into the nature of things? What if the modern man's knowledge of his world makes the existence of "the City" incredible? What if the unbeliever is an honest man who would rather despair than delude himself? In any case, it is the duty of the Christian apologist to *argue* with the unbeliever. Perhaps argument is futile. If so, let us admit that apologetics is futile. Perhaps the modern man can no longer be led to the Christian faith through either harangue or debate. It may well be that the first duty of the Christian missionary today is to make a genuine effort at understanding the modern mind from *within*, instead of a standing outside and fighting it with exhortation or bad argument. It is the judgment of this reviewer that so long as Christian theologians and philosophers of religion continue to write *against* the humanist, and refuse to look deeply into the roots of modern unbelief in our science and culture, Christianity and the modern mind will remain alien to each other.

Dr. Baillie has offered us an impressive "invitation to pilgrimage," but he has neither opened the gate to "the City" nor given us light for our journey.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

Presbyterian Theological Seminary
Chicago, Illinois

The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization. By RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1942. xix + 636 pp. $5.00.

This book of over six hundred pages is a critical survey of ethical thought from ancient Greece to the present. From this statement one should not, however, draw the conclusion that the book is probably too sketchy. Professor Tsanoff has the rare ability of saying much in relatively few words. His exposition is characterized by brevity, adequacy, and, on occasion, even eloquence. Furthermore, in his handling of the various historical movements and problems he centers at once upon the essentials, ignores speculative trivia, and avoids irrelevant exhibitions of erudition.

Naturally the book is not confined to the history of thought as it is found in the more technical histories of philosophy. Historically, ethical speculation and moral idealism have been associated with revealed religion, philosophical theories of reality, discoveries in the fields of the natural sciences, and, lately, statistical findings in sociology. Consequently Professor Tsanoff discusses such topics as biblical-historical criticism, Russian philosophy, Syndicalism, the Neo-Scholastic revival in France, Kierkegaard, Levy-Bruhl, Jane Addams, and so on. He does not suggest that the chronology of ethical thought is necessarily correlated with progress, either in the quality of moral idealism or in the clarity of ethical thinking. In the last chapter of the book, for example, he suggests that one of the outstanding differences between past and present moral philosophy is simply a difference in the source of confusion. Thinkers of the past tended to identify a single feature of the moral experience with the whole, in consequence of which virtue became identified with such things as happiness, loyalty, and even prudence and gregariousness. The modern tendency is to suppose that morality has been explained if one can give a factual account of the historical and sociological setting of accepted moral conduct, thus confusing ethics with sociology and psychology.

Professor Tsanoff always tries to relate ethical doctrine to historical background and the temper of the age without, however, confusing the two. Unfortunately, so he admits, these settings and backgrounds by no means form a complete picture. Moreover, to divide the history of our civilization into the customary three periods is somewhat arbitrary. We are likely to get a mistaken perspective as a result of over-emphasizing the significance of one or another of these periods—as was done, for example, by the old-fashioned liberals of the nineteenth century, who regarded modern times as a partial recovery of the "Glory that was Greece" after the tragedy of the "Dark Ages." In spite of these considerations, Professor Tsanoff successfully resists the temptation to invent a new philosophy of history.

Although we may suppose that there are no absolute breaks in history, nevertheless, according to Professor Tsanoff, history does exhibit the emergence of real differences. The rise of Christianity did bring about a new civilization; the Renaissance represented something more than merely a partial revival of Greece; and the Reformation, although it was nothing sudden, did transform the role and meaning of religion. Now all of this is so complex and, on the other hand, so much of the account is missing, that a serious attempt at a final explanation is out of the question. We see connections here and there, and we can frequently relate philosophies to critical events or changing conditions, but we too often face the mysteries, the contingent, the non-rational elements of life. Looking back we are not surprised that things happened as they did, nor would we have been surprised had they happened otherwise, or not at all.

Only occasionally, therefore, does Professor Tsanoff hazard an interpretation in the grand manner. For example, in his discussion of the Reformation he says that the doctrine of the infinite spiritual value of man bore no fruit until the soil had been prepared by critical thought and by political, social, and economic factors. What was this fruit? Simply the modern democratic ideal. Now this is dangerously close to saying that the ultimate significance of the history of Christianity is the realization of secular social and political democracy. Again, in his discussion of the beginnings of modern ethics (chap. v) he asserts that our civilization is a matter of some twenty-five hundred years. The end of the first thousand years (about A.D. 400) saw the dissolution of classical antiquity and the rise of papal Rome; and the end of the second

thousand saw the decline of papal Rome and the rise of the humanist and the reformer "proclaiming the new version of human life and the new vision and voice of God." Today we are in the middle of the third thousand years. May it not be that the twilight of materialism in which we are now moving will, in future centuries, be seen to have been the twilight before the dawn of some new revelation of human self-mastery?

Professor Tsanoff's critical review is apparently taken from the point of view of a secular liberal idealism. He appears to advocate "tolerant critical intelligence" and a "secular upbuilding of civilization." The revolt against medieval authoritarianism receives his approval, because it represents a "revolt of the critical intelligence," because it is in fact a revival of secularism, of experiment and speculation, and because it is a search not after truth revealed but after truth achieved. Again, his disposition is to distinguish religion and theology from philosophy, and to regard the latter as a secular pursuit whose field of interest includes the facts and problems of the various religious and ethical doctrines. Consequently, his basic problem is this. Assuming that moral perfection is the "normal unfolding of man's true nature," from the very nature of things how may the critical intelligence derive a moral standard which is objective, imperative, and universal? (in this connection see pp. 125-28).

As to Professor Tsanoff's positive ethical beliefs, we may hazard the guess that he has discovered in Friedrich Paulsen a kindred spirit. And, according to Paulsen, the moral law is the natural law not only in the domain of freedom but also and more especially in the "Kingdom of Ends." Inasmuch as all men are citizens of this kingdom, the "ought" is the expression of man's truest self. What is man's chief blessedness in this "Realm of Ends"? It is the "freedom of realized personality in the loyal devotion to ideals" (see pp. 397 f.).

In spite of Professor Tsanoff's critical standard—or it may be because of it—one senses, be it vaguely, an anticlimax following the eloquent and almost inspired account of the moral gospel of Jesus in chapter II. Certainly by the time one is well into modern philosophy and reads such chapters as "The Moral Gospel of Pessimism," or "The Realistic Reaction in German Thought" one feels that the author, although scholarly, is not enthusiastic. However, for this he can hardly be blamed. The old virtues are either compromised or merely given a different order of importance, and there is no new revelation. Nowhere

do we find the exalted transvaluation of values involved in the ethic of Jesus. Only the nihilists seem inspired and original. The appearance of anticlimax is not, of course, everywhere equally evident, but it is increasingly felt as one nears the end of the book, and in the last chapter it is definitely pronounced. This chapter contains a series of sketches of the views of a number of contemporary writers in the field of ethics, most of whom, because of a limited appreciation of the religous content of our moral traditions, and because of an unfortunate state of bewilderment due to the impact of the sciences, can hardly be expected to usher in the dawn of a new revelation.

The heart of the moral gospel of Jesus is this. Inasmuch as man—any man—, as an object of God's love, has a unique and infinite worth because in him there can be holiness, therefore man's duty is to love God above all else and to reverence the moral inviolability of others. Sublime as this conception is, nevertheless, according to Professor Tsanoff, we cannot account for the initial power of the Gospel if we overlook the "mystical regenerative spirit which possessed and transformed the Mediterranean peoples." This radical transformation is not explained by the theory that men, overwhelmed by the personality and spirituality of Jesus, attempted to imitate His life. Almost immediately after His death the Christian Church taught and stressed the doctrine of grace, the fundamental idea of which is the redemption of humanity by God in Christ, and not "human perfection by understanding and adopting the moral teachings of Jesus" (p. 43).

Was the doctrine of grace a later acquisition, something read into the message of Jesus by the early Church? Professor Tsanoff's answer is indefinite, although he does assert that after the development of the doctrine "the radical stirring power of the new moral ideals was still there transfiguring men's lives and men's individual and social outlook" (p. 43). What was the secret of the stirring power of these moral ideals? Professor Tsanoff's answer, that all this was accomplished by moral conviction plus the element of sacramentalism, seems unconvincing. Of course, he may have loaded the word sacramentalism with significant meanings, but since these are not stated we face a question. How was this radical moral conviction sustained so that, long after the death of the divine teacher, those converted to the Christian faith experienced a transformation and renewal of their lives? Just what happened to the disciples? We know by this time that mere moral teaching,

however exalted, is hardly enough to transform a dying civilization into a brilliant and vigorous new one.

Professor Tsanoff is, of course, concerned only with early Christian moral ideals, but it is doubtful that we can understand the *power* of these ideals without a clarification of the religious beliefs and practices of the converts. What, for example, was there about the Gospel that so deeply irritated and offended those who were not won by it? Why was Jesus himself so vindictively hounded by the religious leaders of his day? After all, no one objects to being reverenced because of his human dignity as an object of the love of God. Professor Tsanoff's account of the moral ideals of Jesus, fine as it is, leaves one with an uneasy feeling that there is something missing. It can't be the whole story.

Professor Tsanoff appears to be unusually disturbed about the tragic wrong-headedness of Duns Scotus, and he refers to the sins of Scotism in connection with later topics such as the undermining of Scholastic rationalism and the philosophies of Cudworth, Descartes, Locke, Cumberland, and others.

Briefly, the Scotist theory of virtue is that a life unexamined in the light of the *will of God* "is not worth human living." Inasmuch as perfect reason is an attribute of God's will, there can be no such thing as a universal "Reason" over and above God which He must and in fact does respect. God, having determined the very nature of things, is the source and author not only of man's reason but also of whatever "Reason" there is in the very nature of things. For man, therefore, "the beginning of all wisdom is the fear of the Lord."

These premises, so Professor Tsanoff reasons, lead to conclusions disastrous for truth and morals. If, with Duns Scotus, we say that a moral principle is good because God wills it, then we must conclude that if God had willed its negation, that would be good. If we believe that good and evil are simply matters of Divine fiat, then we virtually deny the possiblity of having fundamental principles with respect to "inherent good" or "inherent evil." And, in practice, this may easily lead to arbitrariness in moral doctrine and to unprincipled living.

Professor Tsanoff, therefore, believes that he can see a connection between Scotism and such unhappy events as the revival of nominalism, the excesses of the Italian Renaissance, the policies of Philip the Fair, the absolutism of Louis the Fourteenth, and the spirit of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. Also, according to Professor Tsanoff, by teaching that

Scholastic rationalism could prove nothing worth proving in theology, Duns Scotus divorced theology from philosophy and thereby virtually turned future generations from theology to things which presumably do admit of proof, namely, philosophy and science. Thus religion was abandoned to faith.

This estimate of Scotism seems a bit far-fetched. The Scotist doctrine of the primacy of the will of God states that God has willed and ordained the very nature of things. The doctrine unquestionably involves philosophical difficulties, but they are hardly the ones pointed out by Professor Tsanoff. Also, it is difficult to follow his reasoning when he asserts that Scotism conflicts with such ideas as "natural end," "rational devotion," and "inherent natural rights." For, as Scotus would say, if we have rights, then obviously God has willed them, and to neglect or go counter to the "light of reason" is to ignore the will of God.

Cudworth's statement that God cannot command as just that which in its own nature is unjust is, from the point of view of Scotism, the merest platitude. And the argument that God cannot make a triangle other than that which the conditions of triangularity demand hardly disposes of Scotus. The demands of triangularity are the demands of a definition, and, so Scotus might reason, a definition is an artifact the possibility of which depends upon the very nature of things as God has willed it. Therefore, the only question here is whether the definition, as an artifact, is useful in leading to a correct conception of things as they are, i.e., things as they reflect God's creative activity and, therefore, His will. From the point of view of Scotism, therefore, the statement that God cannot make the definition of a triangle identical with the definition of a circle would seem to be about as trivial as to say that an ostrich is not a rabbit. In short, for Duns Scotus, as for Christian theism and, ultimately, for Scholastic rationalism, the proposition that a thing is good because God wills it, and the proposition that God wills it because it is good, are identical.

Leaving aside the question of what can or cannot be "proved" even in philosophy and science, it does seem rather obvious that Scholastic rationalism proves no more about God, man, and the cosmos than do the secular philosophies of Aristotle or Leibnitz or Kant. And as for the unique elements of the orthodox Christian view of God and the world, where are the proofs for such doctrines as Creation, the Trinity, the Incarnation, Immortality, Vicarious Atonement, and so on? Is it

out of place to suggest that Professor Tsanoff would probably have had a much better case if he had associated Duns Scotus with the Protestant theologians of the Reformation instead of with Hobbes and Louis the Fourteenth?

Those of us who have been exposed, either directly or indirectly, to the influence of Vernon Parrington, Max Weber, and the Beards will be strangely surprised by Professor Tsanoff's treatment of Calvinism. If any proof of his balance and objectivity is needed, here it is. He doubts the theory that all the social, moral, and religious hypocrisies which have gathered about the system of acquisitive capitalism can be traced back to the sinister influences of the lawyer-theologian of Geneva. He does not believe that the ancient admonition to serve God even in one's daily calling and therefore not to be slothful in business, is responsible for the exploitation of primitive peoples and the poor.

Professor Tsanoff realizes, of course, that the Calvinistic emphasis, just as any other emphasis, carries with it peculiar dangers. Just as Catholicism involves "the hazard of a cleavage between religion and daily life," so radical Protestantism involves the danger of "invading worldliness." But the possible degenerations to which Calvinism may fall heir are not, after all, Calvinism, any more than democratic government polluted by bossism, the professional politician, the political machine, patronage, and the lobby is real democracy. Again, in his exposition of early American philosophy, Professor Tsanoff does not dismiss Jonathan Edwards by means of a few quotations from *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*—although it must be admitted that he does give poor Edwards an unnecessarily caustic little introduction. Incidentally, his exposition of Edwards' doctrine of the unfreedom of the will, although brief, is about as clear and persuasive as the human mind can possibly make a deterministic philosophy which asserts the reality of genuine moral responsibility.

However, Professor Tsanoff exhibits no real sympathy for the Calvinistic frame of mind, and his exposition of it shows, at best, an attempt to be fair. He admires Kant's awe in the presence of the moral law; he does not admire the Puritan attempt to apply that law to social and political life. He tells us that Calvinism suggests Mt. Horeb rather than the compassionate teacher and physician of Galilee; he does not associate Kant with Mt. Horeb, despite the fact that he admits that if humanity adopted Kant's ethics the world might become "an assembly of stern Puritans" (p. 396). He exhibits rare eloquence when delineat-

ing the moral gospel of Jesus. Yet that gospel preaches the doctrine that redemption is possible only after a "devastating sense of sin." One should suppose, therefore, that Calvinism would have appealed to him, if for no other reason than that it appears to be in fair company. For with Kant it upholds the grandeur of the moral law, and with Jesus it insists upon a devastating sense of sin. May we not conclude that the New England fathers, including Jonathan Edwards, are to be criticized for their bad psychology rather than for their unenlightened ethics?

Professor Tsanoff's exposition of the Kantian ethic is, generally speaking, clear and closely reasoned. Of course, there is little here that we have not heard before, but his discussion is so characteristically his own that any reader at all acquainted with Kant will almost certainly acquire a new perspective of an old argument. Occasionally Professor Tsanoff appears to be under the spell of Kant's expositional style. This is especially evident in his discussion of the postulate of freedom, in connection with which he considers the possible interpretations of transcendental freedom as related to empirical events (ch. xxi, part 6). Here his language is hardly an improvement upon Kant's own. In fact one does not quite escape the impression that this part of the exposition is probably a digest of a learned paper written for some technical journal of philosophy. Needless to say, none of the possible interpretations clear up the mystery of the relation between transcendental freedom and causally determined events. Incidentally, Professor Tsanoff's criticisms of Kant, especially those on pages 334 f. and 341, sound a bit like special pleading.

The first and last chapters of the book reveal an interesting correspondence between confused and sceptical Greece and the temper of contemporary civilization. Just before Greece produced its master philosophers it had its materialists, who urged escape from religious superstition by means of a more adequate knowledge of the facts of nature; its fatalists, who taught submission to a grim and impersonal World Reason; its sceptics, who offered "a counsel of expedience in a senseless world." We today have our materialists, the worshipers of science and the antagonists of earlier moral and religious convictions. They have made science synonymous with truth, and by means of its practical demonstrations, such as labor-saving and life-destroying devices, have conditioned even the uninformed to a naturalistic attitude.

We have the men of complete modernity to whom the past is dead. Earlier ethical and religious convictions no longer move them, and they have deliberately desecrated old shrines. Bewildered in their moral outlook, they yearn for the comfort of a new faith, for to remain seated among the ruins is intolerable. Because of a universal confusion and dissatisfaction, many are ready to follow any persuasive fanatic who resolutely steps ahead. Others merely refute old orthodoxies and seem content to fall back upon older heresies.

What is our hope? Well, as Professor Tsanoff suggests in another connection, we are in the middle of the third thousand years of our civilization. Something may turn up. Anyway, here is his parting message to those who will be responsible for the efficacy of future secular moral training:

> It may well be questioned whether moral education means teaching morals in special classes. If the schools are to develop character, a thoroughly moral spirit should take possession of the entire educational process. . . . This is not a problem of administrative or pedagogic details; it concerns the fundamental principles of the whole spirit of education. It likewise concerns the basic moral outlook upon life: not a partial but the integral view of significant human life as the rational organization of values (p. 577).

The book reflects wide learning and balanced judgment. As a rule, Professor Tsanoff strenuously tries to discern the truth (or half-truth) of a doctrine, to see the doctrine as it would be at its best. Incidentally, it is perhaps for this reason that his critical observations can be stated with clearness and brevity. Only occasionally do we find an extreme statement as when, for example, he asserts that the Reformation gave rise to a new form of authoritarianism based upon bibliolatry. This is an overstatement of a half-truth and not quite a balanced judgment.

The book has three parts: Part I reviews the history of moral ideals from Greece to the Reformation; Part II, from the Reformation to Rousseau; and Part III, from Kant to the present. Every chapter is adequately documented, and the sources, with rare exceptions, are of unquestioned authority. There is a table of contents and an index.

This review admittedly fails to do justice to what may be described as a first-class piece of work. All criticisms, whether stated or implied, must be regarded as almost wholly incidental, reflecting the limitations of the reviewer rather than any serious flaw in the book.

Cecil De Boer

University of Arkansas

BOOK NOTES

Tree of Life. Edited by Ruth Smith. New York: Viking Press, 1942, 496 pp. $3.50.

Of the making of anthologies there seems to be no end. Perhaps this particular period in our literary history may sometime be called the Anthological Period. This is not said in criticism of this kind of publication, although they are by no means all of equal merit or importance. There is certainly room for this and possibly various other anthologies in the field of the world's religions, of which there have been all too few until now. I recall that when I first began teaching the Literature of the World's Religions some fifteen years ago, there was no single volume anthology of merit to which I could refer my students but only such collections as *The Sacred Books of the East,* etc. It is gratifying that now there are a number of excellent volumes, each of which has its own peculiar merits. The choice of the title for this book, while perhaps poetic, is probably a handicap, because any one of a dozen kinds of books might go under such a title. Like that of *Tongues of Fire,* a valuable anthology of an earlier day, the title succeeds in telling just nothing about the nature of the book.

The Tree of Life is really an outgrowth of certain editorial work done by Miss Smith while assisting Robert Ballou in the preparation of his great volume, *The Bible of the World.* While there is no formal statement in the book that I can see which states the particular principle which guided the selection of material for the book, a paragraph from the author on the jacket declares that it is primarily designed for young people, with the hope that the reading of the selections might "promote the consciousness that 'all are children of the same Father.' If it does that, it will have taken its place with the forces that are now working for light against those that are trying to plunge us all into a dark eclipse." From an examination of the material included, it would seem to me that the readers would need to be pretty mature young people to get much out of a number of the selections. To be sure, Miss Smith does include a considerable body of story material, particularly concerning the earth's beginning as conceived by the different religious groups, and concerning great personalities of the various faiths, but it is likely to be much more appreciated by older folk than younger.

Obviously, no two editors would choose precisely the same material for such an anthology, even presupposing the same general purpose. On the whole, the selection is a happy one. Of course, no one will get a well rounded notion of various religions from the selection, but he will get some of the nobler phases of each of them, and it must be said that the book probably maintains a better balance of material, as far as space allowed to each is concerned, than the *Bible of the World.* The introductions to each of the sections are very brief and oversimplified. Even for rather young people a little more factual material about the books from which the selections are taken might have been better.

The text is not cluttered with footnotes, but the source of each fragment is indicated in an appendix and is quite detailed. A useful glossary of terms adds greatly to the value of the book, while the index of principal characters, places, subjects, and symbols is quite extensive.

The book is beautifully printed, and the illustrations by Boris Artzybasheff make it an exceedingly attractive volume, one that would grace the shelves of any lover of fine books. It should, of course, be in all libraries, public as well as college and university, and in the private libraries of those who have a live interest in the various faiths of the world.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

The Arabic Commentary of Yefet Ben 'Ali the Karaite on the Book of Hosea. Edited from eight Manuscripts, and provided with critical Notes and an Introduction, by PHILIP BIRNBAUM. Philadelphia: The Dropsie College, 1942. lxii + 247 pp., with two Facsimiles. $1.50.

The Karaites, as their very name, indeed, indicates, were of all Jews those who specialized in biblical studies, and naturally so, as their rejection of the Rabbinic tradition drove them back to the Old Testament as the sole source of authority in religion. For this reason, if for no other, their works of exegesis are of no little interest to the modern student. Several of their exegetes attained to some fame, and had considerable influence on the exegetic tradition, not only in the Jewish Schools, but also in the Christian Church. None of them, however, is more important in this respect than this Jewish Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (Yefeth is the Hebrew equivalent of the Arabic al-Ḥasan), who was as famous in his group as the Muslim al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī became among the Muhammadans.

Baṣra had been a great centre of philological and philosophical learning, whose teachers rivalled those of the even more famous centre at nearby Kūfa, and though we are told that Yefeth lived a great part of his active life in Jerusalem, we may not be far wrong in seeing the influence of the great Baṣran School of his early environment, not only in the strong Mu'tazilite influence discernible in his thinking, but also in his philological method.

Considerable work on Yefeth's Arabic versions and Commentaries has already been done: by Bargès on the Psalms and Song of Songs; by Günzig on Proverbs; by Margoliouth on Daniel; by Hirschfeld on Nahum; by Schorstein on Ruth; but this careful edition of the Commentary on Hosea is, perhaps, the best thing yet done on Yefeth. The Introduction, the main part of which had already appeared as an article in the *Jewish Quarterly Review,* discusses Yefeth's methods of exegesis, his attainments as a philologist, the influences which molded his thought, and the influence which he in turn exerted on later Jewish exegesis. The latter element cannot, perhaps, be put quite in the way the author puts it in his comparisons of Yefeth with Kimhi and Ibn Ezra. Seeing that Yefeth's own commentaries draw so largely on other earlier sources, it is not always clear that many of the parallels pointed out between his state-

ments and those of the later exegetes may not have come directly to these later writers and not through Yefeth. This is not to minimize his influence on both Jewish and Christian exegesis. This was undoubtedly great, and is the more remarkable when we remember how advanced for his times was his critical position with regard to the text, as when, for example in regard to this present book of Hosea, he states his opinion that the text of both Micah and Hosea has come to us only in an abridged form of the original prophecies.

Incidentally this Commentary provides a good deal of interesting material for the study of the Judeo-Arabic dialect on the tenth century.

A. J.

Who Crucified Jesus? By SOLOMON ZEITLIN. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. xv + 240 pp. $2.50.

Dr. Zeitlin's thesis is that the Jewish people were not responsible for Jesus' death either directly or indirectly. He was actually crucified by the Roman Government, to whom he was delivered by a Jewish "Quisling" group which functioned in fear of and subordination to the imperialistic power. The author's chief contribution, as he understand it, is the theory that there were two Sanhedrins in Jerusalem. The religious Sanhedrin, which truly represented the Jewish people, may have tried Stephen, but Jesus, Peter, and Paul were tried before a political Sanhedrin which was wholly the creature of the High Priests. The latter council met only at the behest of the High Priests, tried only alleged political offenders and was no more than a *rubber-stamp* court for the puppets of Rome. The Jewish people, therefore, were no more responsible for Jesus' death than the Norwegian people of the present are responsible for the death of the patriots executed by the Quisling government. Ultimately, the real sources of the evil which destroyed Jesus are imperialism and the destruction of small nations "which inevitably brought about their Pilates, their Quislings and their crucified victims."

This thesis is supported by an elaborate critical inquiry which uses the literature of the Jewish people, the New Testament, and later Christian writings. In so much as Dr. Zeitlin's book is historical inquiry, it requires point by point discussion not appropriate here. The reviewer finds himself unconvinced by much of the argument, especially that which concludes that there were two Jerusalem Sanhedrins.

The greatest difficulty which the book creates, however, lies not in realm of historical inquiry but in the realm of the interpretation of history. Nowhere does the book really come to grips with the dimension in which the New Testament moves, so that its thesis achieves no relevance to the Christian understanding of the Jewish problem. Liberal Judaism, in its fight against anti-Semitism, has a strong ally in true Christianity, but that support is in no way aided by Dr. Zeitlin's book. True Christianity understands that the responsibility for the crucifixion of Christ rests upon man as man. Jewish man is man on the religious level at which the real issue between God and

man appears in its full dimension. The stigma of crucifying Christ cannot be taken away from the Jews, therefore, without exempting them from the whole Christian understanding of man and human history. This stigma, however, gives no ground for anti-Semitism, since it is one which we all bear as unredeemed men. In so much, therefore, as the Jews are understood to have crucified Christ, Christianity has no special responsibility to place upon them in relation to other non-Christian peoples. In so much as Christianity does place responsibility upon Judaism, the responsibility cannot be dealt with except by conversion to Christianity, and this is true for all of us, as well as the Jews. This responsibility is not removable by historical inquiry but is, in Christ, accepted by man as God's just accusation.

According to profound Christianity, the responsibility for the crucifixion of Christ can be accepted by man only when man's opposition to God is robbed of its ultimate consequences by redemption in Christ. It is inevitable, therefore, that the responsibility be evaded by non-Christians, and it is merely an illustration of this truth that an elaborate evasion should come from the pen of a Jewish scholar. So long as men try to be good enough to be uninvolved in Christ's crucifixion, they will find another culprit who is responsible. Dr. Zeitlin shifts the burden from the Jewish people to Quislings and Imperialism. If these are regarded as accidents of history removable by human progress, then Jesus was merely a victim of a bad historical time and of humanly remediable human evil. To the Christian, this is naïve. If these are regarded as manifestations of a deep human malady from which man cannot free himself, then we all partake of that malady and have the alternatives of despair or Christian redemption.

A. T. Mollegen

John Ponet (1516?-1556) Advocate of Limited Monarchy. By Winthrop S. Hudson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. 246, 183 pp. $4.50.

Mr. Hudson has supplied an account of whatever can probably be learned concerning the shadowy figure of John Ponet, and he has reprinted in facsimile Ponet's *Shorte Treatise of politike power* of 1556. Born about 1516, Ponet began his career as one of the subordinate members of the group of Protestant humanists at Cambridge under Henry VIII. He presently became Cranmer's chaplain and secretary and then bishop, successively, of Rochester and Winchester. He was deprived on the accession of Mary, when he took some part in Wyatt's abortive rebellion, and fled to the continent. He settled with other Protestant refugees at Strassburg in 1554, where he composed his *Shorte Treatise* just before his death two years later. He was according to Mr. Hudson "the first person among the English Protestants—and indeed among the Reformed groups on the Continent as well—definitely to advocate resistance by the people to authoritarian government and to base this resistance upon constitutional principles." That is to say, Ponet anticipated Goodman, Knox, Hotman, and others in laying hold upon the ancient doctrine of the

responsibility of rulers to the people under the law of nature and to make use, in appealing to a popular audience, of scriptural proof in support of that doctrine. His immediate object was to justify and to foment Protestant rebellion against Catholic Mary. Thus he took his place at the head of a long line of apologists for the people's right, and Mr. Hudson has performed a useful service in so clearly establishing that fact. Such priority, however, remains Ponet's chief claim to be remembered. Both in the statement of the general principles involved and in the handling of biblical argument, he was so quickly surpassed by writers so much better known and so much more greatly gifted that he was little regarded. His work, originally published at Strassburg, was not reissued in London until 1639, and the first person to make direct reference to it was Prynne in 1643, who, to be sure, made a practice of referring to almost everything he could find in print. Nevertheless, we may well agree with Mr. Hudson that it is impossible to believe that Ponet was utterly without effect in the succeeding age, during which his ideas became the commonplaces of revolution.

WILLIAM HALLER

Education in New Jersey, 1630-1871. By NELSON R. BURR. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1942. x + 355 pp. $3.75.

The appropriateness of reviewing what appears to be a local work on education in a journal devoted to religion will be apparent immediately to readers who examine Dr. Burr's excellent volume. This study, which is the fourth to appear in the Princeon History of New Jersey, is greatly enriched by the author's comprehensive knowledge of American religious history, and the scope of the book is far greater than the history of private and public education as we now know it.

Education came to New Jersey first from the schoolmasters of the various races and sects which settled in that province, and much of the story in this volume is concerned with the insistence of each racial group and sect on preserving and perpetuating its own language, customs and peculiar brand of Christianity under frontier conditions. Inefficient and deplorable as this system seems to us, it is nevertheless part of our background, and Dr. Burr has done a fine job in tracing down each tradition and element from its European origin to recent times. One or more chapters are devoted to the Dutch and their churches and schools, culminating in Rutgers and the New Brunswick Seminary; the Lutheran Swedes, the Quakers, the Anglicans, the Moravians, the Baptists, the Methodist, the Roman Catholics and the Jews. The history of Princeton University is traced back through the Log College to its origins in the Great Awakening. Chapters on the academies and the common schools bring the story down to the legislative action in 1871 which "brought New Jersey at last into the full current of the American public-school system." Each section is well-rounded and written with feeling.

It is hardly necessary to point out the scholarly character of this work, since

it is a revision of the author's doctoral thesis at Princeton; it should be said, however, that the book is fully annotated, that it contains an excellent and extensive bibliography, and that the index has passed the severest tests of the present reviewer.

MILTON HALSEY THOMAS

We Believe. By JOHN J. MOMENT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942; v + 134 pp. $1.25.

Many crucial problems for modern Chrisian faith and nurture center around the difficulties involved in rendering adequately the traditional credal formulas into terminology which is both faithful to the original and meaningful to twentieth-century believers. One group within the Church has sought to cope with this problem by avoiding it and has taught the "faith once for all delivered" in its ancient expressions, with little attempt at clarification of terms beyond "literal" meanings, and has thus been responsible for crude misconceptions which lead to intellectual revolt on the part of its more intelligent constituency. Another group has dealt with the problem by manufacturing new meanings from contemporary fads of thought and artificially attaching them to the traditional symbols. In this readable little volume, a wise minister chooses what many will feel to be a more fruitful approach through a more faithful rendering of the traditional words in their original meanings as these relate to modern thought-forms.

A large part of the brief study is devoted to a lucid summary of some of the shades of meaning intended in the Trinitarian formula. Misunderstandings associated with the evolution of *prosopon, persona,* and "person," and of *hypostasis, substantia,* and "substance" are pointed out, and the lengthy writings and councils of the Fathers in protecting the faith from various forms of heresy are made more intelligible to the modern layman. Indeed, he may even come to feel that the matter of the *iota* at Nicaea really involved the future course of Western culture!

There is a brief chapter on the history of the three most familiar creeds, and the creeds themselves are printed in the Appendix. In view of the present cultural crisis the author has also inserted a chapter on "Man in the Creeds," in which he maintains that the true basis for the democratic conception of man is to be found in the Christian formulas. Some readers may feel that his interpretation of the *imago dei* and the Fall, and his sympathy for Pelagius, represent an exaggerated appreciation of one side of the tradition. But the book as a whole contains a minimum of doctrinal interpretation and is admirably suited for wide distribution among intelligent and inquiring laymen (and ministers!). It may serve to make basic Christian theological terms sound less like "foolishness to the Greeks" who dominate most of our modern thinking.

J. A. MARTIN, JR.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Oriental Religions

One Word Preserves a Nation. By David Lin. *World Dominion,* xxi (1943), 104-7.

The Cultural Importance of Taxila in Ancient India. By N. G. A. Edgley. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlviii (1943), 75-80; 124-28.

Compassion. By George Harrison. *Buddhism in England,* xvii (1943), 123-24.

The Middle Way, a symposium. *The Middle Way (formerly Buddhism in England),* xviii (1943), 8-13.

Jnana Panchami (A Jain Holy Day). By Popatlal P. Shah. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1943), 362-64.

What Is Hinduism? By Suniti Kumar Chatterji. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlviii (1943), 40-44.

Manu and His Educational Philosophy. By Debendra Chandra Dasgupta. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlviii (1943), 128-34; 199-204.

The Gita Theory of Action: A Study in the Light of Hormic Psychology. By P. S. Naidu. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1943), 298-300; 329-35.

The Puranas and the Theory of Human Evolution. By V. R. R. Dikshitar. *Aryan Path,* xiv (1943), 27-31.

The Yoga of Kundalini. By Mahendra Nath Sircar. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlviii (1943), 101-106; 149-56.

Acharya Sankara and Meister Eckhart. By Swami Jagadiswaranda. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1943), 347-49; 372-76.

Sat, Chit, Ananda. By James Bissett Pratt. *Personalist,* xxiv (1943), 181-89.

Shelley and the Vedanta. By Diwan Bahadur T. Bhujanga Rao. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1943), 359-62.

Where are Your Haunts of Consciousness? By Judith Tyberg. *Theosophical* xxi (1943), 202-7.

Maya in Modern Science. By Swami Sharvananda. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlviii (1943), 49-54, 96-99.

Science and Spirituality. By Charles Baudouin. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1943), 266-70.

Castes and Saints. By the Editor. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlviii (1943), 68-75.

The Spiritual Basis of Social Life. By the Editor. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlviii (1943), 166-72.

Islam the Religion of Muhammad. By William Thompson. *Moslem World,* xxxiii (1943), 86-113.

The Spiritual Significance of the Tragedy of Karbela. By M. Hafiz Syed. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1943), 302-5.

The Doctrine of Reincarnation in Persian Thought. By Margaret Smith. *Aryan Path,* xv (1943), 10-15.

Al-Bukhari and the Aggada. By W. R. Taylor. *Moslem World,* xxxiii (1943), 191-202.

The Distinctive Dress of Non-Muslims in Islamic Countries. By ILSE LICHTENSTADTER. *Historia Judaica,* v (1943), 35-52.

Ṣafar Ablutions in Malacca. By R. A. BLASDELL. *Moslem World,* XXXIII (1943), 140-42.

In Defense of the Veil. Translated by CHARLES R. PITTMAN. *Moslem World,* XXXIII (1943), 203-12.

Islam in "Arabia Deserta." By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER. *Moslem World,* XXXIII (1943), 157-64.

Present-Day Movements in Islam. By ARTHUR JEFFERY. *Moslem World,* XXXIII (1943), 165-86.

The Islamic World in and after the War. By A. YUSUF ALI. *Religions,* No. 43 (April, 1943), 18-21.

JUDAISM

The Image of the King: An Introduction to the Books of Samuel. By KENNETH C. EVANS. *Christendom,* VIII (1943) 362-73.

A Symposium: The Message of the Prophets for Our Day. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* XI (1943), 88-106.

Jesus and Jewish Exclusiveness. By JOHN STUART CONNING. *Religious Digest,* XVI (1943) No. 92, 24-28.

"Soldiers on Service": The Draft Among the Hebrews. By S. VERNON MCCASLAND. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXII (1943), 59-71.

The Bible between the Testaments. By WILBUR LARREMORE CASWELL. *Chronicle,* XLIII (1943), 197-99.

Allusions to the Apostle Paul in the Talmud. By HARRIS HIRSCHBERG. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXII (1943), 73-87.

Ginsburg's Studies on the Palestinian Talmud. By SOLOMON ZEITLIN. *Jewish Quarterly Review,* XXXIII (1942-43), 83-88, 419-34.

The Tree of Life in Proverbs. By RALPH MARCUS. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXII (1943), 119-20.

Moses Cohen Belinfante: A Leader of Dutch-Jewish Enlightenment. By SALO W. BARON. *Historia Judaica,* V (1943), 1-26.

Palestinian Messengers in America, 1849-79. By SALO W. AND JEANNETTE BARON. *Jewish Social Studies,* V (1943), 115-62; 225-92.

The American Passover. By DAVID DE SOLA POOL. *Current Religious Thought,* III (1943), No. 4, 6-8.

A Pen Portrait of Peretz Smolenskin. By GRACE GOLDIN. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 9, 8-11.

Peretz Smolenskin's Contribution to Jewish Thought. By DAVID POLISH. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 9, 11-19.

Is the Hebrew Language Indispendable to Judaism? By LOUIS BARISH. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 10, 21-29.

Kelal Yisrael—a Democratic Concept. By ARIO S. HYAMS. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 10, 13-17.

Judaism and the World Today. By GEORG SALZBERGER. *Religions,* No. 43 (April, 1943), 11-17.

We Are History. By MAX WIENER. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 4, 14-18.

Diaspora *vs.* Exile. By EMANUEL GAMORAN. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 8, 12-16.

The Failure of an Investigation. By JOSHUA BLOCH. *Protestant,* IV (1943), No. 11, 53-60.

CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL

The Historical Gospel. By MARY E. ANDREWS. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXII (1943), 45-57.

The Date of the Last Supper. By SAMUEL I. FEIGIN. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXV (1943), 212-17.

"The First Resurrection" and "the Second Death" in the Apocalypse. By W. ROBINSON. *Theology,* XLVI (1943), 97-102.

Early Christian and Jewish Art. By ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. *Jewish Quarterly Review,* XXXIII (1943), 403-17.

New Testament Criticism and Christology. By CHARLES RAMSEY. *Christian Horizons,* V (1943), No. 4, 2-5.

The Lord of Life. By EDMUND D. SOPER. *Religion in Life,* XII (1943), 336-43.

The Doctrine of the Trinity: Its Development, Difficulties and Value. By R. D. RICHARDSON. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVI (1943), 109-34.

Tertullian and Montanism. By R. GREGOR SMITH. *Theology,* XLVI (1943), 127-36.

Christianity and Other Religions. By FRANK W. BEARE. *Christendom,* VIII (1943), 341-52.

The Apostle of Algeria: Raymond Lull, 1236-1315. By the EDITOR. *Modern Churchman,* XXXII (1943), 329-36.

Ulysses in Hell: An Episode in the *Divine Comedy.* By SIR WILLIAM MUNDAY. *Hibbert Journal,* XLI (1943), 235-40.

A Reply: The Demonstration of God's Existence. By HERBERT T. SCHWARTZ, T.O.P. *Thomist,* VI (1943), 19-48.

The Wisdom That Is Mary. By CHARLES D. DEKONICK. *Thomist,* VI (1943), 1-18.

Our Lady's Part in the Redemption According to Seventeenth Century Writers. By J. B. CAROL, O.F.M. *Franciscan Studies,* XXIV (1943), 3-20; 143-58.

Touching for the King's Evil. By JOHN TODD. *Modern Churchman,* XXXII (1943), 298-307.

The Teleological Approach to Spinoza. By RAYMOND J. MCCALL. *New Scholasticism,* XVII (1943), 134-55.

A Century of Anglican Social Thought. By RONALD PRESTON. *Modern Churchman,* XXXII (1943), 337-47.

A New Reformation. By W. R. INGE. *Hibbert Journal,* XLI (1943), 201-9.

Holy Baptism. By R. P. MCDERMOTT. *Theology,* XLVI (1943), 78-83.

The South Indian Scheme of Union. By the EDITOR. *Theology,* XLVI (1943), 73-78.

The 'Hinduism' of the Kerala Christians. By P. J. THOMAS. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLVIII (1943), 44-49.

Church and State in England and Scotland. By G. H. STEVENSON. *Theology,* XLVI (1943), 122-27; 150-55.

The Scottish Disruption and Reunion, 1843-1929. By W. STANFORD REID. *Christendom,* VIII (1943), 318-29.

Toward the Understanding of Kierkegaard. By PHILIP MERLAN. *Journal of Religion,* XXIII (1943), 77-90.

Abraham Lincoln and the Disciples. By FREDERICK D. KERSHNER. *Shane Quarterly,* IV (1943), 61-71.

CHRISTIANITY: CONTEMPORARY

Ante la Crisis Mundial. Manifesto de Católicos Europeos que Peregrinan en América. *Luminar,* VI (1943), 58-74.

Report from Mexico. By IGNACIO DIAZ MORALES. *Liturgical Arts,* XI (1943), 60-65.

Roman-Catholic Anti-Sovietism. By EDWARD FALKOWSKI. *Protestant,* IV (1943), No. 11, 7-11.

Maude Petre (1863-1942). A Memorial Tribute. By JAMES A. WALKER. *Hibbert Journal,* XLI (1943), 340-46.

History and Doctrine: Norway and Holland. By WENDELL Q. HALVERSON. *Union Review,* IV (1943), No. 3, 22-24.

Fundamentalist Catholicism: An Open Letter to an Anglo-Catholic. By THEODORE O. WEDEL. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXV (1943), 161-81.

Quickening Pace of the Concordat Controversy. *Chronicle,* XLIII (1943), 174-77.

World-Wide Co-operation. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. *World Dominion,* XXI (1943), 172-75.

The Ministry in the World Today (Church Congress Syllabus VII, Part 4). By W. NORMAN PITTENGER. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXV (1943), 195-203.

Our Place in the Great Church (Church Congress Syllabus VIII: "The Anglican Tradition," Part 1). By E. R. HARDY, JR. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXV (1943), 295-303.

The Basic Faith of Liberal Christians. By FREDERICK M. ELIOT. *Journal of Liberal Religion,* IV (1943), 171-83.

Method and the Future of Theology. By MERLE WILLIAM BOYER. *Journal of Religion,* IV (1943), 195-205.

The Churches Shift on War. By ROLAND H. BAINTON. *Religion in Life,* XII (1943), 323-35.

The Christian Witness in the Economic Order. By A. E. YOUNG. *Christianity and Society,* VIII (1943), No. 2, 12-17.

The Common Convictions of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians. By A. T. MOLLEGEN. *Christianity and Society,* VIII (1943), No. 2, 22-28.

General Theory of Religion

The Holy Dimension. By Abraham Heschel. *Journal of Religion,* xxiii (1943), 117-24.

The Mystery of Time in the Mirror of Faith. By Richard Kroner. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxv (1943), 204-11.

The Cognitive Quest for God. By William H. Bernhardt. *Journal of Religion,* xxiii (1943), 91-102.

The Teleological Approach to Spinoza. By Raymond J. McCall. *New Scholasticism,* xvii (1943), 134-55.

Answers to the Problem of Suffering: Buddhist, Jewish, and Christian. By Walter M. Horton. *Current Religious Thought,* iii (1943), No. 5, 20-25.

God and the World's Evil. By Milton Steinberg. *Reconstructionist,* ix (1943), No. 6, 9-16.

Free Will and Fate. By Wm. Pepperell Montague. *Personalist,* xxiv (1943), 175-80.

The Nexus of Humility. By Rowland Gray-Smith. *Journal of Religion,* iv (1943), 212-17.

The Poison of Subjectivism. By Clive Staples Lewis. *Religion in Life,* xii (1943), 356-65.

A Critique of the Principle of Continuity. By Joseph Haroutunian. *Religion in Life,* xii (1943), 374-88.

Mythology and Modernism. By K. C. Varadachari. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1943), 271-74.

The Gospel and Community Change. By Harold Thomas. *Congregational Quarterly,* xxi (1943), 122-30.

Is the Separation of Church and State an Illusion? By W. Lyndon Smith. *Christendom,* viii (1943), 306-17.

The State Makes War, Not the Church. By Principal W. Robinson. *Hibbert Journal,* xli (1943), 250-57.

The Duties of the Non-Combatant. By Nathan A. Barack. *Reconstructionist,* ix (1943), No. 7, 15-18.

Democracy and Our Religious Heritage. By Frederick Burkhardt. *Humanist,* iii (1943), 19-23.

Symposium: Pro and Con the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. *Humanist,* iii (1943), 24-38.

Personalism in Latin America. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman. *Personalist,* xxiv (1943), 147-62.

Metaphysical Method. By Stephen C. Pepper. *Philosophical Review,* lii (1943), 252-69.

The Scientific Evidence for a Future Life. By G. N. M. Tyrrell. *Hibbert Journal,* xli (1943), 226-34.